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Results-Based Financing






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Presented at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 6/23/09. An Overview. Results-Based Financing. Joseph F. Naimoli, Senior Health Specialist The World Bank Contributions from Amie Batson, Ruth Levine, Magnus Lindelow, and Rena Eichler. What is RBF?.
Results-Based Financing

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Slide 1

Presented at the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention (CDC), 6/23/09

An Overview

Results-Based Financing

Joseph F. Naimoli, Senior Health Specialist

The World Bank

Contributions from Amie Batson, Ruth Levine, Magnus Lindelow, and Rena Eichler

Slide 2

What is RBF?

Different definitions; common theme

Results-based financing (RBF) ≈ Pay-for-performance (P4P)

Provision of payment for the attainment of well-defined results

Transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measureable action or achieving a predetermined performance target (CGD, 2009)

RBF takes many forms…

Payers

Payees

DonorCentral governmentLocal governmentPrivate insurer

Recipients of careHealth care providersFacilities / NGOsCentral governmentLocal governments

$

Slide 3

  • Increased utilization of MCH services

  • 3 ANC visits

  • Institutional delivery

  • Complete immunization of children under 1

  • Post-partum care within 1 week of birth

What is RBF?

Schemes vary by country

Madagascar

  • Supply-side incentives

  • Demand-side incentives

  • Often multiple beneficiaries in a cascading scheme

Improved Maternal and Child Health

Cash payment to women

Increased $ resources for health service providers

Increased $ resources for regional & district health authorities

Slide 4

People are motivated by intrinsic forces (professional pride)

People are motivated by extrinsic forces (money and recognition)

If designed well, RBF can reinforce professional pride with money and recognition, without undermining intrinsic motivation

What is RBF?

Underlying principles

Slide 5

Why RBF?

Two perspectives

RBF

Slide 6

Why RBF?Development Assistance Perspective

Business as usual unlikely to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

MDG4 progress in 68 priority countries

Source: UNICEF, 2008

Slide 7

Why RBF?Development Assistance Perspective

Frustration with traditional input-based approaches

Inputs necessary

but not sufficient!

CGD, 2009

Slide 8

Why RBF?Development Assistance Perspective

Tool for strengthening health system s

Health system building blocks, WHO, 2007

Slide 9

Why RBF?Development Assistance Perspective

Increasing recognition as promising strategy for MDGs

Taskforce on Innovative Financing for Health Systems

Raising and Channeling Funds

  • Recommendations:

  • Clearly link financing for health to defined outcomes and to measurable results in broader programmes as well as in projects, building on the specific experiences from performance-based funding and SWAps.

  • Further develop and scale up systems that effectively manage development results and provide the incentives for achieving health outcomes.

Working Group 2 report ,Final Draft , 3 June 2009

Slide 10

Why RBF?

Two perspectives

RBF

Slide 11

Why RBF? Country Perspective

Ministry of Finance looking to link decision making to observable results

Argentina: Plan Nacer

Transfers from federal to provinces (15) based on # of poor women, children enrolled in social insurance program and performance on key output measures

Decision:

Devolution of federal budget to

lower levels in the health system

accelerated, in part, by successful

results

Slide 12

Why RBF? Country Perspective

Low uptake of services, especially among the poor

Date of DHS

%

Source: Yazbeck, 2009; Gwatkin, 2007

Slide 13

Why RBF?Country Perspective

Low uptakes of services, especially among the poor

Date of DHS

%

Source: Yazbeck, 2009; Gwatkin, 2007

Slide 14

Why RBF?Country Perspective

Quality concerns, even following traditional performance-improvement interventions (training, follow-up and job aids)

Source: Bryce J, et al., Improving quality and efficiency of facility-based child health care through Integrated Management of Childhood Illness in Tanzania, Health Policy and Planning, 2005, i69-i76

Slide 15

Why RBF?Country Perspective

Current incentive structure contributes to poor performance

Slide 16

Why RBF? Country perspective

Far-ranging experimentation with provider payment reforms

RBF

Source: Buying results? Contracting for health service delivery in developing countries, Loevinsohn B. and Harding A., The Lancet, 2005, 366, 676-681

Slide 17

RBF in practice

Slide 18

RBF Challenges

Institutional change

Slide 19

RBF Challenges

Numerous possible implementation hazards

RBF in principle…

Select action or output

Define indicators

Set targets

Perform

Measure performance

Reward or

sanction

Gaming the system

Reliability, validity of administrative data

Cost of independent verification

But…

Effort in one, several areas may result in neglect of others

Too ambitious, too easy

Rules of game

Unnecessary provision or demand

Quantity trumps quality

Too much $, too little

Undermining intrinsic motivation

Beneficiaries must control behavior change

Too many, too few

Slide 20

Does RBF work?

Solid evidence on demand side

  • Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) rigorously evaluated

  • Bulk of evidence from Latin American and Caribbean countries; some encouraging evidence from Bangladesh, Cambodia

  • Effective in reducing poverty in the short term

  • Substantial increases in use of health services, primarily preventive services

  • Impact on outcomes mixed

  • Typically require complementary supply-side actions

Source: Fiszbein et al., 2009

Slide 21

Does RBF work?

Limited, mixed evidence on supply side

  • Supply side: generally weak designs

  • Argentina: increased enrollment of poor, previously uninsured women and children

  • Afghanistan and Cambodia: increases in immunization, prenatal visits, overall service use, equity gains

  • Many confounding factors (increased financing, TA, feedback, supervision, training, etc.) make it difficult to isolate effect of “incentive”

Slide 22

Does RBF work?

Rwanda leading the way in sub-Saharan Africa

Rwanda: performance bonus scheme

  • Prospective, quasi-experimental design

  • Effect of incentives was “isolated” from effect of additional resources

  • Equal amount of resources without the incentives would not have achieved the same outcomes

  • Improved child health outcomes: height for age, morbidity

Source: Gertler, et al. , 2009

Slide 23

Does RBF work?

Rwanda leading the way in sub-Saharan Africa

  • Less impact on demand-sensitive interventions (ANC)

  • Rwanda now piloting community-based performance bonus to increase demand

  • Government adopting culture of results – moving RBF to Education and other sectors

Source: Gertler, et al. , 2009

Slide 24

Does RBF work?

Need to open the “black box “ of implementation

  • Little information on “why” demand and supply schemes succeed or fail

  • Insufficient information on unintended consequences

  • Sound monitoring, documentation and evaluation of new initiatives will be critical

Slide 25

What’s next?

Slide 26

World BankHealth Results Innovation Trust Fund

  • Eight grants linked to IDA credits to finance the national strategy (International Health Partnership + principles) with focus on MDGs 4 and 5

  • Why linked to IDA credits?

    • Integrates RBF into broader policy dialogue between MOF and MOH

    • Engages Bank operational staff at country level and headquarters

    • Embeds RBF into Bank support for HSS

    • Potentially leverages additional IDA for health

  • $95 million from Norway supports comprehensive design, implementation, monitoring and impact evaluation

Slide 27

The WB Health Results Innovation Trust Fund

Country

Start

End (approx.)

Design

2009

2008

Eritrea

2011

2009

D.R. Congo

2011

2008

2009

Zambia

2011

2008

2009

Rwanda

2012

2008

2009

Afghanistan

2013

2008

2010

Benin

2012-13

2009

2010

Kyrgyz Republic

2012-13

2009

2011

2009-10

Ghana

2014

Slide 28

Characteristics of Selected RBF Trust Fund Projects

  • Afghanistan: performance-based bonus payments to NGOs

  • DR Congo: performance-based bonus payments to public facilities and health workers

  • Eritrea: demand-side incentives to mothers and performance budgets to administrative levels

  • Rwanda: performance-based contracting with community organizations to increase demand

  • Zambia: performance-based bonuses to public facilities and district

Slide 29

A common M&E Framework for RBF

Monitoring and Documentation

Impact Evaluation

Inputs

Activities

Outputs

Outcomes

Long-run results

Resources (time, people, money, commodities, etc.) mobilized

Health system platform strengthened (policy, regulations, HMIS, financial procedures, etc.)

Contracted work program activities executed

Support activities implemented

Innovative, improvised solutions applied

Contractual services used, delivered and reporting verified

Regular, timely, appropriate incentive payments made or withheld

Improved coverage of population with high impact interventions

Improved quality of care

Health promoting behavior change

Maternal mortality

reduction

Infant and child mortality

Reduction

Slide 30

Conclusions

RBF is appealing to governments

  • Motivation and creativity to strengthen health systems

  • Flexibility to engage all providers (public, private, NGO)

  • Culture of results - replacing focus on inputs

  • Facilitates targeting – at poorest, MDG 4/5

Slide 31

Conclusions

  • Both demand and supply side matter – and must be balanced

  • RBF not panacea! – must be part of broader dialogue with Ministries of Health and Finance and linked to investments in health

  • Still building evidence base but exciting potential

    • Accelerate progress toward MDGs

    • Implement Paris/Accra Principles – align with the International Health Partnership


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