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From «  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the

From «  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation Agreements ». The purpose of these guidelines is to provide an analytical framework for the most common types of horizontal cooperation. Nature of the agreement

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From «  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the

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  1. From «  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation Agreements » The purpose of these guidelines is to provide an analytical framework for the most common types of horizontal cooperation.

  2. Nature of the agreement 21. The nature of an agreement relates to factors such as the area and objective of the cooperation, the competitive relationship between the parties and the extent to which they combine their activities. These factors indicate the likelihood of the parties coordinating their behaviour in the market

  3. Market power and market structure 27. The starting point for the analysis is the position of the parties in the markets affected by the cooperation. This determines whether or not they are likely to maintain, gain or increase market power through the cooperation, i.e. have the ability to cause negative market effects as to prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods and services. To carry out this analysis the relevant market(s) have to be defined….

  4. If the parties together have a low combined market share , a restrictive effect of the cooperation is unlikely and no further analysis normally is required

  5. In addition to the market position of the parties and the addition of market shares, the market concentration, i.e. the position and number of competitors, may have to be taken into account as an additional factor to assess the impact of the cooperation on market competition.

  6. Depending on the market position of the parties and the concentration in the market, other factors such as the stability of market shares over time, entry barriers and the likelihood of market entry, the countervailing power of buyers/suppliers or the nature of the products (e.g. homogeneity, maturity) have to be considered as well.

  7. Economic benefits The first condition requires that the agreement contributes to improving the production or distribution of products or to promoting technical or economic progress. As these benefits relate to static or dynamic efficiencies, they can be referred to as .economic benefits.. Economic benefits may outweigh restrictive effects on competition.

  8. OFT – Cartels – A Guide for purchasers Cartels are a particularly damaging form of anti-competitive activity. Their purpose is to increase prices by removing or reducing competition and as a result they directly affect the purchasers of the goods or services, whether they are public or private businesses or individuals. Cartels also have a damaging effect on the wider economy as they remove the incentive for businesses to operate efficiently and to innovate.

  9. Although responsibility for detecting and stamping out cartels lies with the OFT, cartels often operate secretly and we rely heavily on information provided by others, notably the purchasers of the goods or services concerned. This means that purchasers in the public and private sectors have a particularly important role to play.

  10. How can you spot a cartel? You are generally well placed to notice when your suppliers are deviating from normal competitive practices. There are a number of signs that may indicate that a cartel is operating. Some examples are where suppliers: • raise prices by the same amount and at around the same time • offer the same discounts or have identical discount structures • quote or charge identical or very similar prices • refuse to supply a customer because of their location, and • use give-away terms or phrases, such as – ‘the industry has decided that margins should be increased’ – ‘we have agreed not to supply in that area’, and – ‘our competitors will not quote you a different price.’

  11. The presence of these signs does not necessarily mean that a cartel is operating. Some, such as simultaneous price changes or similar prices, can be perfectly consistent with normal competitive responses in the market place. However, you should be particularly suspicious where several of the signs are present.

  12. Some sectors may be more susceptible to cartels than others because of their structure or the way in which they operate. For example, a cartel may be more likely to exist in an industry where: • there are few competitors • the products have similar characteristics (which leaves little scope for competition on quality or service) • communication channels between competitors are already established (eg, trade associations), and • the industry is suffering from excess capacity or there is general recession.

  13. What else can you do to help tackle cartels? The best defence against secret cartels is to be alert to the fact that they exist and to operate an effective purchasing policy that takes this into account. You may find it helpful to make clear in your dealings with suppliers that you are well aware of the temptations of cartel activities but are on the lookout for signs of price fixing or market sharing and will bring any suspicions of such activity to our attention.

  14. ARE CARTELS STABLE?

  15. uncertainty as the primary cause of cartel instability Lure of collusive profits: strong incentive to reduce that uncertainty

  16. create new rules, including governance and compensation systems that raise the quality and credibility of information and better align individual firm incentives with those of the group

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