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Wireless Security Quantification and Mechanisms Bill Sanders Professor, Electrical and Computer Engineering Director, Information Trust Institute www.iti.uiuc.edu Sample Projects Mechanisms: Mobile Device Protection using the Reliability & Security Engine

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Wireless security quantification and mechanisms l.jpg

Wireless Security Quantification and Mechanisms

Bill Sanders

Professor, Electrical and Computer Engineering

Director, Information Trust Institute

www.iti.uiuc.edu


Sample projects l.jpg
Sample Projects

Mechanisms:

Mobile Device Protection using the Reliability & Security Engine

OS Architecture for Reliability and Security

Quantification:

Experimental Quantification of Mobile Phone Failure

Mobile Phone Virus Effect Mitigation and Quantification


Providing application aware reliability and security ravi iyer zbigniew kalbarczyk l.jpg
Providing Application-aware Reliability and Security Ravi Iyer & Zbigniew Kalbarczyk

  • Customize mechanisms for detecting security attacks and execution errors based on knowledge about expected/allowed program behavior

    • Extract application characteristics using compiler analysis

    • Enforce the characteristics at runtime using configurable hardware

    • Develop methods for automated derivation of runtime checks

Application

Middleware

Operating system

Processor

  • Example techniques:

    • data value checking – detects corruption of critical program variables

    • data-flow signatures checking – detects violation of data dependencies in the computation of critical variables

  • FPGA prototype of RSE in the pipeline of DLX and LEON3 processors

  • Plan to implement in the ARM pipeline


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Client2 Data

Client1 Data

OS Architecture for Security & Reliability

Roy Campbell

Our Approach: State Management

Traditional Microkernel OS

Partitioning

Distribution

  • Recovering from errors using server restarts

  • Server restart is not sufficient for recovery

  • State information maintained by OS services may be lost when service is terminated and restarted

  • Error in server due to one client affects all clients

Server

Client1 Info

Client2 Info

Server

+

Client 1

Client2

Client 1

Client2

Client 1

Client2

Client2 Info

Server

Server Data

Client1 Info

Client1 Data

Client2 Data

Client1 Data

Client2 Data

Local Data

Local Data

Microkernel

Microkernel

Microkernel

Request Processing

Dependability Characteristics

  • Reliability

  • Client state not lost when server crashes

  • Error propagation between clients reduced

  • Availability

  • SSR memory allocation charged to client: prevents DoS

  • Confidentiality & Integrity

  • “Need to Know” basis for server access to SSRs

  • Maintainability

  • Server Upgrade: Terminate old and start new

Client1 Info

  • Client Information is managed in Server State Region (SSR) structures

  • SSR’s are mapped into server address spaces only when processing requests

  • When request is processed, the server’s access to the associated SSR is revoked

Client2 Info

Req

Client1

Client2

Resp

Server

Client1 Data

Client2 Data

Local Data

Microkernel


Failure data analysis of smart phones how do mobile phones fail ravi iyer zbigniew kalbarczyk l.jpg
Failure Data Analysis of Smart-Phones: How do Mobile Phones Fail? Ravi Iyer & Zbigniew Kalbarczyk

Data sources:

Publicly available failure reports (from ’03 to ’06)

Failure data collected from actual smart-phones

Data collected from 25 smart phones (running Symbian OS) over 14 months

Regular phones instrumented with a logger program

Collects data on phone freezes and self-shutdowns

Use collected data to guide enhancement of robustness of mobile phones


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Sample Results

Analysis of Failure Reports

Analysis of Data from Monitoring Smart phones

Reboot duration

Self-shutdown duration: 80 s

MTBFr = 313 h (~13days)

MTBS = 250h (~10days)

Freeze: device does not respond to inputs

Self-shutdown: device shuts down itself

Unstable behavior: device exhibits erratic behavior, e.g. back light flashing

Output failure: device, in response to an input, delivers an unexpected output

Input failure: user inputs have no effect on device behavior

Panics

Cascading panic events indicate error propagation across applications

MTBFr – Mean Time Between Freezes

MTBS – Mean Time Between Self-shutdowns


Mobile phone virus mitigation and quantification elizabeth van ruitenbeek bill sanders tod courtney l.jpg
Mobile Phone Virus Mitigation and QuantificationElizabeth van Ruitenbeek, Bill Sanders, Tod Courtney

Smartphones—mobile phones with operating systems—have sophisticated computational and communication capabilities that make them attractive to virus writers

The threat of mobile phone viruses is real

Viruses already exist that can send unauthorized text messages, replace screen icons, install corrupted applications, replace font files, delete data, steal data, or infect system application files on phones

The situation is expected to worsen as more viruses are written and more people acquire smartphones

This research evaluates that threat

By modeling the propagation of viruses between mobile phones

By providing insight on the effectiveness of potential virus response mechanisms


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Modeling Phone Virus Spread using Möbius

We model the biggest potential mobile phone virus threat: virus propagation via Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) message attachments

We model the spread of viruses via MMS using the Möbius stochastic modeling software tool

Each phone in the simulation is represented by a submodel

To produce a network of 1000 phones, the phone submodel is replicated 1000 times

Of the 1000 phones, 800 are designated as susceptible to the virus

Of the phones repeatedly exposed to the virus, 40% eventually choose to accept the infection. Thus, when the virus completely penetrates the population, we can expect 320 phones to become infected.

At initialization, each phone is

assigned an identification

number and a contact list

containing the

numbers of

other phones


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Phone Submodel for MMS Virus

Infection of this Phone

Virus Propagation from this Phone


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Simulation Results Generated

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X


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How quickly should the patches be distributed?

Immunization Software Patches & Virus 4


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