1 / 20

Using the gLite middleware to implement a Secure Intensive Care Grid

CoreGRID: European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies. Using the gLite middleware to implement a Secure Intensive Care Grid FORTH (ICS) and University of Cyprus (CS Department)

nizana
Download Presentation

Using the gLite middleware to implement a Secure Intensive Care Grid

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. CoreGRID: European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies Using the gLite middleware to implement a Secure Intensive Care Grid FORTH (ICS) and University of Cyprus (CS Department) J. Luna, M. Dikaiakos, H. Gjermundrod, M. Flouris, M. Marazakis and A.Bilas June-2008

  2. Outline • The Intensive Care Grid: • Motivation • Architecture • Security Requirements • The Secure Intensive Care Grid • Experimental Results • Conclusions and Future Work European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  3. Intensive Care Units Requirements • eHealth requirements for advanced computing and storage facilities, gave birth to Health Grids • ICUs require mechanisms for data acquisition, validation, storage, analysis, reporting, etc • ICU generate two types of data: • Metadata: including patient’s information and physician’s annotations • Data: raw streams of measurements from sensors European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  4. The Intensive Care Grid • ICGrid has been prototyped using the gLite middleware over the EGEE infrastructure to cope with an ICUs needs • ICGrid’s hybrid architecture combines sensors and Grid-enabled software tools • Intensive Care Window (ICW) • Tool to retrieve data from patient-attached medical devices • Intensive Care Annotator (ICA) • Tool to annotate retrieved data and upload data and metadata to the Grid • Intensive Care Searcher (ICS) • Tool to search metadata European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  5. The Goal of ICGrid • Create a (distributed) tool that enables the seamless integration,correlation and retrieval of clinically interesting episodes across Intensive Care Units European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  6. ICGrid Architecture European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  7. gLite Middleware Components • Storage Element • Used to store the collected data • Contains security vulnerability • AMGA (Metadata Service) • Used to store the collected meta-data • Contains security vulnerability • FiREMAN • Used as the file catalog and to replicate the files • VOMS • Used to authenticate users European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  8. Security Requirements • How to implement a data security solution for ICGrid, which are harmonized with: • Legal (i.e. EU’s Data Protection Legislations) frameworks • and Technological (i.e. GSI and Electronic Health Card) frameworks? • Vulnerabilities discovered in a previous data-centric security analysis over ICGrid [HealthGrid Conf’08]: • Compromised of Storage Elements and AMGA provide full control over stored data and meta data • Attackers with revoked credentials (latency of revocation information) European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  9. Proposed Privacy Protocol • Aimed to protect patient’s private data/metadata from untrusted Storage Elements and Metadata services • Proposed mechanisms: • For Metadata: Mandatory Access Control –MAC- (Bell-LaPadula) to enforce authorization • For Data: Cryptography (confidentiality, integrity) and Fragmentation (high availability, confidentiality) • Our paper focused on investigating the practical issues related with using MAC and Cryptography in ICGrid European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  10. Assumptions • Trusted central services including their implementation • CA • VOMS • Hydra • Use of the following security mechanisms • Secure inter-site channels (i.e. GSIFTP) • AES-128-cbc cryptographic algorithm European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  11. Metadata: Mandatory Access Control (MAC) • Uses AMGA’s POSIX-like mechanisms to implement the two basic MAC rules: • No read-up: given a security level, can’t access higher-level metadata. • No write-down: metadata can’t be disclosed to lower security levels. European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  12. Data: Cryptographic mechanism • Designed to avoid encryption keys from transversing the network • Implemented at a “central location”, the CryptoSRM • Uses Hydra as a secure keystore • Performance tests executed with data simulating one day of a Hospital’s ICU operation European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  13. Proposed Security Architecture over gLite Mandatory Access Control Encryption Key Never Disclosed Secure Logging capabilities Encrypted Data Data Encryption Decryption GSIFTP Compression European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  14. Secure Upload of Data European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  15. Secure Download of Data European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  16. Experimental Setup • Client • Configured as a gLite User Interface • CentOS4 Linux operating system • IBM xSeries 335, Dual Intel Xeon HT @ 2.8 GHz • Storage Element • Configured as a gLite DPM_mysql Storage Element • Scientific Linux version 3.09 • Dell PowerEdge 1400, Dual Pentium III @ 800 MHz • Simulated experiments, i.e. the data life-cycle • No modification to the gLite middleware • Compared the traditional approach (Grid client encrypt/decrypt), versus the proposed CryptoSRM European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  17. Experimental Results European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  18. Conclusions • As a follow-up to previous research, we have proposed a gLite-based architecture for implementing a Secure ICGrid system • Due to their nature, different security mechanisms were proposed for Metadata and Data • Security and privacy were our primary concerns when designing the CryptoSRM • Experimental results show that also CryptoSRM’s performance is acceptable for ICGrid’s operations European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  19. Future Work • Use of crypto-HW is being considered to improve CryptoSRM’s performance • We’re exploring the use of fragmentation (availability, confidentiality) to provide a more general solution, with cryptography taking place at the Storage Elements (scalability, performance) • To prevent attacks from malicious AMGA administrators, the use of encryption should be considered • This is not trivial, because i.e. DB indexes can’t be encrypted European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

  20. Thank you for your attention! • Questions? • More info contact us: • jluna@cs.ucy.ac.cy • mdd@cs.ucy.ac.cy • harald@cs.ucy.ac.cy • http://grid.ucy.ac.cy European Research Network on Foundations, Software Infrastructures and Applications for large scale distributed, GRID and Peer-to-Peer Technologies

More Related