the National Security Strategy

1. the National Security Strategy

2. Vital interests Threats Resilience

3. ALL-HAZARD APPROACH

4. NATIONAL SECURITYthe ‘Dutch definition’ 5 vital interests: Territorial security Phsyical safety Economical security Ecological security Social and political stability Societal disruption All-hazard approach Safety and security

5. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY GOAL: To increase our national resilience through insight in threats and capabilities • Multi-sector approach • Ministries remain primarily responsible – for prevention and preparation and – in cooperation with the ministry of Security and Justice – for response • Ministry of Security and Justice is primarily responsible for crisismanagement • Government-wide cooperation based on equality • Public-private cooperation

6. WORKPROCESS Which threats do we face? What is the impact? What do we need to do? What do we need to have? Threat/Risk Analysis Risk Assessment Tasks Capabilities Policy initiatives Strategic foresight Short-term analysis National Risk Assessment Capabilities Analysis Political Decision

7. ACTORS INVOLVED

8. Scenario Impact Likelihood RISK RISK: likelihood and impact

9. 10 IMPACT CRITERIA 1. Territorial security 2. Physical safety 3. Economical security 4. Ecological security 5. Social and political stability 1.1infringement of territorial integrity 1.2 infringement of the international position of the Netherlands 2.1 fatalities 2.2 seriously injured or chronically ill 2.3 physical suffering (lack of basic necessities) 3.1 costs 4.1 longterm impact on environment and nature (flora & fauna) 5.1 disruption of everyday life 5.2violation of the democratic system 5.3 social-psychological impact

11. Uncertainties in riskassessment Experts should state source of know-how (e.g. empirical data) Available empirical data may not be rejected, replaced or removed Experts should differentiate between uncertainties (due to a lack of knowledge) and differences of opinion between experts Records should be kept of all references, sources assumptions and uncertainties used by experts

12. WORKPROCESS Which threats do we face? What is the impact? What do we need to do? What do we need to have? Threat/Risk Analysis Risk Assessment Tasks Capabilities Policy initiatives Strategic foresight Short-term analysis National Risk Assessment Capabilities Analysis Political Decision

13. CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS GOAL: Identifying capabilities that help reduce the impact and/or likelihood of a threat. General capabilities The capabilities analysis primarily identifies capabilities that have a positive effect on more than one type of threat.  reasons are: cost-efficiency and also covering unknown threats

14. POLICY INITIATIVES TRADITIONAL PARADIGM Prevention Preparation Response Recovery RESILIENCE

15. ACTORS INVOLVED • All ministries: • Responsible ministry leads capabilities analysis • Secretariat by NCTV • Experts: • Private sector and critical infrastructure companies • Thematic experts (e.g. social media) • Other bodies of government: • Local/Regional • International • Societal organisations and civilians

16. WORKING TOGETHER Different responsibilities – Common interest To avoid societal disruption • Government: Prevent fatalities and injury and prevent a loss of confidence in government • Private sector: Prevent loss of income/profit/customers • Individuals: Prevent personal losses (cash, gas/water/electricity)

17. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY • Yearly report to Parliament about: • The National Risk Assessment • Priorities (based on Capabilities analysis) • Progress on previous priorities • Interdepartmental cooperation: • Interdepartmental Workinggroup on National Security (IWNV) • Steeringgroup National Security (SNV) • Council on Safety and Security • Council of ministers

18. IWNV SNV IWNV SNV IWNV SNV MR Roles: Decision making & Advice Workinggroup Capabilities Analysis E.g.: Network of Analists Ministries Thinktanks Safety Regions Network of Analists Coregroup IWNV Steps workprocess Choosing themes Scenario-development Risk assessment Capabilities Analysis Policy Initiatives ADVICE & DECISIONMAKING PER STEP

19. QUESTIONS?

20. PRIVATE SECTOR & CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE Critical infrastructure sectors: products, services and underlying processes that, if interrupted, can cause societal disruption The dependency of society on these (mostly) basic needs is a reason to take extra measures. Critical infrastructure in NL: 12 sectors, partly public, mostly private companies What is expected of C.I.-sectors? Resilience, garanteed continuity, prevention of disruption Mutual aim: to avoid losses as a result of discontinuity Mutual interest: shared notions of possible risks and ‘solutions’

21. CIVILIANS & SOCIETAL ORGANISATIONS • Openness to the public on risks: • Risk map on the internet: www.risicokaart.nl • Mass communication campaign • Resilience of citizens • Public participation (encourage citizens to act) • Implementing a cell-broadcast system • Cooperation with societal organisations: • Red Cross & Orange Cross (Disaster response and first aid) • Educational organisations • Knowledge & advice organisation for post-disaster psychosocial care • Center for Crime-prevention and Safety

22. THE INTERNATIONAL CONNECTION • International attention for risk-analysis is rising: • EU (guidelines for risk assessment) • NATO (Civil Protection Committee) • OECD (future global shocks) • UN (ISDR-Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015) • Similar approaches in different countries (UK, France, Germany, Norway, Canada, The Netherlands) • But many different ways of organising the process • Exchange on methodology, process and outcomes • Exchange of experiences, also in crisissituations