'Truthful mechanisms' presentation slideshows

Mechanisms with Verification

Mechanisms with Verification. Carmine Ventre Teesside University. M = (A, P ). Mechanism design. Principal. Agents. When do you pay?. Do you pay?. Mechanisms with verification.

524 views • 40 slides

Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions

381 views • 27 slides

Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions

275 views • 27 slides

Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions

276 views • 27 slides

A Prior-Free Revenue Maximizing Auction for Secondary Spectrum Access

A Prior-Free Revenue Maximizing Auction for Secondary Spectrum Access. Ajay Gopinathan and Zongpeng Li IEEE INFOCOM 2011 , Shanghai, China. The Secondary Spectrum Market. We require an auction protocol for secondary spectrum access that is Revenue -Maximizing Strategyproof (truthful)

396 views • 23 slides

Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions

Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions. Paolo Penna and Carmine Ventre. Already on these screens. Concept of mechanisms with verification Construction of optimal mechanisms w/ verification

360 views • 23 slides