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Progress Report on Java Based Protocol Analysis

Progress Report on Java Based Protocol Analysis. Presented by Stephen W. Mancini, 1Lt, USAF/AFIT Robert P. Graham, MAJ, USAF/AFIT. Presentation date: 09 Feb 04. Objectives. Understand a Java based Protocol Analysis Tool built for recognizing Authentication Tests in any Protocol. Overview.

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Progress Report on Java Based Protocol Analysis

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  1. Progress Report on Java Based Protocol Analysis Presented by Stephen W. Mancini, 1Lt, USAF/AFIT Robert P. Graham, MAJ, USAF/AFIT Presentation date: 09 Feb 04

  2. Objectives • Understand a Java based Protocol Analysis Tool built for recognizing Authentication Tests in any Protocol

  3. Overview • Research goals • Introduction into Java tool • Perform demo of Java tool • Summary

  4. Research Goals • Automate Guttman’s Authentication Tests • Analyze numerous Protocols • Originally this was limited to a few protocols but since analysis is easy, numerous protocols are examined • Search for alternative way to model penetrator activity • Still not there!

  5. Java Based Analysis • Initially developed to be used as a prototype for final Maude tool • Most model checkers work in a similar fashion so try something different • Why use Java language? • Input files in Java much easier to develop • Rules would be much easier to understand • Coding experience in Java reduced time necessary to develop the tool • Big learning curve with Maude!

  6. Java Based Analysis • Input files in Java much easier to develop • The following shows Needham-Schroeder input file for Java tool: A -> B : {*Na1 A}Kb B -> A : {Na1 *Nb1}Ka A -> B : {Nb1}Kb * Marks the first time a nonce is generated

  7. Protocol From: A Message: A B {A *Na1}Kb To: B Text: A Text: B Encryption: {A *Na1}Kb Term: {A *Na1} Key: Kb Text: A Text: *Na1 Java Based Analysis • The parser breaks down each message into instances of that particular class • For example: A -> B : A B {A *Na1}Kb

  8. Java Based Analysis • The tool instantiates individual classes where sender and receiver roles are expressed • This instance will contain all relevant information pertaining to that principal • For example: Components they send, nonce’s they generate, nonce’s they’ve seen and other properties particular for each participant in the run of the protocol • The tool also keeps track of all messages sent in order to allow principals to check for duplication/spoofs or other errors regarding any message sent

  9. Java Based Analysis • Order of operations: • Run through protocol and grab all messages • Check for duplicates and store in vectors • Check for malformed messages (give errors) • Create instance for each Principal • Restart evaluation of protocol with above gained knowledge • Analyze each message • Populate sender/receiver with relevant information from the current message being evaluated • Depending on sender/receiver check for presence of authentication test in a particular message • Repeat 1 and 2

  10. NS Output using Java Tool Parsing from file 'NSPublic.txt' File Contents: A -> B : {*Na1 A}Kb B -> A : {Na1 *Nb1}Ka A -> B : {Nb1}Kb <Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {*Na1 A}Kb Encrypted term(s) < *Na1 A > with key Kb is readable by recipient only. Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Na1 in encrypted form. Unsolicited test for B because of nonce Na1 within test component < {Na1 A}Kb > <Parties> : <Message> >> B -> A : {Na1 *Nb1}Ka Encrypted term(s) < Na1 *Nb1 > with key Ka is readable by recipient only. The encrypted/fresh nonce Na1 has been received back in component: {Na1 Nb1}Ka Outgoing/Incoming test for A because fresh term Na1 was sent out earlier in < {Na1 A}Kb > Pseudo-unsolicited test for A because Nb1 is a newly received fresh nonce, but A has sent items to B previously Sender may be attempting to initiate an outgoing test by transmitting Nb1 in encrypted form. <Parties> : <Message> >> A -> B : {Nb1}Kb Encrypted term(s) < Nb1 > with key Kb is readable by recipient only. The encrypted/fresh nonce Nb1 has been received back in component: {Nb1}Kb Outgoing/Incoming test for B because fresh term Nb1 was sent out earlier in < {Na1 Nb1}Ka

  11. Live Demo of Java Based Protocol Analyzer

  12. Summary • Introduction into Java tool • Performed demo of Java tool on several protocols • Summary

  13. Bibliography • Cervesato, Iliano and others. A Comparison between Strand Spaces and Multiset Rewriting for Security Protocol Analysis. July 2000. • Guttman, Joshua and F. J. Thayer Fabrega. Authentication Tests. March 2000. • Song, Dawn. Athena: A New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis. June 1999. • Clavel, Manuel and others. Maude 2.0 Manual: version 1. June 2003. • http://cliki.tunes.org/Maude.

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