Achieving trusted systems by providing security and reliability research project 22
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Achieving Trusted Systems by Providing Security and Reliability ( Research Project #22 ). Project Members: Ravishankar K. Iyer, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, Jun Xu, Shuo Chen, Nithin Nakka and Karthik Pattabiraman. Objective and Approach. Objective

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Achieving Trusted Systems by Providing Security and Reliability ( Research Project #22 )

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Achieving trusted systems by providing security and reliability research project 22

Achieving Trusted Systems by Providing Security and Reliability(Research Project #22)

Project Members:

Ravishankar K. Iyer, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, Jun Xu, Shuo Chen, Nithin Nakka and Karthik Pattabiraman


Objective and approach

Objective and Approach

  • Objective

    • design and validate secure and reliable computing systems to support critical infrastructures.

  • Approach

    • analyze raw data on security vulnerabilities and attacks

    • generate stochastic and state machine models depicting security threats

    • apply formal method to uncover security vulnerabilities due to inconsistencies between system specifications and implementations

    • implement defensive techniques at compiler, operating system and hardware levels


Accomplishments

Accomplishments

  • Study impact of hardware errors on system security

    • IEEE Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN’01 and DSN’02)

  • State machine modeling of real-world security vulnerabilities

    • DSN’03

  • Non-control-data attack: a new security threat

    • USENIX Security (Security’05)

  • Memory layout randomization-based defensive technique

    • IEEE Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS’03)

  • Architecture level support for reliability and security

    • EASY’02, DSN’04 and DSN’05

  • Formal reasoning on security vulnerabilities

    • IFIP Information Security (SEC’04)


Modeling and analyzing security vulnerabilities

Modeling and Analyzing Security Vulnerabilities

(DSN’03)

  • An extensive study on security vulnerabilities in Bugtraq and CERT

  • Each vulnerability is decomposed to multiple simple predicates.

  • State machine modeling for buffer overflow, format string bug, heap corruption, integer overflow, …

  • A more formal way for reasoning about security vulnerabilities.

WU-FTP Server Format String Attack

NULL-HTTP Server Heap Corruption Attack


New security threat non control data attack

New Security Threat: Non-Control-Data Attack

(USENIX Security’05)

  • Most current attacks are control-data attacks

    • Corrupting function pointers or return addresses to run malicious code.

    • Many defensive techniques are proposed to defeat control-data attacks.

  • New threat: non-control-data attacks are generally applicable to attack real-world systems

    • User identity data, configuration data, user input data and decision-making Booleans are security critical.

    • Non-control-data attacks can obtain the root privilege on FTP, SSH, HTTP and Telnet servers.

    • A comprehensive defensive technique is needed to defeat both types of attacks.


Pointer taintedness detection for security

Pointer Taintedness Detection for Security

  • The root cause of many attacks (control-data attacks and non-control-data attacks): pointer taintedness

  • Pointer taintedness: a pointer value is derived directly or indirectly from user input.

  • Prevent pointer taintedness  defeat many real-world attacks,

    • e.g., stack smashing, format string, heap corruption, integer overflow, and globbing attacks.

  • Pursued directions

    • Pointer taintedness avoidance – uncover vulnerabilities by source code analysis

    • Pointer taintedness detection – check pointers at runtime.


Source code analysis to uncover pointer taintedness

Source Code Analysis to Uncover Pointer Taintedness

(SEC’04)

  • Formal semantic definition of pointer taintedness using equational logic

  • Develop a theorem proving technique to analyze C source code at machine code level

  • Extract a set of preconditions for each analyzed function

    • Satisfaction of preconditions  no possibility of pointer taintedness inside this function

  • Evaluation

    • Analyze strcpy(), printf(), free() and socket read functions of HTTP servers

    • Negations of extracted preconditions suggest scenarios of potential vulnerabilities.


Runtime pointer taintedness detection

Runtime Pointer Taintedness Detection

(DSN’05)

  • A processor architectural level mechanism to detect pointer taintedness

    • On SimpleScalar simulator

      • Implemented a taintedness-aware memory system

      • Extended ALU instructions to propagate taintedness in memory

  • Evaluation using several network applications and SPEC benchmarks

    • Effective in detecting both control-data attacks and non-control-data attacks

    • Transparent to applications, precompiled binary can run.

    • No known false alarm.


Future directions

Future Directions

  • Combination of static code analysis and architecture support

    • To automatically derive predicates to be checked by processor at runtime

  • Reliability and security support for embedded systems

    • Migrate our current techniques to embedded systems

    • New topics: cell phone virus, reduced power consumption, tamper-resistant hardware, crypto and authentication hardware/software


Backup

Backup


Internals of format string attack

fmt: format string pointer

ap: argument pointer

fmt: format string pointer

ap: argument pointer

Internals of Format String Attack

Vulnerable code:

recv(buf);

printf(buf); /* should be printf(“%s”,buf) */

\xdd \xcc \xbb \xaa %d %d %d %n

High

%n

%d

%d

%d

0xaabbccdd

Stack growth

Low

In vfprintf(),

if (fmt points to “%n”)

then **ap = (character count)

*ap is a tainted value.

back


Extracting security specifications by theorem prover

Extracting Security Specifications by Theorem Prover

Automatically translated to formal semantic representation

C source code of a library function

formal semantic representation

Theorem generation

For each pointer dereference in an assignment, generate a theorem stating that the pointer is not tainted

Theorem proving

A set of sufficient conditions that imply the validity of the theorems.

They are the security specifications of the analyzed function.


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