‘Oh what a tangled web’: EBO in Theory and Practice Rob Grossman-Vermaas EBO Concept Lead

1. ‘Oh what a tangled web’: EBO in Theory and Practice Rob Grossman-Vermaas EBO Concept Lead Centre for Operational Research and Analysis DDA/CFEC ISMOR, UK, Aug 05 UNCLASSIFIED

2. Life is really simple… but we insist on making it complicated - Confucius

3. Outline • EBO concept development • EBO experimentation • EBO in practice • Observations and Conclusions The reported results, their interpretation, and any opinions expressed therein, remain those of the authors and do not represent, or otherwise reflect, any official opinion or position of DND or the Government of Canada. UNCLASSIFIED

4. The Six Flavours of EBO… 1. ‘EBO’ is a planning methodology that links strategy to operations… 2. ‘EBO’ is efficient ‘targeting’ and ‘shock and awe’… 3. EBO consider the application of all available sources of power… 4. EBO involve rapid, decisive operations and rapid dominance… 5. EBO require ‘knowledge’ principles for analysis and support… 6. EBO benefit from Systems of Systems analysis…

5. The Six Fallacies and Flaws of EBO… 1. The Air Force invented it… 2. EBO is too connected to strategy, or, not connected enough to strategy… 3. EBO derives from a position of strength, therefore, close combat is always wrong… • 4. Relies on ‘ch’i’ rather than ‘cheng’ – • extraordinary vs. ordinary; • direct vs. indirect 5. We can predict cause and effect… 6. EBO is ‘old wine in new bottles’

6. The Seventh Fallacy or Flaw of EBO? There is an accepted understanding of EBO

7. An ‘Effect’ • Clear statement for each Effect (written and understood): • Identifies who or what is to be ‘influenced’, ‘affected’ • Suggests ‘nested’ or ‘environmental’ Effects • Suggests the desired environmental state as a consequence of an action(s) - measures • Is descriptively written (how and why) • Includes a timeframe (days, weeks, months) • Is assignable, measurable, achievable UNCLASSIFIED

8. EBO : Conceptual Requirements • EBO incorporates: • Complexity and cause and effect • Systemic knowledge: environment dependencies/links/weaknesses • Multiple levels of conflict • Planning (EBP) process and capable organization • Cognition and decision making in ‘real time’ – tools, models, assessment • Adaptive environment (fluidity of system) • Risk analysis, MOE/MOP and metrics over time and space • Synchronization of actions aligned to capabilities over time and space • Non-military and military planning and assessment construct • Knowledge

9. Assessment of the System(s) Academia Social and Cultural Vulnerabilities Dependencies Nat’l and Int’l Intelligence Political Physical Economic Defence nodes + dependencies Strengths OGDs Legal, Ethical and Moral Scientific and Technical IGOs, NGOs Relationships Private Industry Weaknesses Military System Understanding

10. A Complex Effects-based Environment

11. EBO: the inter-agency perspective • Cultural, social, economic, dependency, humanitarian, developmental issues • critical to Effects-based concept • Complex conflict environments favour ad hoc inter-agency command arrangements • Inter-agency coordination group should not formalize its organization, processes, roles • Consideration of development of inter-agency protocol or best practices • HQ consider including liaisons to NGOs, IGOs and vice versa (PACOM) • – Inter-agency support is an integral ingredient for a functional Effects-based concept • Relationships? Authority? Strategic vs. operational vs. tactical • Coordination? Direction? Advice?

12. COALITION National links IOs &NGOs NATIONSAGENCIES& GOs STRAT OPCDR MNIG Nations reps co-ordinationauthority STAFF STAFF EMBASSIES& HoMs HEADS ofMISSION FCDR D/MNIG co-ordinationauthority MNIG board OPS COS Dep./CMNIG CTFHQ STAFF ACTORS ACTORS CC TACT UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS

13. EBO MOE/MOP Analysis

14. Experimentation: MNE 4 (20 Feb-17 Mar 06) Aim: To explore concepts and supporting tools for Effects Based Operations (Knowledge, Planning, Execution, Assessment) within a coalition environment involving Stability Operations with increasing levels of violence in order to assist the development of future processes, organizations and technologies at the Coalition Task Force (CTF) level of command

15. Multinational Experiment 4 Multinational Experiment 4 Other Participants Multinational (MN) Effects Based Operations Organization Analysis Lead Intelligence Tiger Team Lead Effects Based Execution Tiger Team Lead Information Operations MN Effects Based Operations Concept of Operations Combined Task Force Information Operations Plan Concept of Operations Knowledge Base Development Intelligence Multinational Interagency Group Effects-based Plan Implementing Procedures Implementing Procedures Concept of Operations Concept of Operations Effects Based Tools Combined Task Force Intelligence Plan Combined Task Force Strategic Guidance Implementing Procedures Tools Combined Task Force Political-Military Plan Concept of Operations Implementing Procedures National Political-Military Plan Technical Demo Concept of Operations Multinational Information Sharing Strategic Context Knowledge Management

16. Relationships among the Four Components of EBO for MNE 4 Knowledge Base (Development) Effects - Based Effects - Based Planning Planning Effects - Based Effects - Based Execution Execution Effects - Based Effects - Based Assessment Assessment time T=0 T=1

18. EBO in practice (CJTF 180) • Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB) • - synchronization of lethal and non-lethal effects • - ‘targeting’ board (J2/J3) • - Intelligence, Info Ops, Mil Ops provide assessments • - quantitative and qualitative • Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG) • - weekly staff coordination • - JEWG briefs JECB • - Based on Commander’s Intent • - Develops supporting effects • Targeting Battle Rhythm • - OPORD establishes 3 week battle rhythm resulting in • weekly FRAGOs • - Changes are incorporated into decision making process • = Results in production of (refined) Commander’s desired Effects

19. Desired Effects Objectives Assess Tasks Out- comes Actions EBO in Practice:(Operation Iraqi Freedom) • Finding: ‘Based on initial understanding of the enemy, integrated kinetic and non-kinetic actions and multiple, high-tempo lines of operation were unleashed to achieve enemy disintegration and regime collapse; when execution exceeded capacity to understand change, operations reverted from an effects to attrition focus’. • Why it happened: • Difficulty gaining knowledge to identify appropriate effects, desired actions, & cascading or 2d & 3d order effects. • Limited collection on non-kinetic actions, notably IO • Over focused on measures of performance, rather than measures of effectiveness and merit • Insufficient interagency, joint and Service integration hindered execution / support of effects-based action • What should be done: • Enhance C2 and C2I technology, procedures, & organizations to deal with war’s new character/conduct • Create routine joint and function integration via training & organization; extend jointness to the lowest levels possible • Inculcate EBO via world-class experiment & training venues Maturing Least Mature Least Enabled Most Mature, Routine Source: US Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned

20. EBO in Practice (NATO ISAF) • ISAF ‘targeting’ and assessment cycles • - NO defined methodology • PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) • ESC Working Group (Indicators and MOEs) • MOEs on Security, Governance and Development

21. EBO in Practice vs. Theory • Little integration between CJ2, CJ3/7, CJ5, CJ9 • Task over process vs. process-driven • Sporadic inter-agency coordination • Immature analysis techniques • Confusion over MOE and MOP • Military vs. non-military planning and assessment constructs

22. Observations and Conclusions • Prescription vs. guidance • Operational ‘redux’ (levels are archaic) • Knowledge and technology • Culture • ‘Inter-agency’ includes the military • Doctrine vs. concepts • Don’t break what isn’t broken • Complexity + complicatedness = confusion…

23. Questions? grossman-vermaas.rj@forces.gc.ca 1 613 990 7436

24. Effects Based Operations ‘Operations designed to influence the long- or short-term state of a system through the achievement of desired physical or psychological effects. Operational effects are sought to achieve directed policy aims using the integrated application of allapplicable instruments of hard and/or soft power. Desired effects, and the actions required to achieve them, are concurrently and adaptively planned, executed, assessed (and potentially altered) within a complex and adaptive system’ CA working definition

25. 21st Century Conflict: Towards an Effects-based Policy? Source: Robert Vermaas, Future Perfect: Effects Based Operations, Complexity and the Human Environment (Operational Research Note, Department of National Defence Canada, Ottawa, CA, 2004)

26. EBO Relationships (UK JDCC) Strategic Aim Obj Obj Obj Strategic Level E E E E E E As Obj Obj E E E E E E Operational Level A A A A Obj Obj E E E E E E E Tactical Level A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A

27. Hierarchy of Effects Scale Psychological Uncertainty Large High Systemic Medium Medium Physical Small Low

28. Example of Operational Objective: Establish freedom of movement in Qandahar region R1 A’1 A1 dT N1 N2 N3 E1 E3 E2 Example of Effect¹: ISAF Force (R1) patrols (A1) ensure freedom of movement of relief convoys (E1) along Supply Route (N1) Example of Undesired Effect2, but Warlords ambush (A’1) open routes (N2) resulting in civilian casualties (E2) and animosity, leading to negative press coverage (E3) in international news media (N3). UNCLASSIFIED

29. CA EBO Experimentation • EBO Concept Development for Experimentation (DDA/CFEC) • vs • EBO Concept Development thru Experimentation (USJFCOM; CFEC) • Feasibility Exploration vs. ‘Jumping on the Band Wagon’ • EBO (CA and multinational) • C2 and inter-agency perspective (Strategic and Operational) • Systems and Network Analysis concept and technologies as enabler to EBO UNCLASSIFIED

30. Canadian EBO concept Campaign Plan • Support optimization of existing CA/NATO operational planning process in light of emerging CA effects-based approach • Provide functional solutions (based on experimentation) to support optimized CA planning processes at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and modified CA command organizations (methodologies - analysis; risk; modelling;) • Influence and learn from development of US/NATO multinational EBO processes, C2 organizations and technologies (inter-agency perspective; hard/soft power; long-term effects) • Inform development of subsequent campaign plans to address later horizons (where should CF/DND focus in 2020?) • Inform development of CF/DND doctrine based on concept development and experimentation of EBO

31. CA EBO Initiatives • National Security Policy, 2004 • - Integrated 3D security approach (Defence, Diplomacy, Development) • CDS Vision – ‘integrating effects’ • Multinational concept and policy statements (US; UK) • Integrated Operating Concept (IOC), 2005 • - EBO as an Integrating Concept • - DDA/ACD lead development of concept • Joint Force Development and Joint Vision, 2005 • - Employment of Effects-based approach • Experimentation and Integration – CFEC - MNE series • CF/DND; FAC; CIDA; academia

32. Effects Analysis by MOE

33. Weighting of Multi-dimensional EBO MOE

34. EBO in practice (CJTF 180) • Main ‘combat’ objective: • ‘Deny terrorist operatives sanctuary and eliminate • all foreign-sponsored Taliban, Al Qaeda and Hizb-e • Islami Gulbuddin anti-Coalition forces’ • (measurable) • Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) employed • a method for synchronizing joint fires and effects • Model for military and non-military integration throughout • CENTCOM – Joint Fires Element • Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force • (CJCMOTF) – with NGOs