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Blue Security: Challenges With CAN-SPAM Automation

Blue Security: Challenges With CAN-SPAM Automation. Eran Reshef Blue Security, Inc. Sep 2005 Note: This Presentation Describes Blue Security’s Phase II Beta. Why Did We Found Blue?. Internet users do not want to receive spam The CAN-SPAM law allows users to opt-out

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Blue Security: Challenges With CAN-SPAM Automation

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  1. Blue Security: Challenges With CAN-SPAM Automation Eran Reshef Blue Security, Inc. Sep 2005 Note: This Presentation Describes Blue Security’s Phase II Beta

  2. Why Did We Found Blue? • Internet users do not want to receive spam • The CAN-SPAM law allows users to opt-out • In reality, it is extremely difficult to opt-out: • Faked “reply-to:” addresses • Broken “unsubscribe” forms • Unsubscribe usually brings more spam • Spyware harboring in spam sites • Even if opt-out was possible, there is too much spam to opt-out from manually • Our approach: an automated opt-out mechanism

  3. Key Principles • One opt-out request per each spam message sent to a member’s personal mailbox • Opt-outs are sent via HTTP to advertisers’ web sites • Manual analysis to overcome “Joe jobs” and zombie web sites • No interference with Internet infrastructure • Opt-outs refer spammers to a hashed registry

  4. Naïve Approach Spammer User’s mailbox spam spam User’s opt- out software opt out via email (joe@example.com)

  5. Problems with Naïve Approach • From address is almost always faked • Cannot use “From” to email back to spammer • Sender machine is almost always a zombie • Emailing the IP owner will reach either a careless admin or an ISP

  6. Opt-out at Merchant’s Site Spammer User’s mailbox spam spam Merchant’s web site User’s opt- out software opt out via http (joe@example.com)

  7. Mechanics of Opt-Out Requests • Open an HTTP session to the merchant’s site • Politely crawl site to locate all HTML forms • Spammers randomize links to prevent automated opt-out requests, so crawling is necessary • Max 3 connections (Internet Explorer’s default) • Several seconds pause between each request • Post opt-out text in HTML forms • Ignore client-side validation (JavaScript) • No use of random information (e.g., credit cards)

  8. Problems • What it spam? • Legitimate email is sometimes perceived by users as spam • Joe Jobs • For only $250, one could get millions of emails appearing to advertise a competitor • Zombie web sites • Few spam sites (and all phishing sites) are hosted on compromised home computers

  9. Analysis Service Spammer User's mailbox Blue’s Analysis spam suspected spam Spammer’s web site opt-out instructions User's opt- out software opt out via http (joe@example.com)

  10. Analysis Service Overview • Tracking and researching very few top spammers at each point in time • Currently less than 15 online pharmacies • Extensive manual verification of web sites • White lists, black lists, Internet searches, etc. • Relying on honeypots for deciding which web sites are spammers, not user reports

  11. Spam Currently Not Handled • Emails not sent by the few tracked spammers • Emails advertising legitimate companies • Emails advertising sites hosted in legitimate ISPs (e.g., US based) • Emails advertising sites hosted anywhere but spam-friendly ISPs • Emails without URLs • Emails sent only to users, not to honeypots

  12. Problems • Opt-out text reveals email address of user

  13. Hashed Registry Blue’s Registry hashed addrs addrs Spammer User's mailbox Blue’s Analysis spam Spammer’s web site opt-out instructions User's opt- out software opt out via http (registry)

  14. Registry Overview • Registry entry does not validate a “live address”: • Hashed email addresses of users • High number of hashed addresses of honeypots • Registry has a controlled level of false-positives to protect against brute-force attacks • The registry itself and email cleaning tools (including source code) are offered free of charge to anyone

  15. Problems • Bypassing ISP’s abuse teams • Not leveraging existing anti-spam policies of other Internet entities (e.g., domain registrars) • Not allowing spammers’ to clean their lists before receiving opt-out requests

  16. Spam Reports Spam Reports Blue’s Registry Registrars, ISPs, … hashed addrs addrs Spammer User's mailbox Blue’s Analysis spam suspected spam Spammer’s web site opt-out instructions User's opt- out software opt out via http (registry)

  17. Spam Reports Overview • Reports are sent mainly to hosting ISPs and to advertisers’ sites • One report is sent on behalf of all the members • Reports are usually sent via emails to abuse desks of relevant parties

  18. Do Not Intrude Registry Stats • 25,000 members • ~250,000 spam/day received • Typical case • 15,000 opt-out requests sent by members over a period of 10 hours to a leading spamvertised online pharmacy • Spammer shut down all his domains a few hours after the sending of opt-out requests ended

  19. Opting-out is Not DDoS • Legitimate traffic • Each member submits one opt-out request per each spam message sent to his or her personal mailbox • Invited traffic • Each spam is an invitation to visit the advertiser’s site • Low-volume traffic • Each opt-out request mimics a user submitting one opt-out request at the spammer’s site • No synchronization • Blue security does not initiate or control timing of opt-out requests • Intention • Exercise opt-out right granted under CAN-SPAM law

  20. Spammer’s Perspective • Spammer sends 10M messages • Spammer should expect ~800,000 visitors • Industry average is 8% response rate (source: DoubleClick) • Spammer is required by law to support 10M opt-out requests • If the spammer is a legitimate business, he should have no problem handling even the entire blue community (25,000 users).

  21. Members Are Not Zombies • Members select which spam to complain about (1st control point) • Members can stop all opt-outs (2nd control point) • Full logging (3rd control point) • Members can uninstall the Blue Frog (4th control point) • Compare to challenge/response systems (e.g., Qurb, acquired by Computer Associated)

  22. This Will Not Make Things Worse • “Successful” steady state • Spammers do not send spam to registered members • Members do not send opt-out requests • Much less spam in the Internet • “Failure” steady state • Spammers ignore registry • Community disbands • Same traffic as before • Transient state is short and involves a small community, so there is no real impact on Internet traffic

  23. Summary • Do Not Intrude Registry is an implementation of an automated opt-out mechanism in a secure and responsible manner • Initial signs spammers may respect opt-out requests • Blue Security is interested in cooperation with ISPs and anti-spam vendors • Q & A

  24. Backup Slides

  25. Spammer’s Countermeasures • Spam URLs contain email validation tokens • Analysis service substitutes member-reported URL with honeypot-reported URL • Spammer redirects traffic to legitimate domains or IP addresses • Each opt-out request is limited to specific domains and IP ranges • More countermeasures are expected

  26. Spam Is Not a Solved Problem • Even a low false positive ratio is unacceptable to some users • Sales person do not wish to miss even one customer • Even a low false negative ratio is unacceptable to some users • Religious people are offended by porno spam • Many users cannot afford top-notch filters • In many countries, ISPs charge extra for filters

  27. More Information • www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/spam/rules.htm - The Federal Trade Commission's summary page of Rules, Regulations and Acts regarding unsolicited commercial Email, pornographic and offensive Email, and Email fraud. • www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/canspam.htm - The Federal Trade Commission's Requirements for Commercial Emailers. • www.bluesecurity.com – Blue Security’s web site

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