Who are some of these Invisible Friends?

1. Imaginary Companions, Theory of Mind, and GodJ. Bradley WiggerLouisville Presbyterian Theological SeminaryJune 29, 2010 Cognition, Religion, and Theology Presentation, Merton College

2. Who are some of these Invisible Friends? Quack Quack: 4 yr old duck, one of 5 IFs (the favorite is Stella, 100 yr old robin) Deen and Elizabeth: live in a brown house in an imaginary world. Also her Paw Paw, comes to visit when the child is sad (her grandfather who died when she was 1) Cinderella: a little girl but is sometimes a blue dog Bob and Jefette: Bob knows karate and Jeffette is sometimes a boy, Jeff Ruth and George: IFs of 5 yr old Ruth; she shares George with her 3 yr old sister Lacey, Han, Bia-Bia, Eliana, and Tea: Tea inspired by Beauty and the Beast film Leah and Coda: Coda died but came back 2 weeks before the interview He-tome and Bu-gong: celebrate Halloween and Hanukkah and play with Dad’s (former) IF Jump Jump and Jump Jax: IFs that are 8 yr old brothers Lucy: a rabbit but sometimes a baby, a mom, tiger, lion, or a mouse Dowey and Sammey: IFs of 7 yr old, around since she was 3. The Holy Spirit: IF of 6 yr old, came at Christmastime.

3. Is God just another Invisible Friend? 2 Views If a significant portion of the adult world continues to hold an active belief in invisible spirits, let us not be so surprised at our children’s creation of make-believe friends or societies. Dorothy and Jerome Singer (1990, p. 90) Guardian angels? Fairies? Ghosts? Creatures from outer space? Or even God? Should any of these be considered imaginary companions? I think not. Marjorie Taylor (1999, p. 143)

4. Theory of Mind: A Way Into Testing the Question Barrett, Richert, and Dreisenga (2001): What does God Know? ToM Studies with the “God question”: Barrett, J. L., Richert, R. A., & Dreisenga, A. (2001) Barrett, J. L., Moore Newman, R., & Richert, R. A. (2003) Barrett, J. L. & Richert, R. A. (2003); Knight, N., Sousa, P., Barrett, J. L. and Atran ,S. (2004) Giménez-Dasí, M., Guerrero, S., & Harris, P. L. (2005) Richert, R. A.. & Barrett, J. L. (2005) Makris, N., & Pnematikos, D. (2007) Knight, N. (2008) Lane, J., Wellman, H. W., & Evans, E. M. (2009)

5. Surprise! What will your friend think is in the box? Younger say: “rocks” Older children say: “crayons” But God is different: “rocks” Jeffette

6. So What about Invisible Friends? What will Quack Quack think is in the crayon box? Quack Quack

7. Hypotheses If God is a form of, or much like, an imaginary friend we might expect— Ho:There is no significant difference between the knowledge a child attributes to an IF and the knowledge attributed to God in ToM tasks, when a robust ToM emerges. On the other hand, if God and imaginary friends are different types of non-human agents, then we might expect—  Ha: There is a significant difference between the knowledge a child attributes to an IF and the knowledge attributed to God in ToM tasks, when a robust ToM emerges.

8. Methods 3 types of ToM tasks 1) Occluded Picture 2) Secret Code 3) False Belief tree book sun 4 agents: 1)VF Real/Visible friend; 2) IF Invisible Friend; 3) Dog; 4) God Scoring: Agent knows=0 Agent won’t know=1 Combined=3 possible

9. Results: Analysis by Age Groups 3 yr olds (n=9, M=41 months); 4 yr olds (n=16, M=52 months); 5-8 yr olds (n=11, M= 83 months). All agents correlate significantly with age, p < .001, except God p = .36. 3s: No significant differences . All but dog are significantly below the mean for chance. p = .217 4s: Dog vs. God t (15) = 2.44, p = .028; Dog vs. IF t (15) = 2.79, p = .014; VF vs. IF t (15) = 2.11, p = .052, (approaching a trend to come)

10. 5-8 year olds God vs. each agent, including IF, p < .001. Reject Ho. Plus: IF vs. dog t (10) = 2.67, p = .023, IF vs. VF t (10) = 2.39, p = .038.

11. Results: Analysis by ToM Facility(Based on children who scored 3 for Visible Friend) n=12, M=77 months (losing two 5+s, gaining three 4yr olds) God vs. VF or Dog, p < .001 God and IF, t (11) = 4.02, p = .002 Reject Ho IF and VF, t (11) = 2.99, p = .012

12. Summary Replication: • 3 yr olds—don’t disentangle well. • 4 yr olds—can begin differentiating types of agents. • 5 and older—treat God differently. • Children easily attribute omniscience to God. Extension: • IFs and God are different (Reject Ho/Cannot Reject Ha) • IFs in unique territory

13. Conclusion Is God just another IF? With Taylor—No, God is different With the Singers—Well…

14. Cognitive Science of Religion • Ability to represent and reason about immaterial individuals. (Keleman, 2004) • Ability to sense agency easily (whether seen or not) • Ability to be in relation to invisible agency • The in-between as potential religious territory. (Knight, 2008)

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