'Incentive compatible' presentation slideshows

Internet-Based Auctions and Markets

786 views • 68 slides

On the Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin & Cryptocurrency

On the Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin & Cryptocurrency. Loi Luu Joint works with Jason Teutsch , Raghav Kulkarni , Ratul Saha , Inian Parameshwaran , Aquinas Hobor & Prateek Saxena National University of Singapore. Bitcoin is becoming more important.

594 views • 58 slides

Issues on the border of economics and computation ?????? ????? ????? ??????

Issues on the border of economics and computation ?????? ????? ????? ??????. Speaker: Dr. Michael Schapira Topic: VCG and Combinatorial Auctions II. Quick Recap. Mechanism Design Scheme. types. reports. t 1. r 1. t 2. r 2. outcome. payments. t 3. r 3. Social planner.

413 views • 32 slides

Motivation for On-Line Auctions

Competitive Analysis of Incentive Compatible On-Line Auctions Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan SISL/IST, Cal-Tech Hebrew University. Motivation for On-Line Auctions. Example: auctions are useful for allocating bandwidth. Transmissions arrive over time, each transmission lasts all day.

473 views • 29 slides

Performance Incentives and the Dynamics of Voluntary Cooperation

361 views • 29 slides

Machine Learning for Mechanism Design and Pricing Problems

Machine Learning for Mechanism Design and Pricing Problems. Avrim Blum. Carnegie Mellon University. Joint work with Maria-Florina Balcan, Jason Hartline, and Yishay Mansour. [Informs 2009]. Auctions/pricing.

456 views • 28 slides

Machine Learning for Mechanism Design and Pricing Problems

Machine Learning for Mechanism Design and Pricing Problems. Avrim Blum. Carnegie Mellon University. Joint work with Maria-Florina Balcan, Jason Hartline, and Yishay Mansour. [Informs 2009]. Auctions/pricing.

286 views • 28 slides

COS 444 Internet Auctions: Theory and Practice

COS 444 Internet Auctions: Theory and Practice. Spring 2008 Ken Steiglitz ken@cs.princeton.edu. ?. Moving to asymmetric bidders. Efficiency: item goes to bidder with highest value Very important in some situations!

353 views • 26 slides

Sponsored Search

Sponsored Search . Presenter: Lory Al Moakar. Outline. Motivation Problem Definition VCG solution GSP(Generalized Second Price) GSP vs. VCG Is GSP incentive compatible? GSP has a Nash Equilibrium formed of market clearing prices.

271 views • 26 slides

Interdomain Routing and Games

Interdomain Routing and Games. Hagay Levin, Michael Schapira and Aviv Zohar The Hebrew University. On the Agenda. Motivation: Are Internet protocols incentive compatible? Interdomain routing & path vector protocols Convergence issues BGP as a game

244 views • 24 slides

Algorithmic mechanism design

Algorithmic mechanism design. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. Algorithmic mechanism design. Mechanisms should be accompanied by an efficient algorithm for computing the outcome May not be easy

375 views • 15 slides

Elizabeth Hoffman, Dale J. Menkahus, Dipankar Chakarvarta, Ray A. Field, Glen D. Whipple

Using Laboratory Experimental Auctions in Marketing Research: A case study of new packaging for fresh beef. Elizabeth Hoffman, Dale J. Menkahus, Dipankar Chakarvarta, Ray A. Field, Glen D. Whipple Marketing Science , 1993 Presented by Jong Min Kim. Introduction.

287 views • 15 slides

Issues on the border of economics and computation ?????? ????? ????? ??????

232 views • 14 slides

Tuomas Sandholm Professor Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University

194 views • 6 slides

Tuomas Sandholm Professor Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University

210 views • 6 slides

Tuomas Sandholm Professor Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University

63 views • 6 slides

Mechanism Design for Airport Traffic Planning

Mechanism Design for Airport Traffic Planning. Geert Jonker, John-Jules Meyer, Frank Dignum Utrecht University. Airport Traffic Plan Repair. Properties. Incentive-compatibility: motivate agents to be honest. Clark Tax: pay if you change the outcome. Efficient and incentive-compatible.

64 views • 6 slides