'Social choice function' presentation slideshows

769 views • 57 slides

Group Decision Making

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EC9A4 Social Choice and Voting Lecture 2

EC9A4 Social Choice and Voting Lecture 2. Prof. Francesco Squintani f.squintani@warwick.ac.uk. Summary from previous lecture. We have defined the general set up of the social choice problem. We have shown that majority voting is particularly valuable to choose between two alternatives.

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Characterizing Mechanism Design Over Discrete Domains

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Lecturer: Moni Naor

Algorithmic Game Theory Uri Feige Robi Krauthgamer Moni Naor Lecture 10: Mechanism Design. Lecturer: Moni Naor. Announcements. January: course will be 1300:-15:00 The meetings on Jan 7th, 14th and 21st 2009. Recap social choice.

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SECOND PART: Algorithmic Mechanism Design

SECOND PART: Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Mechanism Design. MD is a subfield of economic theory It has a engineering perspective Designs economic mechanisms like computer scientists design algorithms, protocols, systems Goal : to implement desired social choices in a strategic setting

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Computational Social Choice and Moral Artificial Intelligence

Computational Social Choice and Moral Artificial Intelligence. Vincent Conitzer, Duke University IJCAI-ECAI 2018 tutorial. comsoc mailing list : https://lists.duke.edu/sympa/subscribe/comsoc. Lirong Xia (Ph.D. 2011, now at RPI). Markus Brill (postdoc 2013-2015, now at TU Berlin).

330 views • 31 slides

SECOND PART on AGT: Algorithmic Mechanism Design

SECOND PART on AGT: Algorithmic Mechanism Design. The implementation problem.

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SECOND PART: Algorithmic Mechanism Design

SECOND PART: Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Implementation theory.

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Mechanism Design

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Design of Mechanisms for Dynamic Environments

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Design of Mechanisms for Dynamic Environments

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Elections and Strategic Voting: Condorcet and Borda

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Mechanism design and the provision of public goods

Mechanism design and the provision of public goods. Ilaria Petrarca. Players of the mechanism. Principal : tax autority (government) Agents : taxpayers. The principal. The principal would like to condition her actions on some information that is privately known by the agents

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Social Choice Lecture 16

297 views • 15 slides