1 / 45

R&D efforts during crisis and beyond: Some lessons from NEMESIS simulations

R&D efforts during crisis and beyond: Some lessons from NEMESIS simulations. Arnaud Fougeyrollas, Pierre Haddad, Boris le Hir, Pierre le Mouël et Paul Zagamé WIOD CONFERENCE VIENNA- May 26-28, 2010. Outline. The NEMESIS model 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis

rusti
Download Presentation

R&D efforts during crisis and beyond: Some lessons from NEMESIS simulations

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. R&D efforts during crisis and beyond: Some lessons from NEMESIS simulations Arnaud Fougeyrollas, Pierre Haddad, Boris le Hir, Pierre le Mouël et Paul Zagamé WIOD CONFERENCE VIENNA- May 26-28, 2010

  2. Outline • The NEMESIS model 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis 3- A new scenario for 3% Barcelona objective 4- Increasing R&D effort: doubling FP8 5- Redeployment of European budget towards R&D 6- Conclusions

  3. 1-The NEMESIS Model: 1.1-General dynamic Physico Economic interdependancies Energy/Environment Module Regional Module (Gives results for NUTS 2 regions) NEMESIS Core economic model Land-Use module -Transport - Urban - Agriculture Agriculture module (Detailed agriculture production function)

  4. 1- The NEMESIS Model 1.1-General dynamic • IntersectoralEconomicInterdependancies: up to Knowledge • (30 sectors) • Price and substitution effects on final demand • Exchange of goods and services for production (input-output) • Intermediary • Capital • Knowledgespillovers • Strongheterogeneity of sectorsfrom a dynamic point of view (employment, knowledge, Environment, Energy…) • Economictrack: the result of stronginterdependancies of most progressive sectors (I.C.I, biotechnologies, and lessones (some services, agriculture)

  5. 1-The NEMESIS Model 1.1-General dynamic • Macro-sectoral (hybrid) • Bottom-up sector approach: GDP, revenues are the sum of sectors • Top down: macro Economic Saving Consumption arbitrage • Hybrid result: dynamic loop is generally sectoral: productions, prices, investment, employment, revenues but with a macroeconomic feedback by consumption • Complex result for the dynamic

  6. 1- The NEMESIS Model 1.1-General Dynamic • International interdependancies • 27 distinct models for Europe • Simplified models for Areas of rest of the World • International exchanges of goods and services • International knowledge spillovers

  7. 1- The NEMESIS Model 1.2- Econometric based mechanisms • Econometrics • Mainly on chronological data or panel data (sectors, countries) • Based on implicit maximisation behaviour, (utility profit) but not on explicit maximization conditions and with a choice of relationship based on econometric criteria • Then different from applied general equilibrium approach that is based on: • Maximization • Calibration • Eqilibrium on every market

  8. 1- The NEMESIS Model 1.2-Econometric based mechanisms • A compromise theory /data • Applied modelling is always a « compromise » between : • Theory • Data and facts • The compromise for econometric modelling is nearer data and facts than general equilibrium one

  9. 1- The NEMESIS Model 1.2- Econometric based mechanisms • Inconvenients • Can be rejected by strict orthodoxy • No explicit utility functions and then impossibility to calculate surplisses variations associated to policies • Dependant on statistics availability that is not case for G.E.M. aprroach that is calibrated

  10. 1- The NEMESIS Model 1.2-Econometric based mechanisms • Advantages • Modelling is more based on data recent tendencies and in this sense « more realistic » • Allow forecasts and easier link with the present conjoncture conditions for the start of Baseline • Allow easier adaptation to specific mechanisms (pricing for zero marginal cost activities)

  11. 1- The NEMESIS Model 1.2-Econometric based mechanisms • Advantages (following) • Structure more « flexible » allowing easy removal of mechanisms • More adaptable to heterodox theories • Suited for prospective of « break through scenario ».

  12. 1- The NEMESIS Model 1.3-The central rôle of « knowledge economics » • Three main variables • R&D expenditures and R&D stocks • Spillovers and technical Knowledge (T.K.) • Human capital

  13. 1- The NEMESIS Model 1.4. Externalities and knowledge spillovers

  14. 1- The NEMESIS Model 1.5-Sectoral and national results for knowledge performance • = elasticity for KNOW performance • increasing with R&D intensity in the sector i and the country j with

  15. 1- The NEMESIS Model • 1.5-Sectoral and national results for R&D performance • But sectoral knowledge spillovers very heterogeneous - Emitting sources - Reception • Then for sectors and countries • Identity for private rate of return • Heterogeneity of social rate of return

  16. 1- The NEMESIS Model 1.6-The use of NEMESIS • Energy • Environment, GHG, other pollutions • Agriculture and land use • R&D and knowledge Economics: • 3% barcelona • FP (7-8) • New National Action Plan for R&D

  17. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis 2.1- R&D effort is lowering during crisis (procyclical): • Countercyclical view: • Need for efficiency • Opportunity cost • Bental and Piled (1960) • François Lloyd Ellis (2003) • But majority for pro-cyclical view: • Financial contraints • Demand driven • François Lloyd Ellis (2009)

  18. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis • 2.2- The durability of crisis • Short term effects of crisis: DG ECFIN (Fall prospect)

  19. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis • 2.2- The durability of crisis • Evolution of GDP in pre- and post-crisis forecast scenarios

  20. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis • In the new forecast, NEMESIS is constrained in 2008, 2009 and 2010 to reproduce DG ECFIN GDP prospects. • After 2010, NEMESIS shows that the effects of crisis are durable: The GDP gap increases up to 2025 and after

  21. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis • 2.2- The durability of crisis • Average growth rates of production in pre- and post-crisis forecast scenarios

  22. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis • 2.2- The durability of crisis • Evolution of employment in pre- and post-crisis forecast scenarios

  23. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis • 2.2- The durability of crisis • Evolution of Employment is different than for GDP: The employment gap of 2010 is half filled in 2015 • The lowering of wages during crisis allows a growth richer in employment during the economic recovery

  24. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis • 2.3- The research for economic recovery • Post-Crisis scenario with countercyclical R&D (3): • Increase of R&D effort up to 3% GDP in 2020 • Additional R&D financed mainly by private sector such as to reach 2% private financing in 2020

  25. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis • 2.3- The research for economic recovery

  26. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis • 2.3- The research for economic recovery • 43% of GDP gap is filled in 2025 • but GDP growth is faster and GDP gap reduced compared to the post-crisis scenario without counter-cyclical R&D

  27. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis • 2.3- The research for economic recovery

  28. 2- R&D policies are useful during crisis • 2.3- The research for economic recovery • The employment Gap is almost filled in 2015. • The reduction of wages during crising stimulates employment, the increase in R&D effort boosts growth: Economic recovery is rich in jobs creation

  29. 3- A new scenario for Barcelona 3% objective • Former assessment in 2002 for EU15 • Extension to new member States • New agenda • Crisis

  30. 3- A new scenario for Barcelona 3% objective

  31. 3- A new scenario for Barcelona 3% objective GDP and its counterparts in the 2002 assessment for EU15

  32. 3- A new scenario for Barcelona 3% objective GDP and its counterparts in the new Barcelona scenario for EU27

  33. 3- A new scenario for Barcelona 3% objective • Crisis reduces R&D efforts in the model in 2009 • The new assessment shows less deficits in the first phase due to low inflationary pressure in reason of: • High unemployment rate • Low production capacity utilisation rate • In the long term the major driver for GDP growth are first exportations and second final consumption • It was the reverse in the former assessment • The lowering of wages during crisis stimulates external competitiveness but hampers final consumption

  34. 4.1- Characteristics of the FP: Small share of R&D effort of the European countries: 0.054% of EU GDP in 2009 Up to potentially 0.076% in 2013 (according to the F.P. 7 financial scheme) 1.9% for total R&D effort 4- Increasing R&D effort : doubling the FP8 (1/4)

  35. 4.1- Characteristics of the FP But generates strong incentives (crowding-in effects): Networks effects Best practices transfer High productivity Then doubling FP in 2020 FP will be 0,15% of EU G.D.P. The total R&D effort raises by 0,18% of G.D.P. (1/6 of Barcelona effort) 4- Increasing R&D effort : doubling the FP8 (2/4)

  36. 4.2-Economic consequences 4- Increasing R&D effort : doubling the FP8 (3/4)

  37. 5.1- Redeploying part of CAP direct supports ( ≈ 16%) towards the FP in order to double it leads to an increase of G.D.P and employment: 1.2% additional GDP in 2025 1 million (0.48%) more jobs in 2025 5- Redeployment of European budget towards R&D 37

  38. 5- Redeployment of European budget towards R&D 5.2-But with important adjustment costs for agriculture: • Production -0,14 • Arable land -0,46 • Employment -2,3 • Revenu -2,45

  39. GDP

  40. 6- Conclusion • R&D policies seem to be more adapted to today economic situation deeply impacted by the crisis: • Pulling up the European economy while inducing only limited deficits and inflationary pressures • A better way out of the crisis with a fast catching up of employment and a lower one of G.D.P., compared to their potential level before crisis

  41. 6- Conclusion • The implementation of other structural policies like GHG reduction could also give more breathing space for increasing the R&D effort incentive policies: ex. recycling of the auctionning revenus of the EUTS permits

  42. 6- Conclusion • The results presented here are macro economic at EU level • The different results at a detailed level or countries and sectors highly differenciated regarding the R&D efforts and knowledge spillovers are interesting

  43. 6- Conclusion • The future developments of modelling are on: • The use of new databases (EU-KLEMS and WIOD for productivities, input output tables in order to make new estimations • Deepening of externalities and Knowledge spillovers • General purpose technologies (ICT,…) • International spillovers • New simulations on R&D policies

  44. 6- Conclusion • The main message for WIOD is : • The feasibility of simulations of a detailed interdependent econometric system • The need for new databases and the first results of WIOD will be welcome

  45. 6- Conclusion Thank you for your attention! afougey@ecp.fr lemouelp@ecp.fr Paul.zagame@ecp.fr

More Related