Chapter Twelve: The Fact-Value Problem. Metaethics Philosophizing about the very terms of ethics Considering the structure of ethics as an object of inquiry. Fact-Value Problem.
Chapter Twelve: The Fact-Value Problem
Ought from Is
In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
Ought from Is
A statement is meaningful if and only if it is either tautological or empirically verifiable
1. It is too broad and allows for conduct that we typically deem immoral
2. It permits trivial judgments to count as moral ones
3. It allows the moral substance in life to slip away from ethical theory
4. There are no constraints on altering one's principles
Links moral terms with some kind of natural property. Natural in that they are found in the natural world, specifically the natural realms of human psychology and human society
Naturalism and the Open-Ended Argument
Moore's theory regards the idea of goodness as though it were a thing, the fallacy of hypostatization
It's a category mistake to treat a functional term as though it were a thing