How To Govern Shared Natural Resources? Published 1990

2. How To Govern Shared Natural Resources? • Published 1990 • Governance of common pool resources (CPRs) • Alternative to current approaches (government regulation, private property)

3. How To Govern Shared Natural Resources? Traditional models: • Tragedy of the commons • Prisoners dilemma • Logic of collective action

4. 1. Tragedy of the Commons • 1968 paper The Tragedy of the Commons by ecologist Garrett Hardin • Cited 15,707 times • Individuals, acting rationally and in their own self-interest, will eventually deplete a shared natural resource • Each user gets full benefit of use, but shares the cost of overuse Garrett Hardin1915 - 2003

5. 2. Prisoners Dilemma • Game theory approach • Puzzles with this structure discussed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher • Part of Rand Corporation’s research into nuclear strategy • Canadian-born mathematicianAlbert Tucker formalized the game in 1950 Albert William Tucker1905 - 1995

6. 2. Prisoners Dilemma • Two men arrested, placed in separate cells • No communication between them • Each can confess or remain silent • Dilemma: each one is better off confessing, no matter what other does • Outcome for both is worse than if each remained silent

7. 3. Logic of Collective Action • American economist Mancur Olson • The Logic of Collective Action 1965 • “unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” Mancur Olson1932 - 1998

8. ElinorOstrom • Born 1933 in Los Angeles CA • Professor of political science at Indiana University • Challenged view that common property is poorly managed, must be centrally regulated or privatized

9. Inland Fishery at Alanya, Turkey

10. About 100 fishers in small (2-3 person) boats • By early 1970s unrestrained use led to conflict, violence • Competition for best spots increased production costs, uncertainty • After decade of trial and error, came up with a system

11. Each September, list: • All eligible fishers • All usable fishing spots • All fishers draw lots to determine spots • Sep – Jan every day each fisher moves 1 spot east • After Jan fishers move west • Fishers themselves monitor and enforce rules

12. Fisheries

13. Irrigation systems

14. Forests and pasture land

15. Design Principlesfor enduring CPR institutions • Clearly defined boundaries • Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions • Collective choice arrangements • Monitoring

16. Design Principlesfor enduring CPR institutions • Graduated sanctions • Conflict-resolution mechanisms • Minimal recognition of rights to organize • Nested enterprises (for CPRs that are parts of larger systems)

17. Sources • Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Print • Ostrom, Elinor. Prize Lecture. Nobelprize.org. 17 Oct 2011 http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/ostrom-lecture.html