On the untraceability of anonymous rfid authentication protocol with constant key lookup
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On The Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup. Presented By Professor LI Yingjiu. Outline. Background Review the BMM protocol in AsiaCCS’08 Crack the Protocol by three-run interleave attack Crack the supply chain based on our attack

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On The Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup

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On the untraceability of anonymous rfid authentication protocol with constant key lookup

On The Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup

Presented By Professor LI Yingjiu


Outline

Outline

  • Background

  • Review the BMM protocol in AsiaCCS’08

  • Crack the Protocol by three-run interleave attack

  • Crack the supply chain based on our attack

  • Improve the BMM protocol

  • Conclusion


Background

Background

  • It is still a challenge to balance the security and scalability.

  • For example,

    • The OSK protocol needs O(N) hash calculation.

    • Numerous protocols based on tree-structure suffers from de-synchronization attack and compromising attack.

  • It is emergent to setup a protocol balancing both the security and scalability.


Bmm protocol in asiaccs 08

BMM protocol in AsiaCCS’08

  • Burmester, Medeiros and Motta (BMM) proposed an RFID authentication protocol with constant key-lookup to balance the security requirement and scalability.

  • The protocol is based on challenge-response technique.

  • Guarantee spoofing attack, replay attack, de-synchronization attack, etc..


Overview of bmm protocol

Overview of BMM Protocol


Initiate system

Initiate System


Mutual authentication

Mutual Authentication

  • Tag Reader


Update process

Update Process

  • Tag Reader


Three run interleave attack

Three-run Interleave Attack

  • This attack can trace the same tag by ‘ps=r’.

  • The reason is updating ‘ps’ inappropriately.

  • Include three steps.


Three run interleave attack run 1

Three-run Interleave Attack---Run 1


Three run interleave attack run 2

Three-run Interleave Attack---Run 2

Not Update ‘r’


Three run interleave attack run 3

Three-run Interleave Attack---Run 3


Discussion

Discussion

  • Note that in the third run, a different challenge c’’ could be used by a trusted reader to challenge the tag. As long as the ‘r’ value is not updated in the second run, the ‘ps’ value is still the same as the one in the first run.


Crack the whole supply chain

Crack the Whole Supply Chain

  • Three assumptions:

    • Trusted zone

    • One-time authentication

    • Sticky adversary

  • Two attack strategies:

    • Trace a single tag

    • Trace multiple tags


Crack a supply chain system based on bmm protocol

Crack a Supply Chain System Based on BMM Protocol


Trace a single tag

Trace a Single Tag


Trace multiple tags

Trace Multiple Tags

  • Adversary’s database for tracing multiple tags


Improve bmm protocol

Improve BMM Protocol


Conclusion

Conclusion

  • Under a weak adversary model, an attacker can launch a three-run interleave attack to trace and identify a tag.

  • Attackers can crack the whole supply chain using BMM protocol.

  • We improve BMM protocol to prevent tags from tracing.

  • The improved Protocol is same efficient as BMM protocol.


On the untraceability of anonymous rfid authentication protocol with constant key lookup

Thanks

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