The Management of Crisis Response

1. The Management of Crisis Response Donald P. Moynihan, La Follette School of Public Affairs University of Wisconsin-Madison Research supported by the National Science Foundation Award # 0856576

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3. Outline Why are disasters a difficult organizational problem? The incident command system: a mixture of hierarchy and network What makes the ICS work (and fail)? Overcoming red tape The effects of blaming in disasters

4. Part I: Why are disasters a difficult organizational problem?

5. When do bureaucracies work well? Clear tasks, easy to define and measure Outcomes under control of government Stability – allows use of standard operating procedures and planning Autonomy and flexibility Adequate resources Mission-based culture

6. Disasters do not feature conditions friendly to bureaucracy Disaster response usually not core mission – features novel tasks and challenges, limited control over key aspects Lack of relevant experience – cannot engage in trial and error learning, previous experience ambiguous Organizations must work with other, often unfamiliar organizations – loss of autonomy Goals poorly defined, organizational role in achieving goals unclear Lack of adequate resources The bigger the scale of the disaster, the worse these conditions become

7. Crisis management paradox • No single organization with resources to respond to large or infrequent crises – we need an interorganizational network • But networks tend to rely on consensus and voluntary action • We also need centralization tocombine resources of large networks with rapid and consistent action • Federal crisis policies • acknowledge need for network of responders to disasters, but… • also call for hierarchical command and control to direct network

8. Part II: The incident command system: a mixture of hierarchy and network

9. Solution: Incident Command Systems • Functional origin • 1970s – forest fire responders in California • Wanted a common language, management concepts, and communications • Centralized response authority • Voluntary adoption • Reputation grew – use in other states and for other crises (hazardous material cleanups, earthquakes, and floods) • Mandatory requirement • FEMA began to use it in 1990s, required in 2004 for anyone receiving federal DHS funding

10. This is the ICS: a traditional view

11. Benefits of ICS Common language and network governance rules Mechanism to mediate and resolve conflict Coordinates tasks to avoid duplication or absence of response Central point through which information flows Speeds decisions and clarifies accountability

12. Is the ICS really a hierarchy? • On paper looks like a hierarchy, but… • Multiple organizations with their own background • Limited and temporary control of members

13. This is also ICS: a network view New actor with no connection New actor with no connection New actor connected to existing member

14. Part III: What makes the ICS work (and fail)?

15. Research Methods • Six case studies of ICS • wildland-urban fires in California, 1993/2003 • terrorist attacks (Oklahoma City 1995, Pentagon 9/11) • animal disease outbreak 2003 • Hurricane Katrina 2005 • All bar one of these cases relatively successful responses

16. Continued importance of network issues Even with centralized network governance, network diversity, shared authority and trust affects crisis response operations

17. The influence of network diversity • Network theory: large, diverse networks difficult to coordinate • Supported by case evidence • Larger ICS struggled to coordinate • Tensions between actors from different organizations • Difficult to incorporate emergent aspects of network during crisis • ICS supposed to provide common language, but what if members do not speak the language?

18. Examples Wildland-urban fire responders: shared cultural norms, shared knowledge of ICS Animal disease response: vets vs. forest service officials Katrina: over 500 organizations – how many familiar with ICS? Volunteers at Pentagon at 9/11, Katrina, and Oklahoma – wanted to help, but how to incorporate them?

19. Shared Authority Simply having an ICS does not determine who is in charge Command authority frequently ambiguous, often negotiated/contested between members In some cases command divided between key organizations Even single commanders must attend to needs and concerns of members Potentials for multiple, competing commands

20. Examples • Terrorist incidents: FEMA, FBI, and local fire chief all could claim jurisdiction – in Oklahoma fire chief maintained control, in Pentagon it was shared • Katrina had no unified command: 3 major operational commands just among federal responders: • Federal Coordinating Officer at Joint Field Office; the Principal Federal Official (new role); Joint Task Force Katrina • Led to “freelancing” and bypassing command

21. Working Relationships and Trust • Essential supplement to command relationships: • fosters cooperation and problem-solving between agencies • reduce conflict over authority and policy • eases assignment of responsibilities • encourages information sharing • facilitates flow of resources • incorporates new actors into the network • reduces potential for blame-shifting and solo action

22. Examples • Animal disease response: State veterinarian and Area Veterinarian in Charge (federal employee) have ongoing relationship. Worked together as joint commanders: • “There are definite advantages in that ongoing relationship because they work together on a routine basis on the management of day-to-day programs. So when you are thrown in the crisis mode you are in, they already have those established working relationships and don’t have to develop them during the response.” (Dr. Mark Davidson, a Deputy Incident Commander) • Fire response: responders had worked with each other frequently • Oklahoma: Mayor, police chief, fire chief were golfing buddies; could incorporate emergent actors who knew incident commander

23. Examples • Pentagon: Virginia firefighters worked with incident commander (from Arlington Co. Fire Department) while DC firefighters freelanced; FBI had liaison who had worked closely with incident commander • Katrina: Weakening of FEMA undercut state/local ties • ‘‘Numerous officials and operators, from state and FEMA directors to local emergency managers told the same story: if members of the state and federal emergency response teams are meeting one another for the first time at the operations center, then you should not expect a well coordinated response.’’ (House Report)

24. Part IV: Overcoming red tape Culture is important

25. The role of red tape in Katrina • Perception that response was limited by “red tape” • “Most important, we must eliminate the extraordinary red tape and resulting delays in the process of requests for assistance in response efforts.” (White House Report) • Case study of red tape in the response of the Department of Defense • Largest response organization, most duties under National Response Plan • In early stages, weak response, but much more active later • Reason has to do with DOD culture and effects on red tape

26. Organizational Culture in the Department of Defense • How do we understand culture? • Ideas like “culture of preparedness” not very helpful • Culture based in unique history, symbols, unspoken assumptions of an organization • Most large organizations have multiple cultures • U.S. DOD: two cultural traits • Desire for autonomy: reluctance to take on non-military missions, or work with others • Can-do culture: do what is necessary to achieve mission • In crisis response, two characteristics are in conflict

27. Desire for autonomy • Belief of separation of military and civilian life • Resistance to military operations other than war • “In the macho world of the military, it wasn’t difficult to see who would lose this doctrinal fight: obviously the guy who’s only talking about things ‘other than war.’ Who, after all, joins the military to do things other than war? I mean, isn’t that called the Peace Corps?” • DOD crisis response doctrine: • Do not become involved if other agencies can do it • Field command can request assistance, but not give orders • All requests must go through detailed review process via the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS), which has 21 steps • If crisis is serious enough, military will set up its own command

28. Period One: The Moment of Inertia • Pre-landfall (Sunday) and until two days later • Not proactive: waited for requests – would not move troops • JDOMS procedure burdensome – asking for excessive detail that officials on ground could not provide • Military liasions to FEMA: • “JDOMS is notorious … ‘Well, you can't ask for it that way. You need to do it like this.’ Well, tell me how I need to ask for it, you know? I just need some helicopter support down there” • “there were some delays over there for 9,153 different reasons, and that created some angst…I think it's just a cultural thing, all the way up…Just a cultural reluctance that they want to make sure that mission analysis is done and all the options are explored before you come to DOD”

30. The Culture-Switching Moment • Tuesday morning DOD leaders realized seriousness, accepted its role • President wants more active response • “Whatever you can think of and get it moving yesterday…Overkill is better than undershoot. POTUS is coming back to D.C. tonight just for this” (Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander of NorthCom) • Leaders signaled to organizational actors to act consistent with can-do norms • “lean forward”, “blank check” • Reliance on vocal command rather than written orders

32. Period Two: The Can-Do Response Message: “We're moving anything we think FEMA will need. No obstacles from DOD or Joint” (Northcom Commander Admiral Keating) DOD completed incomplete requests, or made up their own Helped with evacuation, searched for survivors, assisted rescues, maintained law and order, provided supplies and logistics, mortuary services

33. The Can-do response “The pendulum swung from one extreme to the other through this. I mean, it went from having to pry Secretary Rumsfeld's fingers off of a helicopter package…and this 100-pound gorilla just goes, ‘Okay, we've got it.’ Boom, and then the floodgates open” (military liaison) Majority of resources deployed ($805M) were in process of execution by time they were officially approved “one of the best examples of cutting through bureaucratic red tape and getting on with the job” (DHS Deputy Secretary)

34. Preference for autonomy remains Never submitted to unified command Told FEMA what it would do “You're supposed to take care of that gorilla and be responsible for that gorilla, but that 800-pound gorilla is going to do what he wants to do when he wants to do it and how he wants to do it.” (FEMA official)

35. Part V: The effects of blaming in disasters

36. The Politics of Blame in Disasters • Why does blame matter so much? • Negativity bias • The public (and media) care more about not losing than gaining • Political consequences • Disasters are very visible, salient, and touch on basic values • Lend themselves to narratives of failure that are hard to overcome • Katrina was key event in undermining broad support for Bush

37. Practical consequences Fear of blame will shape operational decisions How does this matter in crisis response networks? Participation in crisis response often mandated, not voluntary (e.g. National Response Plan) Participants have multiple audiences: those inside the network, and those outside If extra-network organizational reputation is more important than intra-network organizational reputation, blaming among network members increases

38. Lots of blame in Katrina • State Governor (Democrat) blamed President • State press release: “Blanco declares state of emergency, while Bush vacations at the ranch” • White House blamed state • Citizens use partisan frames to accept or reject these claims • Blame within federal govt: DHS blamed FEMA; DOD blamed FEMA (and vice versa) and DHS • Everyone blamed Michael Brown

39. Strategies employed: Blameshifting • Characteristics • we were not responsible for this function, here are the actors who were; • other actors failed to coordinate properly with us, preventing us from doing our job, and • other actors performed poorly • Brown: Federal officials asked him to “tell the truth about how bad the state was…And what was the purpose? It shifts the blame. And my problem was I'm so pissed off and had been so battered that I fell into that trap because I'm thinking this will help rehabilitate me.” • Risk: Scapegoating of knowledgeable actors can backfire

40. Strategies employed: Solo-action • Continue to provide services, but reduce coordination, e.g. Coast Guard, DOD • Logical when actor judges: • coordinating with other members of the network will actually result in lower effectiveness for their organization; • the network as a whole is failing; even competent performance within network will not be exempted from criticism • Risk: if overall network performs well and is credible, defectors may be criticized

41. Strategies employed: Jurisdiction Claiming • Logical when: • It is not feasible to deny responsibility and retreat – inaction draws blame • Significant real shift in responsibilities • Temporal dynamics of crisis create credit claiming opportunities, i.e., things get better; • Federalizing the National Guard • “It was a proposal to allow the federal government to claim credit for the corner being turned on the ground in New Orleans” – (Blanco Chief of Staff)

42. Effects of blame • Reduces factors that facilitate response • Trust and reciprocity is undermined • In the next crisis, how will you work with those who blamed you • Example: • Hurricane Wilma, right after Katrina • Appointed Governor as incident commander to block federal influence

43. Thanks! Questions, comments, rotten fruit…