Ps 0200 class session notes professor krause fall 2007
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PS 0200 CLASS SESSION NOTES Professor Krause (Fall 2007). UNIT I: FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. CHAPTER 1. THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF STUDYING POLITICS. I.1.A WHY GOVERNMENT?. Maintain Order : Prohibit Anarchy Property Rights : Required of a Capitalist System

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PS 0200 CLASS SESSION NOTES Professor Krause (Fall 2007)

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Ps 0200 class session notes professor krause fall 2007

PS 0200 CLASS SESSION NOTESProfessor Krause (Fall 2007)

UNIT I:

FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT


Chapter 1

CHAPTER 1

THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF STUDYING POLITICS


I 1 a why government

I.1.A WHY GOVERNMENT?

  • Maintain Order: Prohibit Anarchy

  • Property Rights: Required of a Capitalist System

  • Provide Public (Collective) Goods: Indivisible Benefits

    • The “Free–Rider” Problem


I 1 b what is politics

I.1.B WHAT IS POLITICS?

  • The Study of How Attitudes, Opinions, and Preferences are Formed (Pre–Conditions)

  • The Study of the Distribution of Authority in the Public Sphere

  • Influencing Government: Elections, Institutions, and Policies

  • “Who Gets What, When, How?” (Lasswell)


I 1 c forms of government

I.1.C. FORMS OF GOVERNMENT

  • Autocracy: Dictatorship (Monopoly of Power)

  • Oligarchy: Small group of influential government decision makers (Oligopoly of Power)

  • Democracy: The polity has some influence over government policy (Imperfect Competition of Power)


I 1 d types of governance systems of rule

I.1.D. TYPES OF GOVERNANCE (“SYSTEMS OF RULE”)

  • Constitutional Democracy: limits on what government controls (substantive) and how they do it (procedural)

  • Authoritarianism: no formal limits to government power, yet informal limits do exist based upon social, political, or economic institutions.

  • Totalitarianism: Nor formal or informal limits to government power


I 1 e the five principles of politics

I.1.E. THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS

  • RATIONALITY PRINCIPLE: Most Political Behavior has a Purpose

  • Rationality is defined in terms of the Efficient Pursuit of Obtaining Specified Goal(s) (Instrumental).

    • EX. 1: Who Did you Vote for in the 2004 Presidential Election? Why?

  • Exceptions: How Attitudes, Opinions, and Preferences are Formed – Psychological or Sociological Component

  • Exceptions: Study of Individual–Level Political Phenomena Divorced from Collective Outcomes


  • Five principles continued

    “FIVE PRINCIPLES” (Continued)

    • COLLECTIVE ACTION PRINCIPLE: Most Political Behavior Involves Multiple Individuals or Groups with Different Preferences (and hence, Goals) Working Together to Achieve an Outcome. This Requires Resolving Conflict Among Actors.

      • Exceptions: Study of Individual–Level Political Phenomena Divorced from Collective Outcomes


    Types of political bargaining

    TYPES OF POLITICAL BARGAINING

    • Informal Bargaining: “Backroom Deals”

      • E.G.: Logrolling and Side Payments in Legislatures

  • Formal Bargaining: Governed by Formal Rules

    • E.G.: Open versus Closed Rules in Legislatures

  • Group Membership: Sanctioning “Free–Riders” by providing Selective Benefits which Accrue Only to Participant–Members of a Group

    • E.G.: NRA, AARP

  • EX. 4: NRA, AARP


  • Five principles continued1

    “FIVE PRINCIPLES” (Continued)

    • INSTITUTION PRINCIPLE: Formal Rules and Procedures Shapes Politics

      • The Design of Institutions Affect the Distribution of Government Authority

        • EX. 5: The Political Organization of Congress

      • Jurisdiction: “Turf Wars”: Divided versus Overlapping Jurisdictions.

      • Decisiveness: How Decision Outcomes are Attained?

        • E.G.: Motion to Close Debate in a Legislature (“Move the Previous Question”)


    Five principles continued2

    “FIVE PRINCIPLES” (Continued)

    • Agenda Control: What Issues are Formally Considered for Government Action?

      • E.G.: The Power of Legislative Committee Chairs

    • Veto Power: The Capacity to Defeat Issues on the Agenda

      • EX. 8: The Executive Veto


    Five principles continued3

    “FIVE PRINCIPLES” (Continued)

    • Delegation: The Essence of American Democracy; Transferal of One’s Own Authority to Another Individual or Party

      • Principal–Agent Problems: The Basic Relationship Involving the “Delegater” (Principal) and the “Delegatee” (Agent)

      • Transaction Costs: The Costs Incurred by the Principal to Ensure that the Agent does not Deviate from the Principal’s Preferences.


    Five principles continued4

    “FIVE PRINCIPLES” (Continued)

    • POLICY PRINCIPLE: Political Outcomes are the Products of Individual Preferences and Institutional Procedures

      • E.G.: U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making: Individual Preferences × Majority Rule = Median Voter

      • E.G.: Theory of Minimum Winning Coalitions: Individual Preferences × Majority Rule = Median Voter


    Five principles continued5

    “FIVE PRINCIPLES” (Continued)

    • HISTORY PRINCIPLE: The Past Plays a Role in Determining the Present & Future Courses of Action & Outcomes

      • Path Dependence: Certain Outcomes are Made More or Less Likely Attributable to Historical Evolution

        • EX. 11: Why Has the American Presidency Grown as an Institution since WWII?


    I 1 f why delegate authority in a representative democracy

    I.1.F. WHY DELEGATE AUTHORITY IN A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY?

    • Functional Specialization / Division of Labor (Weber)

      • Place a Premium on Policy Expertise

      • Mitigate Collective Action Problems


    I 1 g balancing freedom order

    I.1.G. BALANCING FREEDOM & ORDER

    • Obtaining the Optimal Level of Liberty

      • Choice Relates to Preferences of Political Actors (Both Government & Non–Governmental)


    I 1 h the instability of majority rule

    I.1.H. THE INSTABILITY OF MAJORITY RULE

    • Cycling on More than One Issue Dimension: MVT No Longer Provides a Unique Equilibrium Prediction (McKelvey’s Chaos Theorem)

    • Protection of Minority Rights (Super–Majortiarianism)


    I s 1 path dependence

    I.S.1. PATH DEPENDENCE

    • Current Political Outcomes & Choices are a function of past political outcomes & choices.

      • E.G.: The Creation of Independent Regulatory Commissions to Thwart Jacksonian “Party Spoils” System of the 19th Century

      • E.G.: Adoption of Policies in the American States (ranging from Morality Policies to Tax Changes)


    A primer on rational choice theory

    A PRIMER ON RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

    CONCEPTS & APPLICATIONS TO THE STUDY OF

    AMERICAN POLITICS


    I s 2a what is classical rational choice

    I.S.2a. WHAT IS “CLASSICAL” RATIONAL CHOICE”?

    • Assumes that all political actors are rational (i.e., an action is rational to the extent it is correctly designed to maximize goal achievement, given the goal in question and the real world as it exists – Dahl and Lindblom: efficient pursuit of goals).

    • Actors maximize utility (i.e., satisfaction) without any innate constraints – the only constraints are external to the decision maker (E.G., Resources, Legal Authority)


    What is boundedly rational choice

    WHAT IS “BOUNDEDLY” RATIONAL CHOICE”?

    • Assumes that all political actors make rational choices, yet nonetheless possess nontrivial cognitive and informational (incomplete and/or imperfect) limitations that result in suboptimal behavior

      • Cognitive Limitations = Information Processing is Flawed

      • Incomplete Information = Limited Information

      • Imperfect Information = “Bad” Information


    Strategies for coping as a boundedly rational agent

    STRATEGIES FOR COPING AS A ”BOUNDEDLY” RATIONAL AGENT

    • Incrementalism: Rationally coping with the aforementioned limitations by altering behavior in a piecemeal, gradual manner.

    • Serial Updating: Updating information from the past (albeit imperfectly) to make decisions.


    I s 3 cost benefit analysis

    I.S.3. COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS

    • Decision Rule:

      • NB > 0: Positive Net Benefits

        (Prefer Action/Choice)

      • NB = 0: Zero Net Benefits

        (Indifferent)

        -- NB < 0: Negative Net Benefits

        (Do Not Prefer Action/Choice)


    Cba application of rational choice voter turnout in an election

    CBA APPLICATION OF RATIONAL CHOICE: VOTER TURNOUT IN AN ELECTION

    • The Riker–Ordeshook Turnout Decision Calculus

      R = (P × B) + D – C

      • R = Net Benefit (Reward) of Voting

      • P = Probability your Vote will Break a Tie in an Election Contest

      • B = Utility Difference from your preferred candidate (Candidate “1”) winning over the other candidate (Candidate “2”) – i.e., Candidate Dissimilarity Index

      • D = Downs’ Value of Democracy Continuing (D > 0)(or else the political system would fail if no one voted)

      • C = Costs of Voting (C > 0)


    I s 4 median voter theorem

    I.S.4.MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM

    • The median voter is the most pivotal voter – true for elections or governmental decisions in majoritarian setting.


    Critical assumptions of mvt

    CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MVT

    • Single–peaked preferences that are symmetric (i.e., there is a unique most preferred policy outcome termed an ideal point and any deviation from it is suboptimal from the individual’s perspective with the same preference intensity).


    Critical assumptions of mvt continued

    CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MVT(CONTINUED)

    • Quadratic (Risk–Averse Preferences): this is not necessary, rather a simplifying assumption for technical reasons.

      • The individual’s utility function looks like:

        • where Ui = individual’s utility

        • xi = actual policy or candidate position

        • xi* = ideal policy or candidate position


    Critical assumptions of mvt continued1

    CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MVT(CONTINUED)

    • Unidimensional Policy Space (Liberal–Conservative Continuum): Multidimensional policy spaces can be problematic (see Arrow’s Theorem: no stable point in the policy space unless you restrict individuals’ preferences via agenda control power; McKelvey’s Chaos Theorem: All points in a two–dimensional space can be reached if there is pairwise voting under majority rule.


    Critical assumptions of mvt continued2

    CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MVT(CONTINUED)

    • Simple Majority Voting Rule: Does not consider supermajorities (e.g., amendments to the U.S. Constitution), nor multiparty (proportional representation) democracies that are fractured and thus require coalitions (e.g., France).


    Critical assumptions of mvt continued3

    CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MVT(CONTINUED)

    • Normal Distribution of Voters: Or some other distribution where the greatest mass is located at its center.


    Spatial representation of mtv

    SPATIAL REPRESENTATION OF MTV

    • Median Voter Theorem (Hotelling, 1929): “If there are voters at every point on the scale and parties A & B start at 25 and 75 and move at the same rate, then they will converge to the same location until all voters are indifferent between them (Figure 1 – Downs 1957: 117, An Economic Theory of Democracy).”

    • A→ *C*A ← C

    • |__________|____________|____________|____________|

    • 0 25 50 75 100


    Theoretical predictions median voter theorem

    THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS: MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM

    • Elections: Political parties try to converge to the center to maximize votes. The party who comes closest to the ideological center (aka median voter) wins the election contest.

    • Policy: The winning proposal or critical actor is the median one since it obtains the 50% + 1 vote needed to pass.


    Some applications of median voter theorem

    SOME APPLICATIONS OF MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM

    • Supreme Court decision making

    • Congressional committee decision making

    • Public spending decisions made by citizens via referenda

      • E.G., Bond Issues

  • U.S. election contests


  • I s 5 principal agent theory

    I.S.5. PRINCIPAL–AGENT THEORY

    • Based on hierarchical and contractual relationships

    • Principal: one whom delegates authority to another.

    • Agent: to whom the principal entrusts authority.


    Why delegate

    WHY DELEGATE?

    • Efficiency/Productivity/Social Welfare gains from functional specialization & expertise.

    • Mitigate collective action problems among a large number of decision makers.


    The principal s problem

    THE PRINCIPAL’S PROBLEM

    • How to ensure that the agent acts in her best interests? This means that she must design an incentive structure such that the agent will efficiently serve the interests of the principal.

    • Design a monitoring mechanism that allows for sanctions and rewards based on the agent’s behavior observed ex post.


    The principal s constraints

    THE PRINCIPAL’S CONSTRAINTS

    • She cannot observe actual behavior of the agent in the ex post contracting situation (moral hazard).

    • She does not know the agent’s “true type or nature” prior to selecting them (i.e., ex ante). (adverse selection)

    • She cannot perfectly monitor the agent’s actions.


    Agency costs facing the principal

    AGENCY COSTS FACING THE PRINCIPAL

    • Moral Hazard: The risk that a party involved in a transaction has not entered a contract in good faith by either providing misleading information, or has an incentive to deviate from its contractually agreed upon behavior – i.e. “Shirking”

      • Therefore, a contract cannot verify the behavior of another party. Moral hazard is a problem due to the choice of the informed party (agent) making an incorrect choice.


    Agency costs facing the principal continued

    AGENCY COSTS FACING THE PRINCIPAL(CONTINUED)

    • Adverse Selection: The inability to verify a particular key trait of another party involved in the transaction that is relatively fixed, if not immutable. It is imperfectly inferred by the principal from proxy information or characteristics.

      • Therefore, adverse selection is a problem of the uninformed party (principal) making the incorrect choice.


    Application of pat voters and politicians in a representative democracy

    APPLICATION OF PAT:Voters and Politicians in a Representative Democracy

    • Principal: Voters

    • Agent: Politician

    • Moral Hazard: Once elected, the politician does not represent the interests of their constituents back home (“Gone Washington” syndrome) – “Shirking”

    • Adverse Selection: Voter selects someone who does not share their policy preferences (i.e., voter ignorance about the candidates in an election)

    • Monitoring Mechanisms: Politician’s voting record, debates, public forums, etc...

    • Sanction/Reward: Election Contest


    I s 6 transaction cost theory

    I.S.6. TRANSACTION COST THEORY

    • Costs incurred from the activity of producing or delivery of some particular good or service.

    • North (1990: 27): The costs of exchange between two parties, which is a function of information costs, protecting rights, and policing & enforcing of agreements


    I s 6 transaction cost theory continued

    I.S.6. TRANSACTION COST THEORY(CONTINUED)

    • Total Costs = Classical Production Costs (Labor, Capital, Land) + Opportunity Costs + Transaction Costs


    Transaction costs in politics

    TRANSACTION COSTS IN POLITICS

    • Governance Structures serves as an important aspect of TC theory.

    • Monitoring and enforcement “back–end” mechanisms of principal–agent models represent a particular type of transaction cost – i.e., the cost of monitoring and enforcement.

    • High transactions costs make market solutions to public problems very difficult since bargaining is constrained and the existence of public property and/or private property rights.

    • Even government coercion solution will entail some level of transactions costs since monitoring and enforcement activities are necessary to ensure compliance to the law.


    Examples of conditions that increase transaction costs

    EXAMPLES OF CONDITIONS THAT INCREASE TRANSACTION COSTS

    • Government Gridlock (e.g., divided government, ideological divergence, larger multiparty coalitions)

    • Interest group influence (multiplicity of actors makes the costs of arriving at a collective decision more costly) – regulatory capture

    • Politicized Judiciary & Bureaucratic Agencies

      • Credible Commitment Problems

      • Raises transactions costs

      • (Why? Because more uncertainty about course of action)


    Transaction cost politics

    TRANSACTION COST POLITICS

    • Transaction costs in politics are not inherently bad, but rather they must be weighed in relation to the benefits that they bring about.


    I s 7 game theory

    I.S.7. GAME THEORY

    • Definition: An approach to social and political analysis which assumes that behavior is rational and uses the common game as a model of politics.

    • Game theory is relevant to the study of politics because it analyzes conflict situations – goal is to find the best strategy to follow in a given particular situation.


    Elements of game theory

    ELEMENTS OF GAME THEORY

    • Players (i.e., participants) have both goals and resources. The goal of each player is to follow a rational strategy that will enable them to maximize gains and/or minimize losses.

    • Payoff is the outcome of a game which is attached to a strategy.

    • 2–person games:(1) zero–sum, (2) negative–sum, and (3) positive–sum.

    • In non–zero sum games, the players have some overlapping/ common interests by definition


    Equilibrium concept

    EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT

    • Nash Equilibrium: The condition, whereby the configuration of strategies among players is such that each person’s strategy is best for her, given that all other players are also playing their equilibrium strategies. (Dixit and Skeath 1999: 82)


    Dominant strategy

    DOMINANT STRATEGY

    • The strategy that outperforms all other strategies used by a given player in a game.

    • A dominant strategy is not one that necessarily provides a player with higher payoffs than their opponent, but rather provides the player with higher payoffs than they would receive from playing some other strategy.


    Prisoner s dilemma

    PRISONER’S DILEMMA

    • A type of game that occurs when all players have dominant strategies and move simultaneously.


    Example husband wife interrogation

    EXAMPLE: HUSBAND-WIFE INTERROGATION

    • Assumes: two players – each have a dominant strategy and simultaneous moves


    Example husband wife interrogation1

    EXAMPLE: HUSBAND-WIFE INTERROGATION


    Finding the nash equilibrium solution

    FINDING THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION

    • Identify the Dominant Strategy for each player?

      • Husband: Confessing is better off for him whether his wife confessors (10 year sentence vs. 25 year sentence); or she does not confess (1 year sentence vs. 3 year sentence).

      • Wife: Confessing is better off for her whether her husband confessors (10 year sentence vs. 25 year sentence); or she does not confess (1 year sentence vs. 3 year sentence).


    Finding the nash equilibrium solution continued

    FINDING THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION(CONTINUED)

    • The Nash equilibrium solution to this game is that both the husband and wife choose to confess. The equilibrium outcome yields each player a payoff of 10 years in jail (SOLUTION: CONFESS-CONFESS)


    3 characteristics of prisoner s dilemma games

    3 CHARACTERISTICS OF PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAMES

    • Two Strategies to Select From: Cooperate (with one’s rival) or Defect (from cooperation)

    • Each players possesses a dominant strategy

    • The equilibrium solution from playing a dominant strategy yields a worse/inferior outcome for both players (2 player case) than the non–equilibrium solution.

      • Therefore, the equilibrium solution for a Prisoner’s Dilemma is sub–optimal for by definition since they could find another outcome that is preferable to the (Nash) equilibrium outcome of “Confess–Confess” (i.e., “Deny –Deny”)


    Chapter 2

    CHAPTER 2

    THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY


    I 2 a common features

    I.2.A. COMMON FEATURES

    • A struggle among competing interests (Madison, Federalist Papers)

    • Powerful Colonists (merchants and farm owners) versus Weak Colonists (artisans, laborers, shopkeepers, etc.)

      • Stamp Act (1765) threatened self–governance via higher taxes to Britain (Collective Action Works)

      • Boston Tea Party (1773) push to rescind the Tea Act led by Samuel Adams – the same dude who bears the name of the popular micro–brewed beer

        (Collective Action Works)

      • Indirect election of Presidents (via electoral college) and Senators (appointed via state legislatures – until 1913 – 17th Amendment)


    I 2 a common features continued

    I.2.A. COMMON FEATURES(CONTINUED)

    • National versus State Governments

      • Articles of Confederation (1777): States retained virtually all governmental powers and independence from the national authority – including the capacity not to follow national treaties if it so desired & dispersed authority held by Congress (Net Effect: Poor Institutional Arrangements)

      • Shays Rebellion (1787): Farmer revolt in MA – state seeks national government assistance, but cannot respond since Articles of Confederation does not allow for a swift, activist response.


    I 2 a common features continued1

    I.2.A. COMMON FEATURES(CONTINUED)

    • Bicameralism: division of Congress into two separate chambers (Constitution)

    • Staggered Terms of Appointment: Each House members run for election every 2 years, while each Senator runs for election every 6 years (Constitution)


    I 2 a common features continued2

    I.2.A. COMMON FEATURES(CONTINUED)

    • Large States versus Small States

      • Virginia Plan (1787): representation in the national legislature would be based on state population, relative revenue contributions to national government, or both.

      • New Jersey Plan: representation in the national legislature would be equal across all states, irrespective of population or wealth considerations contained in the Virginia Plan

      • The Great Compromise: House of Representatives were apportioned based on population, while the Senate was apportioned based on equality.


    I 2 a common features continued3

    I.2.A. COMMON FEATURES(CONTINUED)

    • Northern (Merchants) versus Southern (Planters) States

      • Northern States did not wish to count slaves towards apportionment; while Southern states wanted to count them in full

      • Three–Fifths Compromise: Every slave would be counted as 3/5ths of a person (a crucial compromise necessary for passing the Constitution)


    I 2 b institutional features of u s constitutional democracy

    I.2.B. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

    • Legislative Branch:

      • Article I: Sections 1–7: Institutional Design & Apportionment

        • Bicameral Legislature

        • Different Means of Selection

        • Staggered Appointments


    I 2 b institutional features of u s constitutional democracy continued

    I.2.B. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY(CONTINUED)

    • Distinct Powers from Chambers: Senate: ratify treaties and approve (i.e., “advise and consent”) presidential appointments to the executive and judicial government branches;

  • Article I: Section 8: Institutional Powers

    • Authority to Collect Taxes/Borrow Money

    • Regulate Commerce

    • Declare War

    • Maintain an Army & Navy


  • I 2 b institutional features of u s constitutional democracy continued1

    I.2.B. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY(CONTINUED)

    • Expressed Powers vs. Necessary & Proper Clause


    I 2 b institutional features of u s constitutional democracy continued2

    I.2.B. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY(CONTINUED)

    • Executive Branch

      • Article II: An “Energetic Executive”?

        • Independence from Polity via Indirect Election

        • Unconditional Power to recognize other countries and negotiate treaties (though Senate must ratify them to have the force of law)

        • Pardon Powers


    I 2 b institutional features of u s constitutional democracy continued3

    I.2.B. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY(CONTINUED)

    • Appointment Powers

    • Ability to Hold Special Legislative Sessions

    • Presidential Veto of Congressional Bills (though Congress can override it with a 2/3rds supermajority in each chamber)


    I 2 b institutional features of u s constitutional democracy continued4

    I.2.B. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY(CONTINUED)

    • Judicial Branch

      • Article III: “Arbiters of Disputes”

        • Federal versus State Laws

        • Executive versus Legislative Branches (U.S. Federal Government)

        • Individuals/Groups versus State Governments


    I 2 b institutional features of u s constitutional democracy continued5

    I.2.B. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY(CONTINUED)

    • Judicial Review: binding nature of this branch’s decisions is an implied power from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution)

    • Lifetime Appointments – but Politically Appointed (& Confirmed) and Congress could change the “organization” of the judiciary by creation of “lower” courts and altering the composition (jurisdiction and size) of the U.S. federal judiciary


    I 2 c federalists vs antifederalists

    I.2.C. FEDERALISTS VS. ANTIFEDERALISTS

    • Federalists (“Nationalists”) Supported the Constitution and Centralized National Government

      • Wealthy elites who wished to consolidate power (Madison, Hamilton, and Washington)

    • Antifederalists preferred a strong federal system of government with decentralized authority

      • Small business & working class who wished to see state dominance to ensure individual rights and check the authority of wealthy elites


    Tensions between federalists antfederalists

    TENSIONS BETWEEN FEDERALISTS & ANTFEDERALISTS

    • Representation: Distance of Elected Representatives from the Polity

    • Tyranny: Lack of Direct Accountability (Antifederalists) or Majorities (Federalists)?

    • Federal Governmental Power: Broad Powers (Federalists) versus Narrow, Specified (Antifederalists)


    I 2 d amending the u s constitution

    I.2.D. AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

    • A Difficult Process with Several Veto–Style Obstacles (Article V of the Constitution)

    • The Amendment Process:

      • 2/3rds passage in both House and Senate, then ratified by 75% of state legislatures by a simple majority vote. (All but one Amendment)


    I 2 d amending the u s constitution continued

    I.2.D. AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (CONTINUED)

    • 2/3rds passage in both House and Senate, then ratified by conventions called for this specific purpose in 75% of state legislatures. (Only the 21st Amendment – Repealing Prohibition Amendment – 18th)

    • Passage in a national convention called by Congress in response to petitions by 2/3rds of the states, and ratified by 75% of state legislatures by a simple majority vote.


    I 2 d amending the u s constitution continued1

    I.2.D. AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (CONTINUED)

    Or

    • Passage in a national convention called by Congress in response to petitions by 2/3rds of the states, and ratified by conventions called for the this specific purpose in 75% of state legislatures.


    Chapter 3

    CHAPTER 3

    FEDERALISM

    &

    SEPARATION OF POWERS


    I 3 a federalism structure content

    I.3.A. FEDERALISM: STRUCTURE & CONTENT

    • Definition: Division of Authority across Multiple Levels of Government within a Constitutional System. (Vertical Coordination Dilemmas)

    • Aim: Limit Government Tyranny through diffusing authority via jurisdictional arrangements, and thus inducing competition among levels of government


    I 3 a federalism structure content1

    I.3.A. FEDERALISM: STRUCTURE & CONTENT


    Correlates of vertical dilemma factors

    Correlates of “Vertical Dilemma” Factors

    [+]

    • Transaction Costs = f (Degree of Diffuse Authority)

      [–]

    • Ease of Collective Action = f (Degree of Diffuse Authority)

      [–]

    • Pr (Government Tyranny) = f (Degree of Diffuse Authority)


    I 3 b the nature of american federalism

    I.3.B. THE NATURE OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM

    • Purpose: Balance Authority Across Levels of Government to provide a check on power, and also to induce competition between state and national governments.

    • Arbiter: Supreme Court determines outcomes involving jurisdictional turf battles (Most notably, via interpretation of the 10th & 11th Amendments)

    • Expressed Powers: Authority granted to national government; all else reserved for the states according to Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.


    I 3 b the nature of american federalism continued

    I.3.B. THE NATURE OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (CONTINUED)

    • Reserved Powers: Powers that enable state governments via those not specified under the aegis of the national government via the 10th Amendment.

    • Concurrent Powers: Powers that both state and national governments possess (e.g., taxes).

    • Full Faith & Credit Clause: States honor the public laws and judicial decisions made in other states (Article 4, Section 1 of Constitution). Courts have ruled that exceptions can be made.

    • Home Rule: Delegation of policymaking authority by state governments to local governments.


    I 3 c the history of american federalism

    I.3.C. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM

    • Dual Federalism: (1789–1937) Balance of Authority tipped in favor of States [Layer–Cake Federalism]

      • Reinterpretation of the Commerce Clause (1937): Provides National Government with power over the economy via regulation of interstate commerce

      • Activist Government (FDR: New Deal)


    I 3 c the history of american federalism continued

    I.3.C. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (CONTINUED)

    • Cooperative Federalism: (1937– mid 1960's) Federal Grants–in–Aid programs were an important mechanism (“carrot”) for obtaining state government compliance to national government policy aims. [Marble Cake Federalism]

      • Categorical Grants–in–Aid: Earmarked grants.

      • Project Grants: Competitive grants obtained by state and local governments

      • Formula Grants: Grants–in–Aid determine by formulae


    I 3 c the history of american federalism continued1

    I.3.C. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (CONTINUED)

    • Regulated Federalism: (mid 1960's – Present) Federal rules lead to the prominence of both uniform rules via “sticks” – e.g., unfunded mandates. [Command Control Federalism]

      • Command–Control Uniformity of Rules

      • Grant Funding with “Strings Attached”

      • The Rise of Social Regulation: e.g., Health & Safety Policy

      • Unfunded Mandates have grown, but at a slower rate, under Republican control of the U.S. federal government

      • Rebirth under Bush, II administration (e.g., Leave No Child Behind Act)


    I 3 c the history of american federalism continued2

    I.3.C. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (CONTINUED)

    • New Federalism: (early 1970's – Present) Federal rules designed to provide greater discretion to state and local governments to implement policies as they deem fit– e.g., revenue sharing (Nixon); block grants (Reagan); and state relief from unfunded mandates (Clinton).

      • [Devolutionary Federalism]

      • A Modified Shift Towards “Dual Federalism”

      • States as “Policy Laboratories” – Competition & Innovation

        • E.G. Welfare Reform

      • States have “block grant” authority to spend money as they wish.


    I 3 c the history of american federalism continued3

    I.3.C. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (CONTINUED)

    • Trends in American Federalism:

      • Rate of Centralizing Authority has generally grown at a positive, yet smaller rate over the past three decades

      • Courts have generally ruled in favor of States’ against the Federal Government encroachments over the past decade

      • Role of Partisanship: Philosophy of Governance?


    I 3 d separation of powers

    I.3.D. SEPARATION OF POWERS

    • Checks & Balances

      • Executive Veto Powers

      • Senate “Advise and Consent” Powers

      • Judicial Review (of Presidential Actions)

      • Appropriations


    I 3 d separation of powers continued

    I.3.D. SEPARATION OF POWERS (CONTINUED)

    • Institutional Gridlock:

      • Partisan–Based: Divided Party Government

      • Ideological–Based: Ideological Distance Among Pivotal Actors in Executive & Legislative Branches


    Chapter 4

    CHAPTER 4

    CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS


    I 4 a why the bill of rights

    I.4.A. WHY THE BILL OF RIGHTS?

    • Political Compromise Between Federalists & Antifederalists reflected in the 1st 10 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

      • Antifederalists were concerned with the existence of a “Leviathan” Central Government

      • Madison vs. Hamilton (Within Federalist Family)


    I 4 a why the bill of rights continued

    I.4.A. WHY THE BILL OF RIGHTS? (CONTINUED)

    • Civil Liberties: protection of citizens from improper government action.

    • Civil Rights: obligations imposed on government to guarantee equal citizenship, protection from discrimination by private or public entities.


    I 4 a why the bill of rights continued1

    I.4.A. WHY THE BILL OF RIGHTS? (CONTINUED)

    • General Historical Trends (1791 – 1960's)

      • The “Nationalizing” of civil liberties and civil rights mainly through constitutional interpretation by the federal judiciary – to a lesser extent via the constitutional amendment process

        • 14th Amendment: single national citizenship translates into standardization of civil liberties and civil rights

        • The judiciary’s reticence to check Congress’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.


    I 4 a why the bill of rights continued2

    I.4.A. WHY THE BILL OF RIGHTS? (CONTINUED)

    • Mapp v. Ohio (1961) – Unreasonable search and seizure (4th & 14th Amendment protection) – “Exclusionary Rule”

    • Miranda v. Arizona (1966): Right to remain silent and have counsel present during interrogation (14th Amendment protection)

    • Roe v. Wade (1973) – Right to Privacy (14th Amendment protection)


    I 4 a why the bill of rights continued3

    I.4.A. WHY THE BILL OF RIGHTS? (CONTINUED)

    • General Historical Trends (1970's – Present)

      • The “De–Nationalizing” of Civil Liberties & Civil Rights via the federal judiciary

        • Federal courts have moved in a more conservative ideological direction – especially the Supreme Court (see G,L, & S text)

        • The “constitutional” importance of Republican dominance over the presidency


    I 4 b civil rights equal protection under the law

    I.4.B. CIVIL RIGHTS: “EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW”

    • 14th Amendment (1868) is the cornerstone to civil rights law in the United States. [Equal Protection Clause]

      • “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

    • Unconstitutionality of Civil Rights Act of 1875 (in 1883) due to the Court’s interpretation that it encroached upon the civil liberties of private interests. [The advent of Jim Crow Laws]

    • Plessy v. Ferguson (1896): Uphold Louisiana statute that required racial segregation with the proviso that the respective facilities were equal. [Separate but Equal]


    I 4 b civil rights equal protection under the law continued

    I.4.B. CIVIL RIGHTS: “EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW”(CONTINUED)

    • History Principle: the “hardwiring” of judicial interpretation of the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and thus the cumulation of such precedents, made it difficult to end segregation and racial discrimination in a timely manner.


    I 4 b civil rights equal protection under the law continued1

    I.4.B. CIVIL RIGHTS: “EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW”(CONTINUED)

    • Additional Example: 15th Amendment (guaranteeing voting rights for black men) was interpreted “loosely” as evinced by “poll” taxes, literacy requirements, and other barriers to entry for political participation.


    I 4 b civil rights equal protection under the law continued2

    I.4.B. CIVIL RIGHTS: “EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW”(CONTINUED)

    • Subsequent Applications of the “Separate But Equal” Rule

      • Missouri: State government paying out–of–state tuition for qualified African–American law students (Overturned by the SC in 1938 in Missouri ex el. Gaines v. Canada)

      • Texas: State government setting up two separate law schools – one for whites, one for blacks. This was state law overturned by the SC in Sweatt v. Painter (1950).

      • Southern States: State Governments had “white primaries” where African–Americans could not vote – this was overturned by the SC in Smith v. Allwright (1944)


    I 4 b civil rights equal protection under the law continued3

    I.4.B. CIVIL RIGHTS: “EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW”(CONTINUED)

    • Brown v. Board of Education (1954): “Separate Cannot be Equal” – a repudiation of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

      • 1st Federal Government Involvement in States’ discriminatory practices (Institutional Principle)

      • De jure segregation (legally enforced restrictions) versus De facto segregation (naturally occurring from demographic or social considerations)

      • Spurred Grass–Roots Mobilization Movements to enfranchise African–American voters in the south


    I 4 b civil rights equal protection under the law continued4

    I.4.B. CIVIL RIGHTS: “EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW”(CONTINUED)

    • Spurred Civil Rights Act (1964) & Civil Rights Voting Act (1965) designed to Augment/Fortify the 14th and 15th Amendments, respectively.

      • Spurred School Desegregation throughout the nation (i.e., government mandated “busing” of public school students outside of their residential communities)

      • Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg BoE (1971)


    I 4 b civil rights equal protection under the law continued5

    I.4.B. CIVIL RIGHTS: “EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW”(CONTINUED)

    • Spurred Gender Equality Movement

      • Title IX (1972): Outlawed gender discrimination in Education

      • Equal Rights Movement (1970s–1980s)

      • Spurred Movements Against Other Forms of Discrimination [Basis: Title VII of CRA, 1964]

    • Sexual Orientation


    I 4 c affirmative action remedy for past discrimination

    I.4.C. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: REMEDY FOR PAST DISCRIMINATION?

    • Encourage (or Mandate) greater diversity to remedy the consequences of past discrimination

      • Gender, etc... as an advantage (positive characteristic)

      • Compensatory action taken to favor members of a disadvantged group who have not been subject to a particular form of discrimination


    I 4 c affirmative action remedy for past discrimination continued

    I.4.C. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: REMEDY FOR PAST DISCRIMINATION?(CONTINUED)

    • Regents of U. California v. Bakke (1978)

      • Allan Bakke sued the UC system on the basis that he was discriminated against Black and Latino students who were less qualified who were admitted to the Medical School Program at UC–Davis

      • Failed to get AA declared unconstitutional, but did get admitted to Medical School at UC–Davis

      • Why? The SC objected to the use of Quotas & separate admission process for minorities were in violation of the Equal Protection Clause


    I 4 c affirmative action remedy for past discrimination continued1

    I.4.C. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: REMEDY FOR PAST DISCRIMINATION?(CONTINUED)

    • General Legal Trends on AA (Post–Bakke)

      • Greater scrutiny to race–based government contracting (e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. V. Pena [1995]) – must reflect a “compelling government interest and be tailored to address past identifiablediscriminations”

      • Burden of Proof Shifting from defendant (Employers) to plaintiff (Employees) (Wards Cove v. Atonio [1989])

      • Refusal to use Race as a consideration in admission and scholarship decisions at state institutions of higher learning (Hopwood v. State of Texas [5th Circuit, 1996]) – only applies to Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi


    I 4 c affirmative action remedy for past discrimination continued2

    I.4.C. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: REMEDY FOR PAST DISCRIMINATION?(CONTINUED)

    • Rules → Outcomes

      • Quotas and Group Differentials are “Out”

      • Alternative Means of Achieving Diversity via “In” – e.g., Top 10% of one’s HS Class Policy


    I 4 c affirmative action remedy for past discrimination continued3

    I.4.C. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: REMEDY FOR PAST DISCRIMINATION?(CONTINUED)

    • Referendums on Affirmative Action: Majority Rule or Minority Tyranny?

      • Proposition 209 (CA) [1996]: outlaw AA programs at both the state and local government levels (was passed and not challenged by the Supreme Court)

      • “the state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin.”

      • Houston, TX (1997) Referendum: “....The city bans affirmative action on city contracting and hiring” (Referendum was rejected)


    End of unit i

    END OF UNIT I

    EXAM 1 MATERIAL HAS NOW BEEN COMPLETED


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