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PES and Governance Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009 Collective action is a response to the benefits of managing ecosystems at larger scales CBNRM requires highly disciplined institutional design If not, extremely difficult

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Pes and governance l.jpg

PES and Governance

Brian Child

University of Florida

31 August – 3 September 2009


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Putting in place the conditions for the emergence of effective equitable cbnrm governance l.jpg
Putting in place the conditions for the emergence of effective, equitable CBNRM governance

  • CBNRM governance can be locked in an unhealthy state for many years.

  • We should not assume that good governance will naturally evolve.

  • We have theoretical and practical knowledge to design CBNRM organizations that are participatory, transparent, that have low levels of financial misappropriation, and that can manage natural resources well

  • However, we may need to impose these conditions in the sense that:

    • Elites tend to benefit from the status quo (oppose changes)

    • Ordinary people, once they understand these changes (i.e. the capacity to aspire), will support them strongly and, over time, may even be able to defend them (though they will usually need help/support to do so)

    • Tendency for negative governance to re-assert itself.

    • Therefore need to protecting the procedural conditions tfor effective function and evolution of CBNRM.

    • i.e. protecting the weak against the predation of the strong.


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Principles effective, equitable CBNRM governance

  • ECONOMIC: The first principle, therefore, is to maximize the value of wildlife to landholders/occupiers (i.e. INDIVIDUALS)

  • POLITICAL: The second principle is that decision-making power must originate in the people (not the committee). The elected committee (e.g. trust, Conservancy) must be answerable to the people, and not in charge of them


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International effective, equitable CBNRM governance

Macro Level

National

State/Provincial

Property rights push the locus of power towards the local level

‘Governance’

is the linkage

between these

different levels of

public and civil

society entities

Civil Society

District/Municipal

Meso Level

Cooperative/Multi-

community

Local/Community

Micro Level

Household


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Governance & effective, equitable CBNRM governance

Enabling Environment

International

  • Weak conceptual understanding, within historically and site specific circumstances.

  • Biggest challenges to success:

  • incompetence / disinterest

  • defense of status quo

National

State/Provincial

Civil Society

District/Municipal

Cooperative/Multi-

community

Governance of Local Collective Action

Strong, widely applicable conceptual and operational model/s

High probability of success

Local/Community

Household


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Quality wildlife resources effective, equitable CBNRM governance

CBNRM in Luangwa: Institutional Lessons


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CBNRM in Luangwa, Zambia (NORAD Project) effective, equitable CBNRM governance

  • South Luangwa National Park

  • 9,050km2

  • 9,000 elephants

  • Costs USD1m / year

  • Income USD850,000

  • Lupande GMA

  • Six chiefs (4,500km2)

  • 50,000 people

  • Six Community Resource Boards

  • 45 Village Action Groups

  • Two hunting concessions

  • Earning USD 230,000 annually

South Luangwa National Park


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Harsh Climate effective, equitable CBNRM governance

  • Floods

  • Droughts

  • Disease


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Community Development Programme: Top Down Phase effective, equitable CBNRM governance

  • Two powerful co-Directors (“integration”)

  • 40% of park and GMA revenue returned to community

  • But returned through six Chiefs for projects selected by them and implemented by LIRDP (“followership” was not involved)

  • Did 36 different projects in community:

    • Women’s programme (chickens)

    • Roads

    • Infrastructure / buildings

    • Culling

    • Bus service

    • Tourism and hunting managed by project

  • Not one project was viable or sustainable despite massive funding


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When I arrived in 1996: effective, equitable CBNRM governance

  • People did not understand the Project

  • Very low perception of benefit

  • Conflict/suspicion over project implementation

    Agreed to implement “fiscal devolution” to village level (80%) of income


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Resistance to Devolution by “Losers” effective, equitable CBNRM governance

Revenue distribution

meetings held in Malama

But chief rejects programme


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Success in Chivyololo effective, equitable CBNRM governance


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Innovations: Mechanisms of Constituent Accountability effective, equitable CBNRM governance

Recognition that devolution

is a RIGOROUS process

“Loose-tight” principles

  • Constitutions

  • Accounts

  • Records of decisions


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Constituency Accountability effective, equitable CBNRM governance

Ensure that everyone knows what is happening with the finances (quarterly)


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Innovations: Self Managed effective, equitable CBNRM governanceRevenue Distribution


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The tight part (i.e. procedural) of loose-tight management (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)


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Community Projects (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)


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Investing in Wildlife Management (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)


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Financial Flows in CBNRM (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)

First Generation CBNRM

FIRST GENERATION

PERFORMANCE METRICS

SECOND GENERATION

Participation

100’s

75-100,000

Benefits

Few, public

20,500 people got cash

Central Government

Projects

10?

230+

Local Government

40-80% money missing

Accountability

0.8%

-86%

Attitudes to wildlife

+90%

Representational Democracy

0%

Investment in wildlife

18% of income

down

Wildlife trends

Stable/up

Participatory Democracy

Second Generation CBNRM


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Single versus Multiple Villages (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)

Defining local regimes

According to Madison/ de Tocqueville:

  • A Democracy – is where every one meets together to represent themselves (Township Government)

  • A Republic – is where people’s interests are represented by elected persons

  • Multi-Village community

  • Indirect or representational governance

  • Single Village

  • Direct/participatory democracy/ accountability


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Real Life Implications (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)

Preliminary data from CBNRM (next slide) is intriguing.

Suggests Madison’s dichotomy is critical to success


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Participatory Governance (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)

Representational Governance

Red/Pink – gets to people (projects/cash) public good??


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The effects of full face-to-face participation (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)

Where everyone in the community is involved in financial decision making (with full discretionary choice)

  • Revenue is allocated to the best combination of uses (i.e. the highest valued uses) including household and community benefits

  • This locates the origin of power in individuals (Tocqueville)

  • Does this gives us a single metric that can measure both poverty reduction at HH level and empowerment (i.e. participation, accountability, democratization)?


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CBNRM 2.0 (second generation) (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)

  • This leads us to CBNRM 2.0, a second generation model build on the principles of bottom-up accountability.

  • There are several critical changes:

    • Money goes to individuals, and then flows upwards through collective agreement

    • This ensures that committees are downwardly accountable to their constituents

    • An important role for government is to protect downward accountability (see conformance criteria below)

    • Communities must be small enough to meet face-to-face regularly (i.e. single Village communities)

    • This structure is much more likely to be effective than CBNRM 1. However, structure must be accompanied by effective information

  • The following slide compares CBNRM 1.0 and CBNRM 2.0 using a wide range of performance metrics

5. Central

Government

4. District Council

3. Community Based Organization

2. Village

(Grass-roots community)

1. Individuals

(Grass-roots community)

Wildlife/Tourism


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Sequencing Scale (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)

GLOBAL

REGIONAL

Scaling process is critical:

  • Scale down by devolving rights

  • Scale up through upward delegation

  • Avoid appropriation of rights

    Read Murphree (2000)

NATIONAL

SUB-NATIONAL

Province/State/Department

District/County/Traditional Area

Scale Down (devolve rights)

Community

Scaling Up

Village

Household


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I’ve included more detailed notes and recommendations on CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point


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The Enabling Environment: CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Pointsome preliminary lessons


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Some early hints at what a CBNRM enabling environment is CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

  • National process work in impersonal states

  • May need to rely on projects in personalized (neo-patrimonial states) where scaling up is challenging

  • Legislated use rights (benefit, manage, allocate, sell) critical. Can pilot with project agreements (but vulnerable)

  • Continuity of champions

    • Protect conditions for emergence

    • Inter-disciplinary experience and advice

    • Innovation requires trust

  • Pilots critical (pilots lead policy)

  • Learning through communities of practice

Long-term, persistent, consistent facilitation

Aborted

devolution


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More hints for enabling environments CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

  • Donors – variability in outcomes

    • Design (often flawed; locally envisaged programs worked best)

    • Tenacity (seldom present)

    • But financing, political role, can be used positively

  • Associations invaluable:

    • Political (e.g. CAMPFIRE Association)

    • Technical (e.g. CCG, NACSO)

  • Responsible Research adds value (but research often an irritant)

  • Need meso-organization (still lots to learn):

    • Role of local government (district councils) a two-edge sword

    • Sustainability of NGO support organizations

  • Capacity-building

    • Process often misunderstood and badly designed = wasteful, expensive

    • Across-scale, experiential learning highly effective


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REDD – opportunity or threat? CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point


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REDD CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

  • New resource – limited vested interested allows us to do it properly

  • But objectives very unclear, and seems to be driven top down with too little listening to landholders and communities

  • If done properly, could contribute to environment, development, governance:

    • Land recovery (biodiversity, productivity, carbon)

    • Improve livelihoods in marginal areas

    • Incentivize improved governance (build “hollow states” from the bottom up)


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Forest Tenure: Who ‘owns’ the World’s Forests? CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

Rights critical to success but unclear and disputed

M has

M has

Africa

Latin America

African data appears to ignore customary tenure rights?

  • Gov’t ……………….Owned and Administered by Government

  • Public-Comm ……Community has usufruct rights (Gov’t owned)

  • Private-Comm ….Owned by communities and indigenous peoples

  • Private-Indiv ……..Owned by Individuals or Firms

[Sunderlin, Hatcher and Liddle 2008]


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Governance in Countries with 10 largest oil reserves CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

(The Resource Curse)

Money that flows top-down from a single source

=> governance problems

90% of these countries ranked in the lowest 1/3 in terms of Governance

Oil Reserve Data from: http://internationaltrade.suite101.com/article.cfm/top_ten_oil_countries

Governance Indicator Data from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp


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How do we avoid a Tragedy of the Global Carbon Commons? CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

  • Tragedy of the commons occurs in open access situations

  • Many of the commons situations envisaged by Hardin are in fact subject to rules – local, communal and national

  • What are the rules and structures that exist to govern Carbon?

  • Governance = structure and processes that link the macro- with the meso- and micro-levels of NRM


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Carbon Governance Mechanisms – Global to Local CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

International

UNFCCC

Kyoto Protocol

  • UN Declarations

  • human rights

  • civil/political rights

  • ILO 169

  • Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP)

Regional

Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Inter-American Commission of Human Rights

National

Case Law

Human Right to Property

(Mabo Case)

Constitution

SocialFunction Doctrine

Complex – can we start with very simple and clear goals?

Community

CBOs

CAMPFIRE

Conservancies


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[RRI 2008] CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point


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Conclusion CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

  • REDD attaches new value to forests

  • Threat of elite land speculation

  • Governance structures/processes need to be developed for REDD

    • - transparent, accountable, participatory, legitimate

  • Who makes the new rules? Where is the landholder voice?

  • Carbon raises all the same concerns and opportunities as CBNRM

Thanks to RRI for their support


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GOVERNANCE/SCALE ISSUES CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

GLOBAL

Accounting

REGIONAL

  • Baseline

  • Additionality

  • Distribution

  • Monitoring

NATIONAL

SUB-NATIONAL

Province/State/Department

District/County/Traditional Area

Community

  • Projects (low national capacity,

  • initial pilot startups)

Scaling Up

Village

  • Issues:

  • Size/Pop Density?

  • tenure security

  • perverse incentives

  • capacity building

Household



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Overall Findings (2) Recommendations

  • Single Village CBOs work far better than multi-village CBOs

  • CBOs lack procedural guidelines

  • Large, unsatisfied demand for technical support / information

  • Managers, on the whole, working well (need technical support, socialization in empowering communities, protection)


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Critical Areas for Improvement Recommendations

  • Governance, accountability and participation of people (including finances) is weak especially in multi-village CBOs

  • Benefits at household level far too low (ratio of overhead to benefit is FAR too high)


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Overall Judgment Recommendations


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Key Recommendations (1) Recommendations

A. Institutional Design

  • Break multi-villages up into single villages

  • Set guidelines for constitutions and for procedural conformance

  • Monitor conformance


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Key Recommendations (2) Recommendations

B. Devolved Capacity

  • Support and oversee marketing (database, facilitation, training)

  • Develop participatory revenue allocation and accountability systems

  • Experiment with participatory quota-setting (and set goals for wildlife monitoring and management responsibilities)

  • Develop stronger national and internal-CBO information systems


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Key Recommendations (3) Recommendations

C. Enabling Environment and Support Agencies

  • Develop MET capacity for:

    • Adaptive policy formulation

    • Conformance monitoring

  • Develop producer association/s

    • right to levy communities

    • provided they fulfill key functions:

      • Political representation

      • Peer-based monitoring (Grameen Bank)

      • Information (capacity-building)

  • Develop capacity for capacity-building. How?? Who ??

  • Independent monitoring and research (adaptive management model?)


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Building Capacity through Procedural Conformance Recommendations

Government should monitor procedural conformance to ensure

  • Full participation and democracy,

  • Equity,

  • Transparency and accountability,

  • Protect the weak against the serious threat of elite capture

    Hence Capacity-building should focus on:

  • Sound constitutions and awareness of them

  • Information flow

  • Participatory financial allocation and accountability


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Conformance Criteria Recommendations

  • Budget properly discussed, presented and agreed by whole community

  • Proper financial and technical general meetings every quarter, well attended

  • Quarterly financial reports are accurate, follow budget, low variance, no misuse

  • Annual audit presented to community and approved by them (as an activity-based budget)

  • Annual/biannual elections

    Only approve quota / payments on receipt of conformance audit (not just a financial one)


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Technical Recommendations Recommendationsfor CBO Management

  • Improve participation and transparency in financial allocation and control

    • Participatory financial management (budgeting, control)

    • Use PRA communication techniques to make financial decisions

    • Quarterly variance analysis

  • Improve information through carefully planned quarterly meetings

  • Organize financial information to reflect benefits, overheads, investments

  • Define roles and procedures in small manuals


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Participatory Budgeting Recommendations

  • Steps:

  • Define membership

  • Make list of members (and check it)

  • List animals shot and values

  • Worked out share per person

  • Agree on allocation: HH, projects, wildlife, management


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Format for Budget Recommendations


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Making & communicating budgets Recommendations

  • Community participation

  • Visualization


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Making sure people Understand Recommendations

Each Member Gets Their Full Share in Cash

Each Person Pays Into Projects (Buckets) As Agreed by Community


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Quarterly Variance Analysis Recommendations

Ensure that everyone knows what is happening with the finances (quarterly)


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Quarterly Report Recommendations

Agenda

  • Value of animals

  • Constitution

  • Financial report

  • Project report

  • Wildlife management report

  • Report on hunting and tourism

  • HIV/AIDS

  • Other issues arising of interest e.g. wildlife policy



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Collective action is a response to the benefits of managing ecosystems at larger scales

  • Many high value resources in semi-arid savannas are mobile, or fugitive, in space or time – wildlife, water, grazing, ecological health

  • Without institutional mechanisms to manage these ecosystems at scale, the systems tend to be used for those activities that can be owned individually – small scale agriculture, and privately owned livestock

  • In other words, because we do not know to manage these ecosystems at the correct scale, the high value resources tend to be replaced by lower value resources

  • However, scale is a complex issue because:

    • Human institutions work better when they are small

    • Ecological systems work better when they are big

      (The principles for dealing with this mismatch will be dealt with separately)

  • Within the southern African region, and particularly in relation to the wildlife-tourism resource there are large economic benefits associated with scaling up, and new institutions are evolving for this purpose. These include:

    • Large, private ranches and conservancies

    • CBNRM

    • TFCAs

  • There is considerable evidence to showing that scaling up creates significant ecological and economic benefits, including job creation.

  • Scaling up is working well on private land (e.g. Conservancies), and TFCAs are still in their infancy and have many issues worked out.


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CBNRM requires highly disciplined institutional design ecosystems at larger scales

  • However, our interest is in the special case of CBNRM which faces is own challenges:

    • Even at small scale, large numbers of people need to be involved

    • There are particular problems of poverty, literacy

    • People have a long history of political and managerial marginalization (disempowerment)

    • People have limited or no experience with modern organizational development theory and practice, and tend to default to models less appropriate to the challenges of being competitive in a global world.

  • Consequently, many CBNRM programs face serious problems of financial mismanagement, low levels of participation, and elite capture.

  • This reflects badly on policy makers, implementers and communities

  • We do, in fact, understand both the principles and operational practices of CBNRM sufficiently that we should be able to implement it with a high probability of success.

  • There are many parallels with democratization. In the history of mankind, democratization is a rare process that seems to occur only under a particular and complicated set of circumstances. Gradual evolution should not be assumed – even though there is clear evidence that democratic governance is much better for people (every single country with a per capita GDP of over $20,000 is a democracy, except for a few oil rich nations), societies usually remain in a non-democratic status-quo for decades and even centuries.


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Putting in place the conditions for the emergence of effective, equitable CBNRM governance

  • This has several lessons for CBNRM:

    • CBNRM governance can be locked in an unhealthy state for many years.

    • We should not assume that good governance will naturally evolve.

    • Fortunately, we now have sufficient theoretical and practical knowledge to design CBNRM organizations that are participatory, transparent, that have low levels of financial misappropriation, and that can manage natural resources well

    • However, we may need to impose these conditions in the sense that:

      • Elites tend to benefit from the status quo, including dominating Committees and Trusts, and will strongly oppose such changes, or changes that benefit the majority

      • Ordinary people, once they understand these changes (i.e. the capacity to aspire), will support them strongly and, over time, may even be able to defend them (though they will usually need help/support to do so)

      • Nevertheless, there will be a tendency for negative governance to re-assert itself.

      • Therefore supporters of CBNRM, especially government agencies with legal authority, have an important role to play in protecting the procedural conditions that allow effective function and evolution of CBNRM.

      • This can also be seen as protecting the weak against the predation of the strong.


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Aligning CBNRM objectives by locating discretionary choice with individual landholders

Effective design of CBNRM institutions brings the following principles and practices into alignment:

  • It establishes mechanisms for property rights and exchange that allocate scarce resources to the highest valued uses, i.e. the conditions for a neo-liberal democratic economy

  • It locates the right to make decisions with individual community members (not their representatives), i.e. the conditions for participatory democracy

  • It uses communications methods that promote positive social change and transformation

  • It uses performance tracking mechanisms that improve the effectiveness and adaptability of management

  • It manages natural resources profitably and sustainably to create jobs and reduce poverty and vulnerability

    Therefore, if CBNRM is not designed properly, managing CBNRM becomes a complicated trail (and trial)of crisis management.

    However, if we follow the single principle that discretionary choice should be located in the individual landholder, and aggregate institutions upwards from this foundation, it is remarkable how well all these principles come together.

    In this document we present an institutional design for communities that provides a solid foundation for these objectives. Other designs include fundamental political, economic, or ecological contradictions, and we are skeptical that they will work.


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A Practical Sequence for Implementing CBNRM with individual landholders

IF we assume the government has put in place an enabling environment for CBNRM (the subject of another chapter), we can view CBNRM as sequentially addressing the following challenges:

  • Earning money – the first step is to generate benefits by, for example, marketing tourism, hunting or timber concessions. This is easily achieved using open, competitive marketing and many communities do this reasonable well (note 1, 2)

  • Spending money – much less attention is paid to the use of this money, and it is here that many problems occur. Effective systems will:

    • Allocate revenue to the most effective uses

    • Maximize individual benefits and choice (not only collective benefits) as costs are borne by individuals

    • Avoid serious challenges of corruption and elite capture

      However, our research in communities in six countries implementing CBNRM in southern Africa suggests that serious problems are occurring:

    • At best, very few individuals are getting benefits, or participating in the program, or have information about what is happening

    • At worse, communities face serious problems of financial misappropriation (corruption) and elite capture

  • Effective natural resource management

    Note 1: Nevertheless, benefit streams can be greatly improved. We will address this issue separately

    Note 2: While our focus is on high value resources (e.g. wildlife, tourism), which is the fastest and easiest way to develop CBNRM, we acknowledge that CBNRM is entirely appropriate for other natural resource management challenges such as non-financial ecosystem services.


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Spending money with individual landholders

As noted, earning money from wildlife / tourism is relatively easy. However, effective natural resource management is only likely to occur when this money generates individual and communal incentives.

Therefore the key to CBNRM, and its biggest challenge and opportunity, lies in spending money effectively so that:

  • It is allocated effectively, transparently and honestly

  • It is used to build high levels of participation, accountability, and benefit, and therefore a commitment to a natural-resource based economy

    In other words “spending money” is the key to GOOD GOVERNANCE

    However, the serious problems of financial mismanagement and/or elite capture that currently afflict many CBOs are gravely undermining the concept of CBNRM. Consequently, the major threat to CBNRM is governance. This more easily corrected than often supposed but requires that:

    • Implementing agencies understand and operationalize the principles of CBNRM governance

    • Policy makers are committed to devolution, and operationalise this by ensuring that communities have strong rights (and responsibilities) for natural resource management

      We will describe the essential principles, and operational practice for effective governance below.


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Reason 1: Individuals determine land use with individual landholders

  • Individual landholders (including community members) are deterministic of land use and conservation outcomes.

  • Their decisions are strongly influenced by a personal cost benefit analysis that compares:

    • the value of wildlife (including tangible values like cash and intangible values like proprietorship and aesthetics),

    • to (1) alternative land uses (2) and costs and opportunity costs associated with wildlife

  • The first principle, therefore, is to maximize the value of wildlife to landholders/occupiers (i.e. INDIVIDUALS)

  • The success of commercial wildlife management in southern Africa has been based on this principle

  • However, we tend to ignore the importance of maximizing individual landholder benefit when dealing with communities by:

    • Reducing the value of wildlife through bureaucratic constraints, license fees, etc.

    • Thinking that community benefits are equivalent to individual benefits when clearly they are not. Even in communities making a lot of money from wildlife, individuals are often excluded from direct benefit. CBNRM will not be sustainable unless this is changed.


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Reason 2: Individuals determine land use with individual landholders

  • The second principle is that decision-making power must originate in the people (not the committee). The elected committee (e.g. trust, Conservancy) must be answerable to the people, and not in charge of them.

  • Many natural resources, like wildlife, are mobile or fugitive (over time and/or space), and therefore need to be managed collectively.

  • Collective management is currently problematic, and the source of the financial and governance challenges that we are well aware of.

  • Further, in Africa, elite capture is often more pronounced at local than at national level. It is a serious problem that arises from a hollow state, i.e. where leaders are neither controlled by or accountable to the people

  • To make CBNRM work, we have to explicitly address this challenge.

  • The trick to effective CBNRN governance is that individuals (not committees) must control financial benefits and decision-making

  • Achieving this requires careful design of community organizations and procedures to ensure ACCOUNTABILITY and TRANSPARENCY.


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Achieving Accountability with individual landholders

  • Bottom-up accountability is highly effective in rural communities.

  • However, it is seldom automatic, and has to be achieved by careful institutional design and role formulation

  • To protect the community, especially women and the poor, the state needs to protect the conditions for bottom-up accountability.

  • This is achieved by insisting on transparent, accountable, democratic procedures that are maintained through the conformance criteria outlined below.


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6. Illustration of the change from a top-down to a bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

Central Govt.

Chiefs

Community Resource Board

Village Action Group

Wildlife


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Administration and Scale bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

  • To design effective local organizations, it is essential to understand the relationships between difference layers of government, and their respective roles

  • In Africa there are often five layers of organization (illustrated). A sixth layer, province is omitted to simply this explanation

5. Central

Government

4. District Council

3. Community Based Organization

2. Village

(Grass-roots community)

1. Individuals

(Grass-roots community)

Wildlife/Tourism


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Centralized, colonial administration of wildlife resource bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

  • Following the London Convention of 1933, most Africa countries centralized the control of wildlife outside protected areas (note that centralization often increased in post colonial states)

  • All benefits (if there were any) were paid to Treasury, and all decisions were made by the wildlife/game department.

  • The system failed:

    • Landholders (and local governments) were alienated from wildlife and came to resent its presence

    • Wildlife declined rapidly outside protected areas

5. Central

Government

4. District Council

3. Community Based Organization

2. Village

(Grass-roots community)

1. Individuals

(Grass-roots community)

Wildlife/Tourism


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The lesson of private conservation in southern Africa bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

Recognizing that wildlife outside of parks was threatened primarily by competition for land, southern Africa adopted a sustainable use strategy. Policy makers:

  • Encouraged commercial use (rather than banning it)

  • Devolved ownership of and benefits from wildlife to private landholder

  • This led to a rapid increase in wildlife on private land in southern Africa.

  • Landholders received the following rights:

    • To benefit from wildlife

    • To manage wildlife (e.g. set quotas)

    • To allocate and sell wildlife

  • Government retained a regulatory role. This worked most effectively when:

    • A light touch approach to regulation was used

    • Regulatory functions were devolved to communities of landholders (e.g. Intensive Conservation Areas in Zimbabwe, and more recently Conservancies)

  • The success was based on a triad of principles:

    • Price – maximise the value of wildlife

    • Proprietorship – devolved rights to wildlife (often usufruct) to landholders

    • Subsidiarity – ensure that all functions are conducted at the lowest possible level. They should only move upward through upward delegation.

  • The success of this model from the 1960s, led to CBNRM

5. Central

Government

4. District Council

3. Community Based Organization (ICA)

1. Private Ranchers

Wildlife/Tourism


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CBNRM 1.0 (first generation) bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

  • The first CBNRM program was WINDFALL in Zimbabwe.

  • Benefits followed the path illustrated. District Councils were pressured to get benefits to communities producing wildlife, albeit often in the form of schools, clinics and projects.

  • WINDFALL only partially modified the original colonial model, and failedbecause:

    • The links between wildlife and benefits were long and unclear to rural people

    • People had few rights to manage wildlife themselves – they were more the objects of windfall charity than empowered wildlife producers

5. Central

Government

4. District Council

3. Community Based Organization

2. Village

(Grass-roots community)

1. Individuals

(Grass-roots community)

Wildlife/Tourism


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CBNRM 1.1 (first generation) bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

  • Zimbabwe quickly recognized these problems. This led to CAMPFIRE

  • Using the Parks and Wildlife Act, “Appropriate Authority Status” (the same status enjoyed by private landholders – see above) was devolved to District Councils.

  • The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management had wanted to establish “Village Companies” as the appropriate authorities. However, this was resisted by the Ministry of Local Government and a strategic compromised was reached whereby:

    • Rights were legally devolved to District Councils, but

    • There was a gentleman’s agreement, the “CAMPFIRE Principles/Guidelines” that rights would be further devolved to local communities

  • The closer the CAMPFIRE Principles were followed, the better the individual programs worked

  • In some communities, benefits were decided on by individuals. Some of this money was retained by households, and some was delegated upwards to the CBO for collective projects (see blue arrows)

  • It is probably not a coincidence that these were the high performing CAMPFIRE communities, and that they have proven robust even in the face of current economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe (e.g. Masoka, Mahenye).

  • Note that the blue arrow model is actually a prototype second generation CBNRM model

5. Central

Government

4. District Council

3. Community Based Organization

2. Village

(Grass-roots community)

1. Individuals

(Grass-roots community)

Wildlife/Tourism


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CBNRM 1.2 (first generation) bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

Recognizing these problems, CBNRM practioners improved the model.

  • Namibia and Botswana, for example, avoided the problems of passing benefits through district councils.

  • They established communities as legal entities (Conservancies, Trusts). Benefits flowed directly to these CBOs.

    However, in most cases, CBOs included multiple villages.

  • Research and anecdotal evidence indicates serious governance problems with this model including:

    • Low levels of individual participation and benefit (i.e. high levels of elite capture)

    • Financial impropriety

  • There are some exceptions. These are nearly always single village communities. This suggests what we call a second generation CBNRM approach

5. Central

Government

4. District Council

3. Community Based Organization

2. Village

(Grass-roots community)

1. Individuals

(Grass-roots community)

Wildlife/Tourism


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Single versus Multiple Villages bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

Defining local regimes

Implications

Preliminary data from CBNRM across the region (see next slide) is intriguing.

This confirms the importance of Madison’s dichotomy

According to Madison/ de Tocqueville:

  • A Democracy – is where every one meets together to represent themselves (Township Government)

  • A Republic – is where people’s interests are represented by elected persons

  • This correlates to:

    • A single Village with direct or participatory democracy/ accountability

    • A multi-Village community with indirect or representational governance


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Participatory Governance bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

Representational Governance

Red/Pink – gets to people (projects/cash) public good??


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The effects of full face-to-face participation bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

Where everyone in the community is involved in financial decision making (with full discretionary choice)

  • Revenue is allocated to the best combination of uses (i.e. the highest valued uses) including household and community benefits

  • This locates the origin of power in individuals (Tocqueville)

  • Does this gives us a single metric that can measure both poverty reduction at HH level and empowerment (i.e. participation, accountability, democratization)?


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CBNRM 2.0 (second generation) bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

  • This leads us to CBNRM 2.0, a second generation model build on the principles of bottom-up accountability.

  • There are several critical changes:

    • Money goes to individuals, and then flows upwards through collective agreement

    • This ensures that committees are downwardly accountable to their constituents

    • An important role for government is to protect downward accountability (see conformance criteria below)

    • Communities must be small enough to meet face-to-face regularly (i.e. single Village communities)

    • This structure is much more likely to be effective than CBNRM 1. However, structure must be accompanied by effective information

  • The following slide compares CBNRM 1.0 and CBNRM 2.0 using a wide range of performance metrics

5. Central

Government

4. District Council

3. Community Based Organization

2. Village

(Grass-roots community)

1. Individuals

(Grass-roots community)

Wildlife/Tourism


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Real data comparing performance of CBNRM 1 and CBNRM 2 bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

First Generation CBNRM

FIRST GENERATION

PERFORMANCE METRICS

SECOND GENERATION

Participation

100’s

75-100,000

Benefits

Few, public

20,500 people got cash

Central Government

Projects

10?

230+

Local Government

40-80% money missing

Accountability

0.8%

-86%

Attitudes to wildlife

+90%

Representational Democracy

0%

Investment in wildlife

18% of income

down

Wildlife trends

Stable/up

Participatory Democracy

Second Generation CBNRM


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Example Policy Statement: Organizational Structure, Roles and Responsibilities

Recognizingthat democratic institutions (e.g. CBOs) that rely on representation (rather than full and direct participation) are structurally predisposed to problems of accountability, weak participation, and non-performance:

  • Single Villages shall be constituted as the building blocks of any CBOs. As the primary level of implementation, they shall:

    • receive the majority of natural resource revenues (>85%), and

    • shall be responsible for day-to-day decisions and management.

      This is the DOING level, and all decisions shall ultimately be made by individuals.

  • Village decision processes shall be structured in such a manner that ordinary people (i.e. members) control the all activities and budgets, and are responsible for :

    • instructing committees, including setting budgets and work plans through annual general meetings. (Committees should never make budgets themselves, and should be instructed by (and never instruct) their constituents

    • controlling committee activity through regular (quarterly) feedback on financial and technical performance (variance analysis).

  • All decisions, including budgets and the control of financial and technical performance (variance), shall be fully participatory and exercised through regular (quarterly) meetings of the membership.

  • Communities shall decide on the allocation of funds to alternative uses in a full forum. They shall have the right to allocate benefits from natural resource benefits to best advantage, including:

  • Community projects (e.g. social infrastructure; revenue generating projects; loan funds; food relief; clubs)

  • Natural resource and natural resources management

  • Household cash dividends

  • Administration.

  • However, decisions may be implemented by committees that are democratically elected on an annul basis.


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continued and Responsibilities

  • Where Multi-Village CBOs are necessary:

    • their primary function shall be COORDINATION (not management).

    • They shall depend on voluntary payments from Villages, to which they are accountable. These functions shall generally be conduct with no more than 5% -15% of natural resources revenues. Multi-Village CBOs tend to create functions that do not add value if they get too much money

    • Optimally, all revenues should be allocated to Villages. Coordinating CBOs then then obtain their revenues after justifying their plans and performance to the membership of Villages


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Conformance Criteria and Responsibilities

  • Recognisingthat the devolution of (defined) rights and responsibilities is the basis for institutional evolution and should not be held out as its reward.

  • Recognising, further, that institutional evolution always involves experiment, and without authority such experiments are both methodologically and substantively defective.

  • Recognising that capacity must be created in both the leadership, but especially the followership, to avoid the problems associated with asymmetric power and knowledge relationships

  • Recognising, by implication, that the route towards effective CBNRM programmes requires entrusting communities with rights at the scale of face-to-face participation, and facilitating the followership to learn experientially how to apply these rights;

  • Recognising that “experiential learning” is not trial-and-error but a rigorous process than includes

  • (1) scrupulous monitoring and adaptive management, plus

  • (2) insistence on conformance to certain organizational principles (and sometimes

  • (3) NRM performance criteria),

    the following conformance principles shall apply:


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Institutional Conformance Principles and Responsibilities

  • Decision-making: The budget (which reflects key allocation decisions) shall be made by the whole community. Its allocation between cash dividends, projects, natural resource management and administration shall be recorded in detail (using a standard format)

  • Accountability: The variance between financial and technical status (e.g. project implementation) and the instructions embodied in the budget, shall be carefully and competently presented to, and accepted by, a minimum of two thirds of the community quarterly

  • Performance audit: Technical and financial variance analyses shall be audited internally at least twice a year, and at least once a year by an external agency, and this audit report shall be presented to the community

  • Financial management system: Each Village shall have a bank account, and a double-entry cash book systems with clear filing of invoices and receipts.

  • Banking: Income owing to a community shall be paid directly into a community bank account and protected with two panels (signatures) – that of the community, and that of the regulatory agency or a proxy acting on their behalf.

  • Release of benefits: Money shall be released in a timely manner for community benefit provided all conformance criteria and financial problems are resolved. Conformance shall be subject to a standard analysis (see form **)

  • Elections: The committee shall face re-election bi-annually subject to performance ratification by AGM


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NR Management Performance Criteria: and Responsibilities

National authorities may dictate what monitoring takes place (conformance), but the choice of desired outcomes are desired shall rest with the community. The following performance metrics should be monitored:

  • Protection effort: The community shall undertake a number of patrol days each month as agreed with the respective authority

  • Protection effectiveness: Monitoring of patrolling shall ensure that the catch-effort ratio of poaching incidence per patrol days remains below a pre-determined threshold

  • NRM status: The number of animals / fish / trees seen per unit effort (e.g. on patrol, per day, per block covered) shall be monitored

  • Monitoring offtake: The offtake of all natural resources shall be monitored by Village employees. An annual summary shall be prepared and presented to the Annual General Meetings in all Villages. For wildlife this annual summary should list:

    • all animals hunter,

    • Name of hunter,

    • the price paid, and concessions fees.

    • trophy quality

      Data provide by the national authority, the hunting outfitter, and community monitors, and shall be reconcile d.

      For fish ….

      For trees ….

  • Zonation Plan: Each community shall make a land use zonationplan and monitor adherence to plan


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Useful checklists and Responsibilities

The following slides provide:

  • Chart summarizing roles of each organization

  • Checklist to assess if community has conformed with CBNRM principles (and to authorize annual payments)

  • Checklist to assess of principles of accountable financial management are being followed

  • Checklist to assess of CBNRM principles are being followed


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6. Illustration of the change from a top-down to a bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy

Central Govt.

Community Trust / Board

5-10%

Village Action Group

80-90%

Wildlife

Some of wildlife revenue

All Wildlife Revenue (100%)

Old Policy (failed)

New Policy (Second generation)

  • Effective CBNRM requires evolution from a First Generation (left) to a truly devolved Second Generation CBNRM programme (right).

  • In a First Generation:

  • Devolution is only partial

  • People and communities are ‘subjects’. They are not trusted to make sensible decisions, and middle-level government officials invariably ratify or ‘guide’ their choices.

  • They invariably evolved into Second Generation projects because they do not really work.

  • Second Generation CBNRM Projects:

    • Generate real grass-roots participation and empowerment by devolving revenues to them.

    • Encompass principles that ensure full participation in a democratic, transparent and account system.

    • Depend heavily on scale since all members of a community institution should be able to meet face-to-face.

    • People become citizens


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  • Certification of VAG performance and approval of release of funds

  • We hereby confirm the following:

  • This VAG held at least four general meetings during the year at which matters were openly and transparently discussed and which were well attended. (If not, and you are convinced that there are legitimate reasons for this, please note these reasons below).

  • That the financial accounts of this VAG are accurate, follow the budget, and that no money has been misused, or if misuse has occurred acceptable corrective action has been taken. (Before approving this, you should be (a) be convinced that adequate and responsible corrective action has been taken and (b) the problem and actions should be summarized below). 

  • That the finances and other matters of this VAG were properly presented and approved by the community at the AGM.

  • That a membership list was updated and approved by the general community.

  • That elections were freely and fairly held and that a newly approved committee is now in place to receive the NR/wildlife income.

  • That projects and activities were properly presented for the community to choose. Communities were properly facilitated to choose projects.

  • That the choice of projects and approval of the budget was done by the community in a general meeting and was not forced on them. 

  • That the VAG reported on protection, monitoring, zonation metrics

  • That the VAG has full records of wildlife/NRM offtake and income

  • Certified by authority (or proxy): To be attached following revenue distribution:

  • AGM minutes

  • …………… ………………….. ………………. VAG AGM Summary Report (Form 2)

  • Approved Name Title

  • …………… ………………….. ……………….

  • Approved Name Title


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