Project Background

1. Integrating ISMS Safety Concepts and Tools into the Design of CH2M HILL’s Demonstration Bulk Vitrification SystemSeptember 12-13, 2006

2. Project Background • Bulk Vitrification being evaluated as supplemental technology for treating Hanford’s low activity tank waste • Selected as primary technology for pilot testing after evaluating 22 other technologies • Bulk vitrification mixes radioactive tank waste with soil and melts it in a steel container using electrical current. Containers will be disposed of in Hanford’s Integrated Disposal Facility. • Holds the promise of dealing with up to 25 million gallons (~46%) of tank waste • If proven feasible, it will supplement the ability of the Waste Treatment Plant to meet the DOE commitment to dispose of Hanford’s tank waste and immobilize the waste not treated by the WTP • Full-scale melt tests are under way and a pilot plant is to be built near the center of the Hanford Site to perform full-scale testing with actual tank waste. • Pilot plant is to operate under a Research, Development and Demonstration permit issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology • Designed to meet rigid standards to protect workers and the environment.

3. DBVS Technology Benefits • Produces high quality, stable waste product • Supports mission safety objectives • Minimizes worker exposure to contamination and radiation • Provides efficient handling for long-term on-site disposal using 20% less space

4. DBVS Illustration

5. Hanford 200 West DBVS

6. DBVS Aerial View Future Production Site

7. Bulk Vitrification Flow Diagram

8. DBVS – Completed Testing • Development Testing performed to date includes: • Laboratory Scale Testing, >45 tests to date, • one w/ actual waste (6-tank composite) • Engineering Scale ICV Testing, 16 tests to • date, one w/ actual waste (6-tank composite) • Full-Scale Testing, with simulant – seven tests • to date (3 top down melts; 4 bottoms up melts, • or melt while feeding)

9. Bulk Vitrification Large Scale Demonstration

10. ISMS Integration Strategy for DBVS • Single message of ISMS continuous improvement with goal of event and injury prevention • Encourage individuals to raise issues • Emphasize event and injury prevention in design and testing • Emphasize worker involvement in design and testing

11. Safe Work Environment (SWE) ISMS continuous improvement is based on an open work environment where everyone feels free to raise issues without fear of retaliation

13. Problem Identification and Resolution • First hazards assessment was done prior to and as part of technology selection process, before there was even a project • Preliminary hazards assessment completed early in the design process (~10% complete), which resulted in equipment changes to eliminate some hazardous conditions (e.g. moving the dryer from the melt structure) • Continued as part of the PDSA development, refined as the design matured • Results of full scale testing fed back into DBVS design (and operations) process real time. Controls were modified as the design matured to reflect latest information • Switch from passive to active ventilation to control NOx releases • Adjusting operational parameters (power levels, initial box waste loading, etc) based on results of large scale testing • Process Hazards and Operability Analysis (PrHOA) performed

14. Process Hazards and Operability Analysis • Process Hazards and Operability Analysis (PrHOA) performed at a detailed design level • Series of 28 all-day sessions conducted over three months • Multidiscipline team performed analysis • SMEs from design contractor • Operations • Engineering • Industrial safety • Environmental health • Radiological Controls • Environmental • Nuclear safety • QA • DOE/ORP • Reviewed design at P&ID level • Over 400 actions resulted from the review, these are being reviewed to ensure design has addressed them

15. Employee Involvement • Dedicated, multi-discipline team efficiently supported design efforts • Design contractor, operations, engineering, industrial safety, environmental health, RadCon, environmental, nuclear safety, QA • Worker reviews of proposed equipment for hooking up the melt box resulted in significant revisions to the equipment to improve operability and ergonomics • Multiple hazard control meetings held to determine how to mitigate identified hazards • Built in engineered controls based on critical hazards identified from worker and environmental protection perspective • Supplemented with administrative control

16. Event Prevention • Conservative designs used to minimize use of operator actions in case of emergencies to add defense against human error events • PrHOA 8 week hazards analysis to identify hazards and controls • Focus on critical hazards and tasks • Hazards evaluated for engineered and administrative controls and defense in depth • ISMS mentors brought in at start of design and testing process • Test procedures emphasized critical tasks to focus on consequential activities • Stop points identified in test procedures to respond to unexpected conditions • Design and test team trained in • ISMS • Conduct of operations • 3-way communication • Procedure usage

17. Subcontractor Control • QA requirements flow down review performed • Procurement requirements flow down review performed • Independent requirements flow down review performed • Two operations oversight personnel assigned to project team • Protocols and expectations emphasized up front and prior to each test • Design and test team trained in • ISMS • conduct of operations • 3-way communication • Procedure usage

18. Results • 700,000 person hours without a lost time or recordable incident (since project inception) • No occurrence reports • Expert Review Panel found DBVS to be a promising technology with no identified mission critical showstoppers

19. Lessons Learned • ISMS Expectations provided adequate structure for fundamental concepts • Early emphasis on problem identification allowed changes to be made with minimal effect on cost or schedule • Early employee involvement improved overall design, testing, and team work • Bringing in ISMS/Conduct of Operations mentors at start of project helped team focus on ISMS/conduct of operations • HPI event prevention tools were effective in design and procedures • PrHOA process rigorous and resource intensive, but resulted in assurance that the DBVS design had been evaluated at the proper level of detail • Independent external technical experts more valuable if used early enough to allow for positive suggestions and criticisms to be incorporated into the final design