An analysis of Kant’s argument against the Cartesian skeptic in his ‘Refutation of Idealism”

1. An analysis of Kant’s argument against the Cartesian skeptic in his ‘Refutation of Idealism” Note: Audio links to youtube are found on my blog at matthewnevius.wordpress.com

2. Introduction • The question being asked is whether one can know objects outside of ones representations of that object. • Is this object, that is distinct from the representation, ontologically distinct or no? • Can one be an empirical realist and still refute the Cartesian skeptic?

3. Kant’s Thesis • “The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.” • What does Kant mean by consciousness being ‘empirically determined’? • Objects ‘in space outside me’?

4. The Argument • His argument is as follows: (1) “I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. (2) All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. (3) This permanent cannot, however, be something in me, since it is only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself be determined. (4) Thus perception of this permanent is possible through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me.(5)Now consciousness [of my existence] in time is necessarily bound up with consciousness of the [condition of the] possibility of this time-determination; and is therefore necessarily bound up with the existence of things outside me, as the condition of the time-determination” (B 276).

5. Distinction between ‘problematic idealism’ and ‘transcendental idealism’ with respect to the status of objects • “The required proof must, therefore, show that we have experience, and not merely imagination of outer things; and this, it would seem, cannot be achieved save by proof that even our inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only on the assumption of outer experience” (B275 added italics for emphasis).

6. Premise 1: “I am conscious of my own existence in time” (B276). • Kant’s conception of space and time • “The required proof must, therefore, show that we have experience, and not merely imagination of outer things; and this, it would seem, cannot be achieved save by proof that even our inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only on the assumption of outer experience” (B275).

7. Premise 2: “All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception” (B275). • What are the conditions for something to be permanent in perception? • “In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished”(B224). The substance is that which is permanent, does Kant mean an Aristotelian notion of substance or a Cartesian notion of substance? • Kant’s conception of Substance as a category of the understanding matter in motion

8. Premise 3: “This persisting thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persisting thing” (B275). • Premise 31: “But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all grounds of determination of my existence which are to be met with in me are representations; and as representations themselves require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and so my existence in the time wherein they change, may be determined” (Preface to B pg.36).

9. Premise 3 and 31 • Why cannot the intuition of the persisting thing be in me as subject? • Why cannot the subject be the persisting substance? • Example of the perception of the two ships to explain something as persisting in perception • Absolute permanence vs. relative permanence

10. Premise 4: “Thus perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me.” (B276).

11. This conclusion in premise 4 seems only to say that the object must be spatial but what about objects of the imagination? How does Kant distinguish from the imagination and the things that are ‘really’ out there apart from consciousness?

12. Premise 5: “Now consciousness [of my existence] in time is necessarily bound up with consciousness of the [condition of the] possibility of this time-determination; and is therefore necessarily bound up with the existence of things outside me, as the condition of the time-determination” (B 276).

13. Two poles of existence • there are two aspects or two poles of experience, the consciousness of ones existence in time is necessary bound up with the conditions of the very experience of one’s self as existing.

14. Concluding thoughts: • Empirically speaking I believe we can call Kant a empirical realist, in the sense that space and time are ‘real’ and that there are objects outside the mind that persist through time by virtue of the absolute persisting thing, which in Kant’s case would be the substratum of all experience as succession of events in time. The objects are ‘real’ in the sense that they are given as outer objects to inner experience and not the other way around. In a sense we have immediate experience of the outer objects and mediate experience of the inner objects. We can contrast and compare the inner and outer by virtue of the laws of causality outside of oneself. If one determines an object in time and that object is one’s own existence we can say that existence is not inferred but rather is immediate. To make an inference to outer objects is the very problem Kant is trying to refute. • What do you think of Kant’s attempt to reach ‘real’ objects?