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8 November 2006

Recruitment into Managed Courts during Political Chaos: Japan in the 1990s By J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen. 8 November 2006. Theory.

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8 November 2006

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  1. Recruitment into Managed Courts during Political Chaos: Japan in the 1990sBy J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen 8 November 2006

  2. Theory 1. Each person decides to apply to become a judge based on salary, alternative jobs, personal taste (error term), and whether the judiciary is conservative (a post-1993 dummy). 2. The judiciary accepts the most talented applicants, where talent means going to Tokyo and Kyoto and having low Flunks. This is a mixture of supply and demand.

  3. Data 1. A sample of 1,605 private attorneys who began their careers between 1971 and 2001. (population, 21,000) 2. The population of judges who began their careers between 1971 and 2001 who were still judges in 2004. We want to see why some LRTI graduates became private attorneys, some judges. So an observation is the decision the person made in the year he graduated, his college, his age then, international trade volume that year, etc.

  4. Talent Variables U. Tokyo--- =1 if the person has an undergrad degree U. Kyoto--- similar Flunks– number of years between college graduation and entering LRTI.

  5. Private lawyers Histograms of Flunks Judges

  6. The Test A simplified version: Judge = A UTokyo + B UTokyo*Post93 + C InternationalTrade If 1993 increased or reduced the attractiveness of the judiciary, the interaction term will be significant.

  7. Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics A. Mean university and flunk figures, change over time: 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-92 1993-97 1998-99 1. Judges -- means, followed by n: U Tokyo .258 (365) .231 (359) .326 (291) .260 (346) .234 (162) .215 (506) .204(191) U Kyoto .110 (365) .131 (359) .079 (291) .054 (346) .006 (162) .004 (506) .000(191) Flunks 3.40 (361) 4.02 (359) 3.99 (290) 4.73 (339) 5.66 (152) 4.54 (495) 3.48(454) (flunks not 98-99, but 98-01) 2. Lawyers -- means, followed by n: U Tokyo .177 (226) .162 (234) .148 (271) .169 (172) .309 (55) .182 (154) .270(74) U Kyoto .062 (226) .085 (234) .089 (271) .093 (172) .055 (55) .084 (154) .081(74) Flunks 5.97 (226) 6.40 (234) 7.30 (271) 8.30 (171) 6.98(52) 7.27(155) 5.25(181) (flunks not 98-99, but 98-01)

  8. Table 1-b Probability of becoming a judge, by Flunk score Flunks 1971-92 1993-2001 0-5 .26 .34 6-10 .09 .20 11-15 .04 .06 16-20 .03 .02

  9. Table 1-c: control variables 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 Judges Salary** 17.32 18.93 19.19 20.45 21.79 23.14 Total Trade** 4.514 6.560 8.240 6.556 7.809 8.390 Per Cap GDP** 1.870 2.156 2.711 3.092 3.839 3.947 Unemployment (%) 1.2 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.1 3.4 (constant dollars)

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