Gary Varner Department of Philosophy Texas A&M University g -varner@tamu

1. “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners” Gary Varner Department of Philosophy Texas A&M University g-varner@tamu.edu http://philosophy.tamu.edu/~gary/ URL: The Acrocats on Colbert

2. “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners” Gary Varner Department of Philosophy Texas A&M University g-varner@tamu.edu http://philosophy.tamu.edu/~gary/

3. “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners” “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners,” in Ethics for Everyday (McGraw Hill, 2002).

4. “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners” “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners,” in Ethics for Everyday (McGraw Hill, 2002). “A Two-level Utilitarian Perspective on Companion Animals,” in People and Pets(Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

5. “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners” Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism (Oxford University Press, 2012) R.M. Hare (1919-2002)

6. “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners” Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism (Oxford University Press, 2012)

7. “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners” Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism (Oxford University Press, 2012) Sustaining Animals: Envisioning Humane, Sustainable Communities (Oxford University Press, 20??)

8. “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners” Describe two-level utilitarianism. Define three categories of pets. Is pet-keeping justifiable in utilitarian terms? Strategies for improving our relationships with pets within two-level utilitarianism: changing laws, codes of professional ethics, and our “common morality.”

9. “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners” Describe two-level utilitarianism.

10. Two-level utilitarianism “Utilitarian” “In quasi-deprecating use: Having regard to mere utility rather than beauty, amenity, etc.” (Oxford English Dictionary)

11. Two-level utilitarianism “Utilitarian” “In quasi-depreciative use: Having regard to mere utility rather than beauty, amenity, etc.” “Of philosophy, principles, etc.: … regards the greatest good or happiness of the greatest number as the chief consideration or rule of morality.” (Oxford English Dictionary)

12. Two-level utilitarianism “Utilitarianism” “The greatest good for the greatest number.” “The right thing to do is whatever will maximize aggregate happiness under the circumstances.”

13. Two-level utilitarianism • “Utilitarianism” • “The greatest good for the greatest number.” • “The right thing to do is whatever will maximize aggregate happiness under the circumstances.” • “Utilitarianism =df the view that you should arrange things so as to maximize aggregate happiness.”

14. Two-level utilitarianism Act utilitarianism = The right thing to do is whatever will maximize aggregate happiness under the circumstances. .

15. Two-level utilitarianism Act ethical egoism = The right thing to do is whatever will maximize my own happiness under the circumstances. .

16. Two-level utilitarianism Two-level ethical egoism = One “critical level” principle: Arrangethings so that my own happiness will be maximized. Many “intuitive level system” rules: Don’t think like an egoist all the time. Put your loved ones’ interests ahead of your own. &c. .

17. Two-level utilitarianism Two-level utilitarianism = One “critical level” principle: Arrangethings so that aggregate happiness is maximized. Many “intuitive level system” rules: Don’t think like a utilitarian all the time. &c. .

18. Two-level utilitarianism Why utilitarians need “intuitive level” rules: We would miss an important component of human happiness if our interpersonal relationships were always mediated by utilitarian calculations. .

19. Two-level utilitarianism Why utilitarians need “intuitive level” rules: We would miss an important component of human happiness if our interpersonal relationships were always mediated by utilitarian calculations. Extremely detailed information needed to apply the theory correctly. .

20. Two-level utilitarianism Why utilitarians need “intuitive level” rules: We would miss an important component of human happiness if our interpersonal relationships were always mediated by utilitarian calculations. Extremely detailed information needed to apply the theory correctly. Humans have limited data-processing abilities and we make mistakes. .

21. Two-level utilitarianism Why utilitarians need “intuitive level” rules: We would miss an important component of human happiness if our interpersonal relationships were always mediated by utilitarian calculations. Extremely detailed information needed to apply the theory correctly. Humans have limited data-processing abilities and we make mistakes. We are prone to “cook the data” in favor of self-interest. .

22. Two-level utilitarianism Why utilitarians need “intuitive level” rules: We would miss an important component of human happiness if our interpersonal relationships were always mediated by utilitarian calculations. Extremely detailed information needed to apply the theory correctly. Humans have limited data-processing abilities and we make mistakes. We are prone to “cook the data” in favor of self-interest. .

23. Two-level utilitarianism Categories of ILS / “intuitive level” rules: Laws Codes of professional ethics “Common morality”

24. Two-level utilitarianism Categories of ILS / “intuitive level” rules: Laws Codes of professional ethics “Common morality” A type of pragmatism

25. “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners” Describe two-level utilitarianism. Define three categories of pets.

26. Three categories of pets Deborah Barnbaum (1998), “Why Tamagotchis Are Not Pets”: 1. A pet’s keeper feels affection for it (although not necessarily vice-versa), 2. A pet leads a very different life than its keeper, 3. A pet lives in an area significantly under the keeper’s control, and 4. A pet depends on its keeper to have various important interests met.. (Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 13: 41-43.)

27. Three categories of pets Deborah Barnbaum (1998), “Why Tamagotchis Are Not Pets”: 1. A pet’s keeper feels affection for it (although not necessarily vice-versa), 2. A pet leads a very different life than its keeper, 3. A pet lives in an area significantly under the keeper’s control, and 4. A pet depends on its keeper to have various important interests met.. (Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 13: 41-43.)

28. Three categories of pets Deborah Barnbaum (1998), “Why Tamagotchis Are Not Pets”: 1. A pet’s keeper feels affection for it (although not necessarily vice-versa), 2. A pet leads a very different life than its keeper, 3. A pet lives in an area significantly under the keeper’s control, and 4. A pet depends on its keeper to have various important interests met.. (Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 13: 41-43.)

29. Three categories of pets Deborah Barnbaum (1998), “Why Tamagotchis Are Not Pets”: 1. A pet’s keeper feels affection for it (although not necessarily vice-versa), 2. A pet leads a very different life than its keeper, 3. A pet lives in an area significantly under the keeper’s control, and 4. A pet depends on its keeper to have various important interests met.. (Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 13: 41-43.)

30. Three categories of pets Deborah Barnbaum (1998), “Why Tamagotchis Are Not Pets”: 1. A pet’s keeper feels affection for it (although not necessarily vice-versa), 2. A pet leads a very different life than its keeper, 3. A pet lives in an area significantly under the keeper’s control, and 4. A pet depends on its keeper to have various important interests met.. (Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 13: 41-43.)

31. Three categories of pets “Companion animal” =dfa pet that receives the affection and care owners normally give pets, but that also has significant social interaction with its owner and would voluntarily choose to stay with the owner, in part for the sake of the companionship.

32. Three categories of pets “Domesticated partner” =dfa companion animal that works with humans in ways that emphasize and exercise the pet’s mental and/or physical faculties in a healthy way.

33. Three categories of pets “Companion animal” =df … “Domesticated partner” =df … “Mere pet” =dfa pet (by Barnbaum’s criteria) that is neither a companion animal nor a domesticated partner.

34. Domesticated partners?

35. Domesticated partners?

36. Domesticated partners?

37. Companion animals?

38. Companion animals?

39. Mere pets?

40. Mere pets?

41. My Stipulative Definitions animal nor a domesticated partner. “Companion animal” =df a pet that receives the affection and care owners normally give pets, but that also has significant social interaction with its owner and would voluntarily choose to stay with the owner, in part for the sake of the companionship. “Domesticated partner” =dfa companion animal that works with humans in ways that emphasize and exercise the pet’s mental and/or physical faculties in a healthy way. “Mere pet” =dfa pet that is neither a companion

42. “Pets, Companion Animals, and Domesticated Partners” Describe two-level utilitarianism. Define three categories of pets. Is pet-keeping justifiable in utilitarian terms?

43. The utilitarian justification • of pet-keeping Three empirical considerations:

44. The utilitarian justification • of pet-keeping Three empirical considerations: There is some evidence that keeping pets improves people’s lives.

45. The utilitarian justification • of pet-keeping Three empirical considerations: There is some evidence that keeping pets improves people’s lives. That a pet meets my stipulative definition of a “companion animal” is prima facie evidence that it benefits from its relationship with its human keeper.

46. The utilitarian justification • of pet-keeping Three empirical considerations: There is some evidence that keeping pets improves people’s lives. That a pet meets my stipulative definition of a “companion animal” is prima facie evidence that it benefits from its relationship with its human keeper. For pets that meet my stipulative definition of a “domesticated partner,” behavioral problems, which are the leading cause of strife in humans’ relationships with pets, can be more effectively controlled, and humans’ relationships with them tend to be more satisfying than with pets that don’t qualify as “domesticated partners.”

47. The utilitarian justification • of pet-keeping Three conclusions I draw:

48. The utilitarian justification • of pet-keeping Three conclusions I draw: The practice of pet keeping is justifiable from a utilitarian perspective.

49. The utilitarian justification • of pet-keeping Three conclusions I draw: The practice of pet keeping is justifiable from a utilitarian perspective. Although keeping “mere pets” may sometimes be a good thing, it is generally better to keep companion animals than to keep mere pets.

50. The utilitarian justification • of pet-keeping Three conclusions I draw: The practice of pet keeping is justifiable from a utilitarian perspective. Although keeping “mere pets” may sometimes be a good thing, it is generally better to keep companion animals than to keep mere pets. It is generally good for pet keepers to develop, to the extent practicable, a domestic partnership with their pets.