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Secure Routing and Intrusion Detection For Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

National Institute for Standards and Technology. Anand Patwardhan Jim Parker Anupam Joshi. Michaela Iorga Tom Karygiannis. Secure Routing and Intrusion Detection For Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. March 10, 2005 Kauai Island, Hawaii. Challenges. Wireless communication

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Secure Routing and Intrusion Detection For Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

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  1. National Institute for Standards and Technology Anand Patwardhan Jim Parker Anupam Joshi Michaela Iorga Tom Karygiannis Secure Routing and Intrusion Detection For Mobile Ad Hoc Networks March 10, 2005 Kauai Island, Hawaii

  2. Challenges • Wireless communication • Short range (802.11, Bluetooth etc.) • Open medium • Identification and Authentication • PKI based solutions infeasible • No prior trust relationships • Routing • Based on dynamic cooperative peer relations • Key to survival of MANET • Device constraints • Power Conservation • Finite Storage • Computation power

  3. AODV • Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol • All up to date routes are not maintained at every node • Minimizes number of broadcasts by creating routes on-demand • Routes are created as and when required • Route remains valid until destination is unreachable or the route is no longer needed • Adaptation to dynamic link conditions • Low processing and Memory Overhead • Low Network Utilization

  4. AODV Messaging • Source Node – node originating routing request • Destination Node – sends route reply • Sequence Numbers – used to avoid loops/replay • Route Request – route discovery message • Route Reply – destination to source message • Route Error – destination node unreachable • Intermediate Node Path List – list of nodes traversed along message path

  5. Attacks • Attacks can be broadly classified into • Routing disruption attacks • Resource consumption attacks • Attacks on data traffic • Objective: Isolate and deny resources to intrusive and/or chronically faulty nodes

  6. Routing disruptions • Malicious nodes may: • convince nodes that it is routing packets to the correct destination when it is not, • fabricate route-maintenance messages, • refuse to forward or simply drop packets, • spoof routing addresses, • and/or modify messages.

  7. Secure Routing in MANETs • Each node is a Router • Identification and Authentication • Statistically Unique and Cryptographically Verifiable (SUCV) identifiers • No prior trust relationships required • Large address space of IPv6 suitable for SUCVs • Secure binding between IPv6 address and Public key

  8. Secure Routing in MANETs • Routing state • Additional fields in control messages to protect data • SUCV: IPv6 address and Public Key • Secure binding, computationally infeasible to compute private key in order to spoof • Routing messages protected against mangling and masquerading

  9. Securing the IPv6 AODV MESSAGE: MESSAGE: RSA Public Key RSA Public Key Signature Signature 64-bit Hash of Public Key 64-bit Network Specific ID 64-bit Network Specific ID 64-bit Hash of Public Key IP: IP: 2003:33:0:0:31ba:af0f:82ea:a0b 2003:13:0:0:16ba:ae7f:8aea:dab3 Binding IP Address and RSA Public Key

  10. Intrusion Detection • Wired Networks • Traffic monitoring at routers, gateways, firewalls • Static routes • Physical security • MANETs • Mobile nodes • Other radio interference • Reliance on cooperative mechanisms for routing • Intrusion detection limited to devices within radio-range

  11. Intrusion Detection Challenges • Identity • Use SUCVs • Mobility • False positives • Scalability • Large radio-ranges or dense networks • Aggregation of data • Communicate intrusions data to warn others

  12. B A dgram_in dgram_out C • Datagram dgram_in has: • Source IPv6 address, x  U – {B,C} • Destination IPv6 address, y  U – {B,C} • MAC source, mac(u), u  U – {B,C} • MAC destination, mac(B) • Corresponding dgram_out must have: • Source IPv6 address, x • Destination IPv6 address, y • MAC source, mac(B) • MAC destination, mac(u), u ε U – {B,C} Packet Forwarding

  13. { TCP Sequence no., TCP checksum } { RREQ, RREP, RERR } Build and Maintain Neighbor table (mac, ipv6) pairs And route status Update in-memory Hash table AODV TCP Packets that should be forwarded IPv6 Ethernet Frame From the packet capture library (pcap) Stateful Packet Monitoring

  14. Example Scenario

  15. Future Work • Active Response • Nodes send out accusations on events that they directly observe • Accusations are signed so accuser is accountable • No Hearsay is propagated • All nodes have same information on which to base decisions • Combine cross layer evidence to evaluate trust between MANET nodes • Design and develop a secure trust routing protocol

  16. Additional Information • UMBC • http://ebiquity.umbc.edu • NIST • http://csrc.nist.gov/manet

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