WEEK #6 THE THEORY OF RECOLLECTION AND METHOD OF HYPOTHESIS ( Meno ) (2-21-06)

1. WEEK #6THETHEORYOFRECOLLECTIONAND METHOD OF HYPOTHESIS (Meno)(2-21-06)

2. Tonight’s Thesis • Two Features of classical Platonism (the theory of recollection & the method of hypothesis) are introduced in the Meno in response to an underlying problem in the Socratic dialogues • Not committed to developmentalism • Although developmentalism may arguably be the best explanation

3. Agenda/Argument • Outline of Meno • It naturally falls into three distinct portions. • The portion aimed at defining virtue or testing Meno’s knowledge (70a-80a) • The methodological digression (80a-86c) • Begins with Meno’s paradox and introduces the theory of recollection • Virtue is both teachable and not teachable (86c-100c) • Introduces and practices the method of hypothesis • First third resembles the Socratic dialogues

4. Agenda/Argument Continued • The covert problem in elenctic dialogues • An argument that the paradox at 80d-e is natural consequence of this problem • An argument that the Theory of Recollection in the Meno provides the theoretical framework for a solution to this problem • An argument that the conversation with the slave boy establishes that the problem is solvable • An argument that the Method of Hypothesis is the method Socrates recommends in light of this problem

5. Outline of Meno • Testing of Meno’s Knowledge (70a-80a) • Setting up of Question (70a-71e) • Is virtue teachable? (70a) • Priority of definitional knowledge (70a-71c) • Meno’s claim to know (71d-e) • First Answer: A man’s virtue, a woman’s virtue, a child’s virtue … (71e-73c) • Second Answer: Capacity to govern men (73c-d) • Third Answer: Virtue is justice (73d-77a) • Explanation of question (73e-77a) • Fourth Answer: Desire for fine things and ability to acquire them (77b-78b) • Fifth Answer: Ability to acquire fine things (78b-79e)

6. The Methodological Digression (80a-86c) • The paradox (80a-e) • Meno’s recognition of ignorance (80a-b) • Socrates’ repeated disavowal (80c-d) • Meno’s paradox (80d) • Socrates’ paradox (80e) • The theory of Recollection (81a-e) • The Conversation w/ SB (82a-86a) • Question (82a-e) • Refutation of answers (83a-84d) • Arrival at true belief (84d-85c) • Description of process to knowledge (84c-d) • Conclusion (84d-86a) • Conclusion (86b-c)

7. The Teachability of Virtue (86c-100c) • Method of Hypothesis (86c-87c) • Argument that virtue is teachable (87c-89c) • Argument that virtue is not teachable (89d-96d) • If teachable, then teachers (89d-e) • Anytus: virtuous statesmen do not teach virtue (90a-94e) • Meno: Sophists don’t teach virtue • The true belief solution (96d-100c) • True belief is sufficient for virtue (96d-97c) • Distinction between knowledge & true belief (97c-98b) • Virtue qua true belief is acquired by divine dispensation (98b-100c)

8. Key Features in Apology as found in the Meno • Profession of Ignorance • Meno 71a-b & 80c-d • Concern for the Soul • Meno: the what is virtue and is virtue teachable questions • Manner of Practice: examines those who seemed to be wise both [a] to themselves and [b] to many others • Meno claims knowledge at 71c-e, 80b

9. Key Features Continued • Immediate Aims: to investigate and examine those who seem wise in order [a] to show him that he is not, if he is not and [b] to learn from him, if he is. • Meno 71d & esp. 84a-c • Consequences: [a] he quickly incurred their hatred and [b] gained a reputation for wisdom • Sting-ray analogy • Three Classes of Examinees • Politicians (21c3-22a8) - Meno • Poets (22a8-c8) • Craftsmen (22c9-e5) 7. Concern with definition

10. Covert Problem • Socrates took himself to lack knowledge, and • Socrates sought the knowledge he lacked. • How? • Learned from one who knows (e.g. Hippias Minor 372c2-8) • Discover on one’s own (Laches 186d-187a) • In the Socratic dialogues the only method Socrates appears to pursue is the former • E.g. Laches 200e1-201a7 • But problems for learning from another • No one knows • Charmides 167b-172c • Protagoras 313c-314a

11. HippiasMinor 372c2-8; But I have one wonderfully good trait, which saves me: I’m not ashamed to learn. I inquire and ask questions and I’m very grateful to the one who answers, and I’ve never failed in gratitude to anyone. I’ve never denied when I’ve learned anything, pretending that what I learned was my own discovery. Instead I sing the praises of the one who taught me as a wise person, and proclaim what I learn from him. [trans. Smith]

12. Laches 186d-187a … so I now call on you not to let Laches go, or Nicias, but to question them, saying that Socrates denies having any knowledge of the matter or being competent to decide which of you speaks the truth, because he denies having been a discoverer of such things of having been anyone’s pupil in them. So, Laches and Nicias, each of you tell us who is the cleverest person with whom you have associated in this matter of educating young men, and whether you acquired your knowledge of the art from another person or found it out for yourselves, and if you learned it from some one, who were your respective teachers, and what other persons share the same art with them. [Sprague trans.]

13. Laches 200e1-201a7 Well it would be a terrible thing, Lysimachus, to be unwilling to join in assisting any man to become as good as possible. If in the conversation we have just had I had seemed to be knowing andtheothertwohadnot, then it would be right to issue a special invitation to me to perform this task; but as the matter stands we are all in the same difficulty. Why then should anybody choose one of us in preference to another? What I think is that he ought to chose none of us. … what I say we ought to do ... is to join in searching for the best possible teacher (didaskalon), first for ourselves - we really need one - and then for the young men, sparing neither money nor anything else. What I don’t advise is that we remain as we are.” [Sprague trans.]

14. The Paradox Context: Both admit ignorance • Meno: I used to be told, before I began to meet you, that yours was just a case of being in doubt yourself and making others doubt also: and so now I find you are merely bewitching me with your spells and incantations, which have reduced me to utter perplexity. ... For in truth I feel my soul and my tongue quite benumbed, and I am at a loss what answer to give you. And yet on countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue to various people--and very good speeches they were, so I thought--but now I cannot say one word as to what it is. [79e7-80b4; Lamb trans.] • Socrates: If the sting-ray numbs others by being numb itself, then I resemble it; but if not, not. For it is not by being clear myself that I make others at a loss, but by being more at a loss than anyone that I make others at a loss. So now, for my part, I have no idea what virtue is, whilst you, though perhaps you may have known before you came in touch with me, are now as good as ignorant of it also. But none the less I am willing to join you in examining it and inquiring into its nature. [80c6-d4; Lamb trans.]

15. Meno’s version [a] In what way, Socrates, will you search for that thing which you do not know at all what it is? [b] What sort of thing, of those things you do not know will you set up as the object of your search? [c] Or even if you should happen upon it, how will you know that this is what you didn’t know? (80d5-8) • If A does not know x, then A does not know what to search for (beginning problem; ([Ab]) • If A does not know x, then, even if A happened upon x, A cannot know that this is x. (ending problem; [Ac]) • If A does not know what to search for nor even if A happened upon x, A could not know that this is, then A cannot search for x. • So, if A does not know x, then A cannot search for x ([Aa])

16. Socrates’ Version I know what you mean, Meno. Do you know how contentious an argument you are introducing, [a] that it is possible for a person to search for neither what he knows nor what he does not know? For, [b] he could not search for what he knows - for [c] he knows it and there is no need to search for it - nor [d] could he search for what he does not know - for [e] he does not know what to search for. (80e1-5) • Either A knows x or A does not know x • If A knows x, then A does not need to search for x [Bc] • So, if A knows x, then A cannot search for x [Bb] • If A does not know x, then A does not know what to search for [Be] • So, if A does not know x, then A cannot search for x [Bd] • So, A cannot search for x, i.e. search or inquiry (directed self-discovery) is impossible [Ba]

17. Full Version: Meno’s Paradox • Either A knows x or A does not know x • If A knows x, then A does not need to search for x [Bc] • So, if A knows x, then A cannot search for x [Bb] • [1] If A does not know x, then A does not know what to search for (beginning problem; [Ab] & [Be]) • [2] If A does not know x, then, even if A happened upon x, A cannot know that this is x. (ending problem; [Ac]) • [3] If A does not know what to search for nor even if A happened upon x, A could not know that this is, then A cannot search for x. • [4] So, if A does not know x, then A cannot search for x ([Aa] & [Bd]) • So, A cannot search for x, i.e. search or inquiry (directed self-discovery) is impossible [Ba]

18. Issues Surrounding the Paradox • Directed inquiry • Equivocation (Euthydemus 276a-277c) • Objects of knowledge – propositions, entities, universals • Knowledge appears to be an all or nothing affair • Robust knowledge suggested by priority of defintion • Priority of definition in the Meno

19. Priority of Definitional Knowledge • [PD] If A fails to know what F-ness is, then A fails to know anything about F-ness. • neither that x is F or x is not-F • nor that F-ness is G or that F-ness is not G • Evidence • … I am so far from knowing whether virtue is teachable or not that I do not know at all what virtue itself is.” Indeed, Meno, this my situation; I am as poor as my fellow citizens in this regard and I blame myself for not knowing at all about virtue. Not knowing what a thing is, how would I know what sort of thing it is? Or do you think that it is possible for someone who does not know at all who Meno is to know whether he is fine or wealthy or well-born or the opposite of these? [Meno 71a1-b7]

20. Meno 86d-e Had I control over you, Meno, as over myself, we should not have begun considering whether virtue can or cannot be taught until we had first inquired into the main question of what it is. But as you do not so much as attempt to control yourself--you are so fond of your liberty-- and both attempt and hold control over me, I will yield to your request--what else am I to do? So it seems we are to consider what sort of thing it is of which we do not yet know what it is! Well, the least you can do is to relax just a little of your authority, and allow the question--whether virtue comes by teaching or some other way--to be examined by means of hypothesis. I mean by hypothesis what the geometricians often do in dealing with a question put to them, for example …

21. Meno 100b We will know clearly concerning this [that virtue comes to us by divine inspiration] when before we attempt to seek how virtue comes about in men, we attempt to seek what virtue is itself by itself. [100b4-6]

22. Return to Problem • Only ways of acquiring this knowledge that is so valuable to Socrates in Socratic dialogues • Learn from others who know • Discover on one’s own • Socratic dialogues presented problems for learning from others • Meno’s paradox presents problems for discovering on one’s own

23. What Needs to be Shown • The theoretical framework that explains the possibility of directed self-discovery: the theory of recollection • The possibility of directed self-discovery: the conversation w/ slave boy • The method to employ in making the possibility an actuality: the method of hypothesis

24. Theory of Recollection (Meno 81a-e) • Priests & Priestesses • The soul is immortal • So, it has seen (heorakuia) all things here and in Hades • So, it has learned everything • All nature is akin • So, having learned one thing, one can learn everything else

25. Issues Surrounding the Theory of Recollection here • Pushes learning back to previous existence • Looks circular • Directed learning • Previous learning looks to be a form of sense perception of abstract objects • Two processes • Process of recollecting one thing • Process of deducing everything else from that • How does it resolve the paradox? • Reject [3]? • Reject [7]?

26. Transition to CSB • M: Yes, Socrates, but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is recollection? Can you instruct me that this is so? • S:I remarked just now, Meno, that you are a rogue and so here you are asking if I can instruct you, when I say there is no teaching but only recollection: you hope that I may be caught contradicting myself forthwith. • M: I assure you, Socrates; that was not my intention I only spoke from habit. But if you can somehow prove to me that it is as you say, pray do so. • S: It is no easy matter, but still I am willing to try my best for your sake. Just call one of your own troop of attendants there, … • S: Now observe closely whether he strikes you as recollecting or as learning from me. [81e3-b7; Lamb trans.]

27. Conversation w/ Slave Boy • Question & Profession of Knowledge • And now [the slave-boy] thinks he knows what sort of line it is from which the eight-foot square will come to be. [82e5-6] • Examination of Knowledge (83a-84d) • First answer & response (83a-c) • Second answer & response (83c-e) • Recognition of ignorance (84a-d) • But, by Zeus, Socrates, I do not know (84a1-2) • Commentary (84a-d) • Arrival at True Belief (84d-85c) • Description of the Process to Knowledge (85c-d)

28. Description of the Process to Knowledge If someone asked him these same questions again and in a variety of ways, you know that in the end he would know these things less accurately than no one... Without anyone teaching him, but only asking him questions he will come to know, recovering himself this knowledge from himself... And recovering oneself knowledge in oneself is recollection, isn’t it? [85C1-D7]

29. Conclusion of the CSB I would not confidently assert the other things said in defense of this account, but that we would be better and braver and less idle if we believe that one ought to inquire concerning those things he fails to know than if one believes it is not possible to discover nor necessary to inquire concerning those things one fails to know, I would fight for in both word and deed as far as I am able. [86b6-c2]

30. The Teachability of Virtue (86c-100c) • Method of Hypothesis (86c-87c) • Argument that virtue is teachable (87c-89c) • X is teachable ↔ x is knowledge • Virtue is knowledge • So, virtue is teachable • Argument that virtue is not teachable (89d-96d) • x is teachable ↔ x has teachers (89d-e) • Pace Anytus: virtuous statesmen do not teach virtue (90a-94e) • Pace Meno: Sophists don’t teach virtue • So, virtue is not teachable • The true belief solution (96d-100c) • True belief is sufficient for virtue (96d-97c) • Distinction between knowledge & true belief (97c-98b) • Virtue qua true belief is acquired by divine dispensation (98b-100c)

31. Method of Hypothesis Introduction “Had I control over you, Meno, as over myself, we should not have begun considering whether virtue can or cannot be taught until we had first inquired into the main question of what it is. But as you do not so much as attempt to control yourself--you are so fond of your liberty-- and both attempt and hold control over me, I will yield to your request--what else am I to do? So it seems we are to consider what sort of thing it is of which we do not yet know what it is! Well, the least you can do is to relax just a little of your authority, and allow the question--whether virtue comes by teaching or some other way--to be examined by means of hypothesis. I mean by hypothesis what the geometricians often do in dealing with a question put to them; for example,” [86d3-e5]

32. Geometrical Example “whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangular space in a given circle: they reply--‘I cannot yet tell whether it has that capability; but I think, if I may put it so, that I have a certain helpful hypothesis for the problem, and it is as follows: If this area is such that when you apply it to the given line of the circle you find it falls short by a space similar to that which you have just applied, then I take it you have one consequence, and if it is impossible for it to fall so, then some other. Accordingly I wish to put a hypothesis, before I state our conclusion as regards inscribing this figure in the circle by saying whether it is impossible or not.” [86e6-87b2; Lamb trans.]

33. Method • Find Equivalent Question/Hypothesis • Proposition if true entails truth of original disputable proposition • Proposition if false entails falsity of original disputable proposition • Examine the truth of Equivalent Question/Hypothesis

34. Virtue Example So let us speak about virtue also, since we do not know either what it is or what qualities it possesses, let us investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of a hypothesis, and say this: Among the things existing in the soul, of what sort is virtue, that it should be teachable or not? First, if it is another sort than knowledge, is it teachable or not, or, as we were just saying, recollectable? Let it make no difference to us which term we use: is it teachable? Or is it plain to anyone that men cannot be taught anything but knowledge? [87b2-c3; Grube trans.]

35. Equivalent Question/Hypothesis • Virtue is teachable ↔ virtue is knowledge • Equivalent question: • Whether virtue is teachable = whether virtue is knowledge • The two questions are equivalent on the assumption that • X is teachable ↔ x is knowledge • Recall Protagoras 361a3-c2 • Hypothesis • Virtue is teachable ↔ virtue is knowledge • Virtue is knowledge

36. Examination of Equivalent Question • “The next point to consider seems to be whether virtue is knowledge or something else.” [87c11-d1; Grube trans.] • Upward & Downward paths: Phaedo 101d1-e3 • Upward path: 87c-89c • Downward path: 89d-96d

37. Phaedo 101d1-e3 But you , ..., would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis and give that answer. If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examined whether the consequences that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one another. And when you must give an account of your hypothesis itself you will proceed in the same way: you will assume another hypothesis, the one which seems to you best of the higher ones until you come to something acceptable, but you will not jumble the two as the debaters do by discussing the hypothesis and its consequences at the same time, if you wish to discover the truth. [Grube trans.]

38. Examination/Confirmation of Equivalent Question • First one identifies a further hypothesis from which the original hypothesis can be derived and shows how this derivation goes until one reaches something adequate and [upward path] • Second one examines the consequences of the hypothesis to be whether they are consistent with other background beliefs or information concerning the topic under discussion [downward path].

39. Upward Path • Virtue is good (87d2-3) • If x is good, then x is knowledge (87e1-89a2) • This premise is arrived through a series of examples; epagoge • So, virtue is knowledge (89a3-4)

40. Downward Path • The question under discussion is whether virtue is knowledge • I am not saying that it is wrong to say that virtue is teachable if it is knowledge, but look whether it is reasonable of me to doubt whether it is knowledge.” [Meno 89d?; Grube trans.] • If virtue is knowledge, then virtue is teachable • If virtue is teachable, then there are teachers of virtue • Tell me this: if not only virtue but anything whatever can be taught, should there not be of necessity people who teach it and people who learn it . I think so. Then again, if on the contrary there are no teachers or learners of something, we should be right to assume that the subject cannot be taught? [89d6-e2; Grube trans.] • But, the kaloi kagathoi are not teachers of virtue pace Anytus (89e-95a) • Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, Thucydides • The Sophist and poets are not teachers of virtue pace Meno (95a-96d) • So, no teachers • Now there seem to be no teachers of virtue anywhere?—That is so. [Meno 96c6-7; Grube trans.] • So, virtue is not knowledge