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Powerpoint slides for professors spring 2010 version

PowerPoint Slidesfor Professors

Spring 2010 Version

This file as well as all other PowerPoint files for the book, “Risk Management and Insurance: Perspectives in a Global Economy” authored by Skipper and Kwon and published by Blackwell (2007), has been created solely for classes where the book is used as a text. Use or reproduction of the file for any other purposes, known or to be known, is prohibited without prior written permission by the authors.

Visit the following site for updates:

http://facpub.stjohns.edu/~kwonw/Blackwell.html.

To change the slide design/background,

[View]  [Slide Master]

W. Jean Kwon, Ph.D., CPCUSchool of Risk Management, St. John’s University101 Murray StreetNew York, NY 10007, USA

Phone: +1 (212) 277-5196E-mail: [email protected]


Powerpoint slides for professors spring 2010 version

Risk Management and Insurance: Perspectives in a Global Economy 19. The Economic Foundations of Insurance

There are two sections (Insurance Legal Principles; Insurance Contract Structure).

Both are derived from Appendix Chapter 2.

Click Here to Add Professor and Course Information


Study points

Study Points

  • Expected utility and the demand for insurance

  • Insurance supply: characteristics of ideal insurable exposures


Expected utility and the demand for insurance

Expected Utility and the Demand for Insurance


Recall the cases

Recall the Cases

  • John and Mary

    • Risk-averse utility function

  • XYZ Insurance

    • Expected value theory

    • Premium at cost


How premium is calculated

How Premium Is Calculated?

  • Cost  expected loss

  • Loadings for

    • Internal expenses (e.g., underwriting and marketing)

    • External fees (e.g., premium taxes and license fees)

  • Profits


Moral hazard

Moral Hazard

  • The propensity of individuals to alter their behavior when risk is transferred to a third party, such as being less careful in:

    • Maintaining health condition

    • Driving

    • House maintenance

  • Fraud as an extreme case


Insurance demand in markets with moral hazard

Insurance Demand in Markets with Moral Hazard

Discussion in page 482

  • Ex-ante moral hazard

    • Insurance fraud

  • Ex-post moral hazard

  • Insurer responses to moral hazard

    • Controlling the marginal benefit of being careful or the marginal cost of being careless

    • Loss sharing through deductible and coinsurance

      • Insight 19.2

    • Rewarding insureds who undertake loss preventing activities

      • Retrospective or experience rating


Moral hazard and insurance demand andrew

Moral Hazard and Insurance DemandAndrew

  • Andrew, risk-averse salesperson

    • Has €12,000 in cash and a car worth €4,000

    • Probability of accident depending on his driving behavior

      • If not careful, p = 0.5

      • If careful, p = 0.2 but incurs additional expense of €1,000

    • Has a square root function for his wealth utility


Moral hazard and insurance demand ecu insurance

Moral Hazard and Insurance DemandEcu Insurance

  • Ecu Insurance Company

    • Full insurance at the actuarially fair premium

    • Should it consider Andrew is a safe or risky driver?

      • If a safe driver: premium = 0.2 x €4,000 = €800

      • Otherwise: premium = 0.5 x €4,000 = €2,000


Insurer responses to moral hazard

Insurer Responses to Moral Hazard

  • Controlling the marginal benefit of being careful or the marginal cost of being careless

  • Loss sharing through deductible and coinsurance

    • Insight 19.2

  • Rewarding insureds who undertake loss preventing activities

    • Retrospective or experience rating


Deductible and coinsurance insight 19 2

Stop loss

Coinsurance

Coinsurance

Deductible

Deductible

Insured’s Share

Insurer’s Share

Deductible and Coinsurance (Insight 19.2)


Deductible and coinsurance another look

Deductible and Coinsurance (Another Look)

Frequency

Amount Financed

Amount Retained

Coinsurance

Stop Loss

Severity

Deductible

Coverage Limit


Insurance demand in markets with adverse selection

Insurance Demand in Markets with Adverse Selection

Discussion in page 485-486

  • The effect of adverse selection on insurance markets

  • Insurer responses

    • Eliciting more information about applicants and insureds

    • Designing insurance contracts that encourage insureds with differing risk types to self-select into the most appropriate risk class

      • Table 19.1


Adverse selection and insurance demand individual rating

Adverse Selection and Insurance DemandIndividual Rating

  • Two Japanese

    • Risk averse and each with initial wealth of ¥125,000

    • Will suffer a ¥100,000 loss if cancer develops

    • One is “low risk” (p = 0.25) and the other is “high risk” (p = 0.75)

    • Insurance at actuarially fair premium


Adverse selection and insurance demand pooled rating

Adverse Selection and Insurance DemandPooled Rating

  • If the insurer pools both risks

    • Fair pooled premium [(¥75,000 + ¥25,000) ÷ 2] = ¥50,000


A solution

A Solution

  • Eliciting more information about applicants and insureds

  • Designing insurance contracts that encourage insureds with differing risk types to self-select into the most appropriate risk class


An example using a simple pricing technique

An Example Using a Simple Pricing Technique


Insurer s tool underwriting

Insurer’s Tool – Underwriting

  • Case

    • A city with one health insurer, Monopoly Insurance

    • All citizens must purchase health insurance.

    • There are 1,000 good risk citizens and 1,000 bad risk citizens.

  • Will the insurer classify them into high and low risk classes and charge different premiums?

    • No. Instead, it can treat all risks equal and charge the same premium.

    • No medical exam would be required.


Insurer s tool underwriting1

Insurer’s Tool – Underwriting

  • Suppose

    • A good risk costs the insurer $1000 a year.

    • A bad risk costs the insurer $5,000 a year.

  • The pooled premium is then:


Insurer s tool underwriting2

Insurer’s Tool – Underwriting

Medical Exam Required

Those Who Pass Gets the Coverage for $2,000 of yearly premium.

Those Who Fail Gets the Coverage for $4,000 of yearly premium.

  • Suppose now

    • Competition Insurance enters the market.

    • It has the risk information of the city.

    • It wants to generate profits with minimum effort. Possible?

  • The result

    • Monopoly Insurance goes out of business.


Substitutes for insurance

Substitutes for Insurance

  • Substitutes

    • Higher insurance prices tend to decrease the amount of market insurance purchased by risk-averse individuals and increase the amount of loss reduction “bought.”

  • Complements

    • Loss prevention and market insurance are complements, not substitutes.

      • An investment in loss prevention may actually raise the amount of risk that a risk-averse person faces and therefore raises the demand for market insurance.


Why corporations purchase insurance

Why Corporations Purchase Insurance


Why corporations purchase insurance1

Why Corporations Purchase Insurance

Discussion continues from Chapter 2

  • Already covered are:

    • Managerial self-interest

    • Corporate taxation

    • Cost of financial distress

    • Capital market imperfections

  • Other reasons include:

    • Insurers may offer real service efficiencies.

    • Regulated industries have a higher demand for insurance.

    • The purchase of some types of insurance is required by government.


Ideal insurable exposures not necessarily practical in some aspects

“Ideal” Insurable Exposures– Not Necessarily Practical in Some Aspects


Ideal insurable exposures

“Ideal” Insurable Exposures

  • Presence of numerous independent and identically distributed (IID) units

  • Unintentional losses

  • Easily determinable losses as to time, amount, and type

  • Economically feasible premium


Numerous iid exposure units

Numerous IID Exposure Units

  • Each exposure unit (e.g., liability risk) in an insurance pool should be IID.

  • Two random variables (e.g., exposures units) are independent if the occurrence of an event affecting one of the variables has no affect on the other variable.

    • The independence property is important because it affects how well insurers can diversify the systematic risk of their insurance pools.

  • Random variables are identically distributed if the probability distributions of two random variables prescribe the same probability to each potential occurrence.


Numerous iid exposure units1

Numerous IID Exposure Units

  • The law of large numbers

    • Variance and standard deviation as measures of dispersion

  • Effects of pooling IID exposures units – A fire insurer would be interested in the following four statistics:

    • The total amount of losses expected to be paid during the year;

    • The standard deviation of the total loss distribution (to understand the riskiness inherent in providing this insurance)

    • The average loss (to determine the premium to be charged);

    • The standard deviation of the average loss distribution (to determine the risk each exposure unit contributes to the risk class)


Average loss distribution of an insurance pool figure 19 2

Average Loss Distribution of an Insurance Pool (Figure 19.2)


Probability of ruin figure 19 3

Probability of Ruin (Figure 19.3)


Accidental losses

Accidental Losses

  • Losses should be accidental or unintentional

    • We made this point earlier in the context of moral hazard

    • From a societal viewpoint, it clearly is not good public policy to allow policyholders to collect insurance proceeds for internationally causing losses.

  • Some losses occur naturally over time.

    • It is usually less expensive to budget for possible repair or replacement of the property than to purchase insurance.


Determinable losses

Determinable Losses

  • The details of the insured loss – time, place, and amount – must be verified and the payment amount agreed upon by the insured and the insurer.

  • The costs of verifying loss details should be relatively low for insurance to be offered at an economically feasible premium.


Economically feasible premiums

Economically Feasible Premiums

  • On the one hand, rational risk-averse individuals will pay a maximum premium equal to the expected value of the loss plus the risk premium. On the other, the owners of private insurance companies require that insurance rates be enough to give them a competitive return on their investments.

  • Factors affecting this range

    • Competition in the market

    • Threats of new entrances

    • Price

    • Threat of alternative products and substitutes

    • The bargaining power of consumers

    • The degrees of risk attitudes of consumers


Legal aspects a short visit appendix chapter a2

Legal Aspects: A Short VisitAppendix Chapter A2


Legal principles

Legal Principles

  • Indemnity

  • Insurable interest

  • Utmost good faith


Indemnity

Indemnity

  • In nonlife insurance

    • Actual cash value (ACV)

    • Replacement cost

    • Valued policy

    • Other insurance provision

      • Primary and excess insurance Figure A2-1

    • Subrogation


Another example of primary and excess

Excess

Primary

Another Example of Primary and Excess

Personal Umbrella Liability Insurance

(Liability Coverage)

$1,000,000

Homeowner’s

(Liability Coverage)

$500,000

Personal Automobile

(Liability Coverage)

$300,000


Indemnity1

Indemnity

  • In life insurance

    • No application of “other insurance” provision

      • When applied, it could be in relation to the total earnings power of the insured life and the sum of life insurance in the aggregate of all outstanding policies

    • Thus, life insurance policies are “valued policies.”

  • In health insurance

    • ‘Coordination of benefits”


Insurable interest

Insurable Interest

  • The principle:

    • An insured must have a financial interest in the loss event that is the subject of the insurance contract for the policy.

  • Application in

    • Nonlife insurance

      • Bailment

    • Life insurance

      • Insurable interest for domestic partners  Insight A2-2

      • Viatical Settlements (and Death Bonds)  Insight A2-3

Bailment – Temporary change in possession of property but with no change in ownership


Utmost good faith

Utmost Good Faith

  • A higher degree of honesty on the parties to an insurance contract than what is expected from parties to other [legal] contracts

  • Information asymmetry problem inherent with insurance contracts

Good faith

Utmost Good faith

http://www.lawyersrealestate.com.au/blogger/2006_04_01_archive.asp; http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1780026/posts


Utmost good faith applications

Utmost Good Faith – Applications

Materiality?

  • Misrepresentation

    • Material response incorrectly made by an applicant in procuring insurance

  • Concealment

    • Intentional failure to disclose material information

  • Warranty

    • Statement of fact or promise that must be true for the insurer to be liable under the insurance contract


Powerpoint slides for professors spring 2010 version

When "material" misrepresentation

or concealment is found...,

The contract becomes

"voidable."

Cancelled Contract?

Void Contract?


Insurance contract a short visit appendix chapter a2

Insurance Contract: A Short VisitAppendix Chapter A2


Characteristics

Characteristics

  • Aleatory contract

    • The values exchanged by the contracting parties may not seem equal.

  • Unilateral contract

    • Only one party (the insurer) has a legal duty to act.

  • Conditional contract

    • The insurer is obligated to honor its promises only if the insured has complied with certain conditions specified in the policy.


Characteristics continued

Characteristics (continued)

  • Personal contract

    • The agreement is between the insurer and the insured person (not the insured property).

      • Hence, property insurance contracts cannot be assigned to another insured person without the insurer’s consent.

  • Contract of adhesion

    • The contract is designed by one party and offered to another party on a "take it or leave it" basis.

  • Reasonable expectations doctrine

    • It considers the objectively reasonable expectations of insureds and beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts.


The insurance contracting process

The Insurance Contracting Process

  • Offer and acceptance

    • Binding authority

    • Conditional premium receipt

  • Consideration

    • Insurer – promise to pay the stipulated insurance benefits

    • Insured – complete application and initial premium payment

  • Legal competence

    • Age?

  • Legal purpose


Structure of the insurance contract

Structure of the Insurance Contract

  • Declarations

  • Insuring agreements

  • Exclusions

  • Conditions

  • Endorsements (riders)


Declarations page

Declarations (Page)

Insight A2-4Automobile Liability Insurance Limits

  • Policy limits

    • Aggregate limits

    • Sublimits such as:

      • Per person limit

      • Per occurrence limit

  • Loss sharing

    • Deductible

      • Elimination period (e.g., health insurance)

    • Coinsurance


Insuring agreements

Insuring Agreements

  • Describes the nature of the insurer's obligations:

    • Promises to pay certain sums upon the occurrence of enumerated events, for example:

      • Property damage to covered property caused by insured perils

      • Payment for settlements and judgments when the insured is found legally liable for activities covered in the contract

        • Plus a duty to defend the insured against all allegations

      • Life insurer’s promise to pay the beneficiary (or insured) certain amounts upon the death (or survival) of the insured

      • In health insurance, reimbursement of covered medical expenses or the periodic payment of income for covered disabilities


Exclusions

Exclusions

  • A necessary element of the contract for the following reasons

    • Insurable risks should be independent and identically distributed loss events.

    • Problems of moral hazard must be addressed.

    • When applicable, the insurer avoids overlapping coverage and the inefficiency created by such redundancy.

    • Exclusions can serve to limit coverage to make the premium more affordable.


Conditions

Conditions

  • The insured must meet these conditions to keep the policy valid and to receive applicable benefits.

    • Prompt notification of a loss event

    • Mitigation of the property from further loss

    • Documentation of evidence

    • Cooperation to the insurer and investigation


Conditions termination of contract

Conditions – Termination of Contract

Cancellation differs from voiding (avoiding)a contract or void contract.

  • Cancellation

  • Nonrenewal


Endorsements and riders

Endorsements and Riders

  • Added to the standardized contract to modify the terms and conditions of the policy.

    • Endorsements commonly used in nonlife insurance business

    • Riders commonly in life insurance business


Discussion questions

Discussion Questions


Discussion question 1

Discussion Question 1

  • Hannah owns a home worth US$50,000, which is subject to the risk of fire. The probability of a fire is 25 percent and the amount of damage due to the fire would be US$40,000. Assume Hannah’s utility function is the square root of wealth. Hannah has been offered full insurance at a cost of US$13,000. Will she buy the insurance? Why or why not?


Discussion question 2

Discussion Question 2

  • A frequency distribution shows the number of accidents that an insurer can expect from each exposure unit in its insurance pool during the year. Use the information provided below to answer the following questions:

    • Calculate the expected number of accidents a single exposure unit could expect during the next year.

    • Calculate the standard deviation of the number of accidents a single exposure unit could expect during the next year.

    • Calculate the standard deviation of the number of accidents.


Discussion question 3

Discussion Question 3

  • Consider the following lotteries, x, y and z:

    • Calculate the expected value of each gamble.

    • Assuming a risk-averter’s utility function of wealth is given below. Calculate the expected utility of each gamble for a person who has an initial wealth level of 10. Which gamble does this person prefer? Why?


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