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Domestic Sources of Russian Foreign Policy

Domestic Sources of Russian Foreign Policy. Cultural, ideological and psychological perceptions of the world. ---Mikhail Gorbachev. Liberal Perceptions.

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Domestic Sources of Russian Foreign Policy

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  1. Domestic Sources of Russian Foreign Policy Cultural, ideological and psychological perceptions of the world

  2. ---Mikhail Gorbachev

  3. Liberal Perceptions “As Russia enters the 2007-2008 elections cycle, there is no question that it has a czarist political system, in which all major decisions are taken by one institution, the presidency, also known as the Kremlin. The separation of powers, provided under the 1993 constitution, is a fiction… All institutions of the federal government, from the cabinet to the bicameral legislature, are in reality mere agents of the presidency.” ---Demitri Trenin, Getting Russia Right, p. 9

  4. Westernization Under Yeltsin • - The Yeltsin government and Westernization • - Deputy Prime minister Gaidar’s Shock Therapy • - Foreign minister Kozyrev’s version of Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’- “Determined to liberate Russia from the burdens of empire, the messianism, and the overreliance on military instruments that had characterized both the tsarist and Soviet periods” (Donaldson and Nogee, P. 124) • - Did the liberal (or rather ‘neo-liberal’) project fail?

  5. What happened? • -Russia applied for NATO membership, sought friendship with the U.S. and expressed interest in joining the EU • - The Gorbachev and Yeltsin government made some progress at establishing multilateral linkages with the West(i.e. joined in North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991, joined the IMF and World Bank in 1992, became the 8th member of the G7/G8) • - • - Trenin argues that this did not amount to real integration: it became a “peripheral” partner of the U.S. and E.U. • - Russia disappeared as a superpower and its ‘world-power’ status became precarious. • - between 1993 and 1996 NATO expanded to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary

  6. Lessons drawn by Russian Elites According to Trenin, the following are some lessons drawn by post-soviet leaders: • - The world is an interplay of political interests • - There are no universal values “except for the survival of the human race” • - military power is not longer the overarching key to success – economic, technological, cultural influence are exceedingly important • - international relations are about competition and power (bilateralism is crucial) • - Russia must ultimately be an independent power -”Western talk on democracy and values is hollow and is used to put American or European interests at an advantage and Russia at a disadvantage” • - Mistrust of U.S. claims to good will – every American promise must be accompanied by concrete concessions • - Russia should prevent new members of the E.U. from gaining too much influence on the inside that might damage Russia’s interests – it should establish close connections with those countries in the EU (like Germany an France) who have the strongest interests inside Russia • (Trenin, p. 75-76)

  7. …continued • 2003 onward Russia began to rebuild itself as a great power – but its strength ceased to be a factor of military might alone • - While political liberalization, economic liberalization was not reversed • - “what is good for Gazprom is goof for Russia” • Russia’s largest company (world’s largest gas producer and fourth-largest publically traded company in the world in 2006). • - Elite perception of economic liberalism was not reversed, but rather changed direction • - Eric Helleiner et al. has called this trend ‘economic nationalism,’ a political position which does not preclude liberal economic, but instead makes use of market forces, global integration, and globalization more broadly to gain structural power in the global economy • - According to Maya Eichler economic nationalism “allowed the government to claim to be defending the interests of the Russian nation while continuing Russia’s capitalist transformation.” (in Helleiner and Pickel, p. 79)

  8. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Hegemony or Global Citizenship? According to the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) in 2001-2002 the majority of the Russian populations rejects the defining features of Russia’s previous identity: The Orthodox Church as the State Religion, anti-Westernism, expansionism and ‘messianism.’ (Shevtsova, in Motyl et al, p. 106.) - a 2001 study revealed that 87% of those surveyed believed that Russia should move close to the countries of the West (Shevtsova, p. 109) • Shevtsova argues that it is not the Russian public is not ready for liberal democracy, but the Russian elites, are afraid to subordinate themselves to the rule of law and to function outside an authoritarian system of government - Modernization and creation of western institutions from the top

  9. …continued • Parliamentary elections in 2004 revealed a ‘crisis’ in Russian liberal democracy • - Nevertheless, 50% of the voters backed parties “with strong statist and nationalist bent (the Communist Party, the Liberal Democracy Party of Zherinovsky and Rodina [motherland]).” – Shevtsova in Russia’s Engagement with the West, p. 110 • - the revival of the Russian Orthodox church and its accession to the political sphere • - Putin appeals to nationalist votes • Putin’s choice: • - “to recreate in Russia the entire system of Western institutions, leaving out what it did not like and what really mattered” • - instead of “definite rules of the game and uncertain results,” Russian elites opted for “uncertain rules that can be changed at will, and predictable, certain results, guaranteeing that they remain in power” (Shevtsova, p. 111) • -

  10. What kind of nationalism? • - Astrid S. Tuminez argues that nationalism “has been a weak and uneven force in Russia in general” • - when ‘aggressive nationalism’ did shape Russian foreign policy it was only to re-enforce its role as great power • - “Russian rulers have never successfully used nationalism as an ideology to bind state and society in a lasting way” • - hist0rically, expansionism had been carried out as an instrument of empire, rather than nation • (Martinez, p. 6) • - But, nationalism continues to permeate not only the Communist party of Russia, but Putin’s United Russia as well • - a weak force in itself, it is nonetheless a powerful political tool Zhirinovski’s political campaign poster from the recent election. He leads the nationalist ‘Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.’

  11. What About the Communists? Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the party: • “The barbarian capitalism and rapacious consumerism imposed by Americans flagrantly contradicts Earth's nature, and the Earth has started to take merciless revenge ... with the savage hurricane that flooded New Orleans and powerful fires. ... If we don't fight capitalism, we will simply destroy the Earth and die on this ship.“ - 2007 • - “The ideology, culture and global outlook of the Western world are becoming more and more influenced by the Jews scattered around the world. Jewish influence grows not by the day, but by the hour.” – 1995 • - source: The Moscow Times, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/10/12/002.html>

  12. …the communists, continued • The most popular party in the Duma during the 1990s • - in 1993 the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) became the biggest and most organized political party in Russia • - However, Luke March argues (in Cameron Ross, p. 54), they were stuck between existing as a tough and irreconcilable opposition to Yeltsin (i.e. opposing the new system) and a party with a coherent platform an popular appeal within the system • however, it lacked the electoral support of the majority of Russia’s citizens • - generational turnover has always been a problem for the communists • - the ideological anti-communism of the Yeltsin years is gone • - United Russia has such a wide, non-ideological appeal that the communists are faced with an electoral impasse

  13. Putin: Geopolitics, Economic Nationalism, Rebuilding the Russian State • 2007 Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation • “the absence of cultural beacons of our own, and blindly copying foreign models, will inevitably lead to us losing our national identity…” • “Having a unique cultural and spiritual identity has never stopped anyone from building a country open to the world.” • “Our foreign policy is aimed at joint, pragmatic, and non-ideological work to resolve the important problems we face”

  14. Putin Speech Continued… • “It is my conviction that our country will take its deserved place in the world, and we will be able to preserve our statehood and our sovereignty, only when our citizens see and feel for themselves and are confident that all of the state's endeavors aim at protecting their vital interests, at improving their lives and bringing them greater prosperity and security.” Putin (left) and his preferred successor , Medvedev (right).

  15. Duma Election Results 2007- Source: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, <http://www.cikrf.ru/eng/elect_duma/results/index.jsp> • All-Russian Political Party “United Russia” - 64,1 % • Political Party “Communist Party of the Russian Federation” - 11,6 % • Political Party “Liberal- Democratic party”- 8,2 % • Political Party Fair Russia: Motherland, Pensioners, Life - 7,8 % • Political Party “Agrarian Party of Russia” - 2,3 % • Political Party “Russian United Democratic Party ’YABLOKO’” - 1,6 % • All-Russia Political Party “Civil Force” - 1,1 % • Political Party “UNION OF RIGHTIST FORCES” - 1,0 % • “PATRIOTS OF RUSSIA” - 0,9 % • Political Party “Party of Social Justice” - 0,2 % • Democratic Party of Russia - 0,1 % • Questions to keep in mind: • Why did the liberals do so poorly? • Where were the moderates?

  16. Questions for Discussion: • Demitri Trenin states that “Russians need to see that Western values are not only a big stick that editorial writers carry about, but also a real measure of societal progress. They need to see that while the foundation of Russia’s foreign policy (i.e. real and mostly private economic interests) has been established, this policy lacks a spine, which only deeply held values can form.” (Trenin, P. 96) • Do you agree with Trenin? Does Russian foreign policy lack values? Or is there something else wrong with its leaders' perceptions of the world? • Does Russia need to adapt Western values?

  17. Bibliography: Eichler Maya. “Explaining Postcommunist Transformations: Economic Nationalism in Ukraine and Russia.” in Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World, edited by Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel, pp. 69-87 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). Shevtsova, Lillia. “Political Leadership in Russia’s Transformation.” In Russia’s Engagement with the West: Transformation and Integration in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Alexander J. Motyl, Blair A. Ruble, and Lilia Shevtsova, pp. 99-120. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005. Trenin, Demitri V. Getting Russia Right. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. Donaldson, Robert H, and Joseph L. Nogee. The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005. Tuminez, Astrid S. Russian Nationalism Since 1865: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. March, Luke. “The Putin Paradigm and the Cowering of Russia’s Communists.” In Russian Politics Under Putin, edited by Cameron Ross, pp. 53-75. New York: Manchester University Press 2004. Putin, Vladimir, “Our foreign Policy is aimed at joint, pragmatic, and non-ideological work to resolve the important problems we face.” International Affairs 53, no. 3 (2007).

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