'Algorithmic mechanism design' presentation slideshows

On the Hardness of Being Truthful

On the Hardness of Being Truthful. Michael Schapira Yale University and UC Berkeley. Joint work with Christos Papadimitriou and Yaron Singer (2008), and with Elchanan Mossel, Christos Papadimitriou and Yaron Singer (2009). On the Agenda. Algorithmic mechanism design

549 views • 46 slides

Non-linear objectives in mechanism design

582 views • 46 slides

Blackbox Reductions from Mechanisms to Algorithms

Blackbox Reductions from Mechanisms to Algorithms. Nicole Immorlica, Northwestern U. & MSR. Algorithm Design. Input v. v 1. v 2. MACHINE SCHEDULING. Feasibility constraints on outcome space. SET COVER. ASSIGNMENT. Output x. v 3. v 4. v 5.

538 views • 46 slides

Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions

Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. Speaker: Michael Schapira Joint work with Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan. Hebrew University. Algorithmic Mechanism Design.

381 views • 38 slides

SECOND PART on AGT: Algorithmic Mechanism Design

SECOND PART on AGT: Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Game Theory vs Mechanism Design (in poor words).

325 views • 32 slides

Algorithmic Mechanism Design: an Introduction

Algorithmic Mechanism Design: an Introduction One-parameter mechanisms, with an application to the SPT problem Guido Proietti Dipartimento di Ingegneria e Scienze dell'Informazione e Matematica University of L'Aquila guido.proietti@univaq.it.

445 views • 30 slides

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Network Problems

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Network Problems. Rahul Sami. Ph.D. Dissertation Defense. Advisor: Joan Feigenbaum. Committee: Ravindran Kannan Arvind Krishnamurthy Scott Shenker (ICSI & Berkeley).

428 views • 30 slides

VC v. VCG: Inapproximability of Combinatorial Auctions via Generalizations of the VC Dimension

VC v. VCG: Inapproximability of Combinatorial Auctions via Generalizations of the VC Dimension. Michael Schapira Yale University and UC Berkeley. Joint work with Christos Papadimitriou and Yaron Singer (2008) and Elchanan Mossel, Christos Papadimitriou and Yaron Singer (2009).

345 views • 26 slides

Piotr Krysta University of Liverpool, UK Orestis Telelis AUEB, Greece

252 views • 12 slides

Mix and Match

Mix and Match. Itai Ashlagi , Felix Fischer, Ian Kash , . Ariel Procaccia (Harvard SEAS). Kidney Exchange. Many types of kidney disease require transplantation Potential donors sometimes incompatible with patient Pairs of incompatible donor-patient pairs can sometimes exchange kidneys

483 views • 12 slides