Download
1 / 18
190 likes | 360 Views
Network Intrusion Detection. By Biju Varghese Siva Jambulingam Rohan Belani. Team Roles. Theory of Network Intrusion Detection Systems - Siva Problems in Network Intrusion Detection Systems - Biju Description of the Different Network Intrusion Detection Systems - Rohan. Principle.
E N D
Network Intrusion Detection By Biju Varghese Siva Jambulingam Rohan Belani
Team Roles • Theory of Network Intrusion Detection Systems - Siva • Problems in Network Intrusion Detection Systems - Biju • Description of the Different Network Intrusion Detection Systems - Rohan
Principle A secure Computer or a Network System should provide the following services • Data Confidentiality • Data and Communications Integrity • Assurance against Denial of Service
Common Intrusion Detection Systems Components • Event Generators - E Box • Analysis Engines - A Box • Database Component - D Box • Counter Measures - C Box
Passive Analysis • Detects attacks by watching for patterns of suspicious activities • Acts like a Sniffer and obtains copies of packets directly from the Network • Contents of actual packets are parsed and analyzed • It is unobtrusive and extremely difficult to evade
Signature Analysis • ID System is programmed to interpret a certain series of packets as an ATTACK • They use pattern recognition Algorithm • Look for a sub string within the main stream of data carried by network packets • Also called “Misuse Detection”
Problems with Network ID Systems Points of Vulnerability Insufficiency of Information on the wire Attacks
Points of Vulnerability in ID systems • E-box : eyes and ears of an IDS • A-box : analysis of the raw input • D-box : data storage • C-box : counter measures
Insufficiency of Information on the wire • Network ID systems work by predicting the behavior of networked machines based on the packets they exchange. • A passive network monitor cannot accurately predict whether a given machine on the network is even going to see a packet , let alone process it in the expected manner.
Attacks - Insertion • IDS can accept a packet that an end system rejects. • IDS and the end system reconstruct two different strings. • Attacker can slip attacks past IDS by “inserting” data into the IDS.
Attacks - Evasion • An end-system can accept a packet that an IDS rejects. • End system sees more data than the IDS. • This information that the IDS misses can be critical to detection of an attack.
Attacks – Denial of Service • Passive ID systems are “fail open”. • Resource Exhaustion - CPU cycles - Memory - Disk space - Network bandwidth
ISS RealSecure • Most polished IDS solution currently shipping. • Fails to deliver the flexibility unlike ID-Trak. • Delivers a solid, well-documented and easy-to-use system. • Equipped with more than 100 network-attack signatures. • The architecture uses a sensor (deployed across multiple networks) to communicate with a management console. • Allows large-scale coverage and a level of fault tolerance. • Any console can view the results of any sensor. • Console interface allows for multiple views of incident data by administrator. • Attacks can be viewed by target, source or event type.
Cisco Systems NetRanger • First commercial IDS to ship. • Contains an implementation system that is fairly versatile. • Healthy attack signature database + creative signatures. • Heavy dependency on HP’s OpenView. • Lack of documentation on the ins and outs of the product. • Failure to provide an overview of recent attacks. • Difficult to configure for non UNIX administrators. • IDS can reconfigure perimeter devices on the fly. • Absence of functionality: unable to process multiple step condition-based actions. • Dropped to second place behind ISS Real Secure.
AXENT Tech ID-Trak • Requires a Windows NT platform to run correctly. • Flexible assortment of security-related tools. • Fails to match the level of robustness, or depth that RealSecure and NetRanger provide. • Requires administrator to define a list of hosts to monitor. • Base of pre-built attack signatures is less than competitors. • Customizability is far superior: Rule-building utility allows administrators to provide more complex checks. • Provides administrator with visuals on open sessions, in real time. • Extremely hard to configure, menus are hard to interpret and navigation is extremely troublesome.
