SubVirt: Implementing malware with virtual machines

1. SubVirt: Implementing malware with virtual machines Presented by Boris Yurovitsky boris.yurovitsky@gmail.com

2. The Paper • SubVirt: Implementing malware(*) with virtual machines • By • S. King, P. Chen University of Michigan • Y. Wang, C. Verbowski, H. Wang, J. Lorch Microsoft Research • Appears On • 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy • (*) Malware – malicious software Topics in Information Security 2007

3. Presentation Outline • Introduction • Virtualization Technology • VM-Based Rootkit Implementation • Defense Topics in Information Security 2007

4. Rootkit Introduction • A tool used to hide malicious activities • Goals of the Attacker • More capability • Less visibility • Goals of the Defender • Detect • Prevent Topics in Information Security 2007

5. Some History Introduction Topics in Information Security 2007

6. Current State Introduction Whoever controls a lower level – wins Rootkits and detection SW migrate to lower layers Both stop at the OS level Whoever is smarter – wins Attackers must sacrifice functionality for invisibility Topics in Information Security 2007

7. Virtualization Manage underlying hardware Provide an abstraction of a virtual-machine Common practices Run several OSes on the same system Test and Debug Live machine migration Virtualization Topics in Information Security 2007

8. Virtual Machine Introspection Virtualization • The Semantic Gap • VM: disk blocks, network packets, memory • Guest SW: files, TCP connections, variables • Read guest OS symbol and page tables • Use breakpoints to control execution • Invoke guest OS or application code Topics in Information Security 2007

9. VMBR – a new class of rootkits Implementation • Virtual Machine-Based Rootkit (VMBR) • Use the virtual-machine technologies • Gain maximum control • Allow arbitrary malware yet stay invisible Topics in Information Security 2007

10. VMBR Implementation I Implementation Topics in Information Security 2007

11. Installation Implementation Topics in Information Security 2007

12. Installation – contd. Implementation • Acquire root level access • Exploit remote vulnerability • Corrupt a software / bootable image on a P2P network • Save to persistent storage • Use the file system • Use low-level access • Modify boot sequence (and avoid detection) • Run at shutdown • Take over the low-level disk controller Microsoft Security Bulletin MSxx-xxx:“A remote code execution vulnerability exists in … that could allow remote code execution on an affected system. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by … An attacker … could take complete control of an affected system.” Topics in Information Security 2007

13. VMBR Implementation II Implementation Topics in Information Security 2007

14. Malicious Services Class I – No interaction with the target system Spam relays Phishing servers (*) Distributed DoS zombies Implementation • (*) denotes services implemented by the authors Topics in Information Security 2007

15. Malicious Services – contd. Class II – Observe the target system Hardware Key loggers (*) Packet Monitor Using VMI Intercept SSL packets before encrypt Scan for sensitive data (e. g. ~user/.ssh/id_dsa) (*) Implementation Topics in Information Security 2007

16. Class III – Deliberately modify the target system Can either modify HW level data or use VMI Examples: Modify execution of target applications (*) Modify network traffic Malicious Services – contd. Implementation Topics in Information Security 2007

17. VMBR Implementation III Implementation Topics in Information Security 2007

18. Maintaining Control Implementation • VMBR has full control of the system while powered up. • No control from system power-up until load of the VMBR • User can boot from an alternate media • Avoiding power-up • Emulate restarts – only restart the VM (*) • Alternate boot media is loaded under the VMBR! • Avoid complete shutdown (*) • Emulate shutdown using ACPI Topics in Information Security 2007

19. VMBR Implementation IV Implementation Topics in Information Security 2007

20. Performance System performance is hardly affected About 3% RAM usage for the Virtual PC-based VMBR Video intensive applications may suffer degraded performance Solution: graphics card doesn’t have to be virtualized… Implementation Topics in Information Security 2007

21. Performance – contd. Implementation • All times are given in seconds • All measurements have variance less than 3% Topics in Information Security 2007

22. Security Below the VMBR Defense • Hardware based defense • Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology (formerly LaGrande) • AMD’s platform for trustworthy computing initiative • Copilot – PCI-based integrity monitor • Secure boot from CD or network • Do not forget to unplug… • Secure VMM • Detect and prevent VMBRs at the installation stage Topics in Information Security 2007

23. Security Above the VMBR Defense • Detect VMM impact on the system • Memory: VMBR can hide memory usage by paging • Disk: VMBR can hide disk usage by emulating bad blocks • CPU: VMBR can slow down target’s clock • Run benchmarks against wall-mount clock • Detect modifications to I/O drivers • VMBR can emulate only what it needs Topics in Information Security 2007

24. Conclusions • VMBR is a new form of a layer-below attack • VMBRs can provide features unavailable to traditional rootkits • VMBRs are easy to implement • VMBRs are difficult to detect and remove • Future of VMBRs • Widespread use of virtualization • Hardware support for virtualization Topics in Information Security 2007

25. Thank You Topics in Information Security 2007

26. Home Assignment • What are the advantages of a VM-based rootkit over an OS level rootkit from the attacker’s point of view. • If complete control over the hardware is achieved, why VMI is still required? Discuss the differences between HW level based and VMI based key loggers. • Suppose a secure file system is deployed on the host. Would user data remain secure from a malicious service running within a VMBR? Explain. • How hardware support for virtualization would affect VMBRs? • boris.yurovitsky@gmail.com Topics in Information Security 2007