The Case for Quality CQSDI 2011

1. The Case for Quality CQSDI 2011 14 March 2011 Mr. Thomas Bulk Acting Director, Quality, Safety and Mission Assurance Missile Defense Agency

2. Today’s Missile Defense Threat Belarus Scud SS-21 Ukraine Scud SS-21 Syria Scud SS-21 Turkmenistan Scud Kazakhstan Scud SS-21 • Missile Defense Attributes • Provides extended deterrence • Devalues missile proliferation • Dissuades ballistic missile investment • Enables international cooperation for regional defense • Threat • Real • Growing • Unpredictable • Threatens regional stability • Enables asymmetric threats Libya Scud North Korea Toksa, Scud ER Scud No Dong New IRBM Taepo Dong-2 Egypt Scud SS-1 Iran Fateh-110, CSS-8 Shahab 1 & 2 Shahab 3 Shahab 3 Variant Ashura/Sejil Vietnam Scud India Prithvi 1 & 2 Dhanush, Agni 1 Agni 2, Agni3 Sagarika Pakistan Ghaznavi, Shaheen 1 Ghauri, Shaheen 2 Iranian SRBM, 20 August 2010 Yemen Scud SS-21 Taepo Dong-2 Launch April 2009 Iranian Salvo Launch Sources: NASIC, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2009; DIA, Iran’s Military Power, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 APR 10; DIA, Annual Threat Assessment 2008; MSIC, e-mail, RE: Unclassified Force Level Numbers, 8 APR 10 Case number: 0410-MS0391; DNI, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 JAN to 31 DEC 29,

3. Missile Defense Agency Focus Missile Defense Agency (2001-Present) Focus on developing and fielding integrated ballistic missile defense system Against multiple threats and increasing ballistic missile proliferation Maintain current level of protection, while developing future, proven capabilities Today’s Mission To develop and deploy a layered BMDS to defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends from ballistic missile attacks of all ranges and in all phases of flight

4. Layered Ballistic Missile Defense Precision Tracking Space System (2018) ICBM Defense ICBMs > 5,500 km Ft. Greely IRBMs /MRBMs 1,000-5,500 km Space Based Infrared (2007) Vandenberg Air Force Base Ground-based Interceptor (2010) SRBMs < 1,000 km SM-3 IIB (2020) Ground-based Interceptor (2008) Aegis Ashore (2015) C2BMC (2011) IRBM / MRBM Defense Sea-based X-band Radar (2011) Beale, Shemya, Thule, Fylingdales Aegis Ships • SM-3 IA (2011) • SM-3 IB (2015) • SM-3 IIA (2018) SRBMDefense THAAD Fire Units (2011) Israel Shariki, Japan AN/TPY-2 (2009) Early Warning Radars (2010) NATO ALTBMD (2011-2018) Airborne Infrared Sensors (2018) Patriot Fire Units (2003) SM-2 (2008) SRBM = Short Range Ballistic Missiles MRBM = Medium Range Ballistic Missiles IRBM = Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles ICBM= Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Includes European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)

5. U.S. Phased Adaptive ApproachContributes To NATO Missile Defense Phase 3(By 2018) Phase 4(By 2020) Phase 1(By 2011) Phase 2(By 2015) Early intercept capability against MRBMs and IRBMs; and ICBMs from today’s regional threats Initial capability against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, enhanced homeland defense Robust capability against IRBMs Robust capability against SRBMs and MRBMs Aegis Ashore 5.0 with SM-3 IB (one site) Aegis BMD 5.1 with SM-3 IIA Aegis BMD 5.1 with SM-3 IIA Aegis Ashore 5.1 with SM-3 IB/IIA (two sites) Aegis Ashore 5.1 with SM-3 IIB (two sites) Aegis BMD 3.6.1 with SM-3 IA AN/TPY-2 (FBM) AN/TPY-2 (FBM) AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Aegis BMD 4.0.1/5.0 with SM-3 IB C2BMC Updates Enhanced C2BMC ALTBMD Upper Tier Potential EPAA Enhancements Potential EPAA Enhancements AN/TPY-2 (FBM) C2BMC Updates THAAD THAAD ALTBMD Lower Tier Potential EPAA Enhancements C2BMC AOC Ramstein ABIR ALTBMD Interim Capability PTSS ABIR PTSS THAAD

6. Demand For Reliable, High Quality Components and Software • Successful engagement of threat missile depends on quality, highly reliable systems and sub-systems - First time, every time level of reliability - Detection, tracking and interceptor launch require precision timing Launch Interceptor Initiate Weapons Task plan Create Track Threat Destroyed Detect Launch Defended Area +3 min +8 min +6 min +20 min Typical Commute

7. Ongoing Quality/Mission Assurance Activities • System Functional Review • Software Specification Review • Evaluate human interfaces, controls, displays • S/W safety issues & audits • Preliminary Design Review • Critical Design Review • Subsystem and functional issues • Design Performance • Producibility and risk areas • System Verification Review • Joint Services IM Munition WG • Design Certificate Review • Safety Hazards Assessment • Development Test for Risk Reduction • FMECA, Sneak Analysis Continuous Activities • Test Design Reviews (TDR) • Voting Member • Mission Operations Review • Interface Control WG • Interface integration activities • Ensures integration and compatibility • Resolve technical issues • Interoperability and/or Integration Test • BMDS System Safety Working Group • System Requirements Review • Mission Assurance Reps (MARs) on-site • (Gov. & Industry sites) • Mission Assurance Audits • Award Fee Boards • Independent Readiness Review Teams • Mission Readiness Reviews • Acquisition Strategy Panel • MAP / PMAP on contract • Mission Assurance Criteria • Award Fee Requirements DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT INTEGRATED TEST & EVALUATION PRODUCTION LAUNCH ACTIVITIES CONTRACT AF AF AF AF • Pedigree Review • Flight Operations Review • Pre-Flight Readiness Review • Launch Readiness Review • Mission Readiness Review • Four to six weeks prior to launch • Voting Member • BMDS Safety Officers (BSOs) • Six BSOs at Colorado Springs • MDA Executive Level Flight Test Reviews • Series of four flight test reviews leading to launch • Voting Member • Mission Assurance Audits • Average six MA audits annually • Pre-shipment Reviews • BMDS Parts & Materials Control Board (PMCB) • Element PMP Control Boards (PMPCB) • Voting Member • Tests and Inspections • FOD Prevention, NDT, Acceptance Inspection • Mandatory Gov. Inspections (MGIs) • Failure Review Board • Material Review Board • Supplier Road Maps • Stakeholder Initiatives • Integrated Product Teams (IPT) • Peer Reviews • Surface correctable problems early • Identify risk • Ensure best practices • Flight Readiness Review • Voting Member AF Award Fee Board Voting Member

8. Recent Process & Workmanship Failures: • Improper rigging of a lanyard pull connector – Target failed to deploy and negated test • Missing lock wire on onboard thruster– Caused a test failure • Sub-tier supplier cork installation process not adequately controlled – Caused delamination/ voids on target vehicle • Refurbished memory devices used in mission computer – Caused excessive rework • Failure to follow process (Heat treat certification) – Caused multiple lot failures & lost production of E-Bolts • Lack of process controls (Supplier manufacturing process not proofed/qualified) – Caused strake bonding failures • Software (Radar algorithm) design validation and under-estimated input demands of “real-time” system – Caused performance, timing and processing errors

9. Responses to Quality Issues • ‘Body of knowledge’ created over decades (configuration management, process discipline, workmanship) codified in QS quality and mission assurance plans • Incorporated Industry ‘best practices’ and explicit quality clauses in development and production contracts • Conducting QS “audits” to evaluate suppliers and eliminate inconsistent compliance • Focusing on supplier producibility assessments where increased throughput /schedules have resulted in manufacturing and fabrication problems • Current focus is on determining supplier capability to deliver quality production units (yield)

10. Recent QS Initiatives • Critical production readiness reviews to ensure manufacturing producibility • Manufacturing and fabrication assessments • On-site distribution audits • Dedicated Parts, Materials and Processes Team • Emphasis on preventing faulty and counterfeit parts from entering the supply chain • Obsolescent parts now identified and tracked • In-plant inspections for manufacturing workmanship • Rigorous facility checklists • Independent technical assessments of supplier facilities and production processes • Provides insight on production risks for “complex” and mission “critical” components

11. Facility Assessment Checklist • Assess suppliers to a common set of objective, industry-standard criteria • Weighted system for each criterion • 14 Sections • Electrical, Electronic, Electromechanical (EEE) Parts • Software • Design & Workmanship • Work Instructions • Manufacturing & Tooling • Clean Rooms • ESD, FOD, Safety, Training & Operator certification • Critical lifts & moves • MRB and Configuration Management Processes • Metrology • Safety (Work hazards & Ordnance)

12. Facility Assessment Checklist Display Facility Report Card • Final score presented in a ‘report card’ format • Highlights Production-risk areas: • Deficiencies Score • Observations Score • Identifies areas for future sub-tier supplier assessments

13. SUMMARY • Focus on “first time, every time’ reliability • Prevent counterfeit parts from entering the supply chain and their use in mission critical components • Drive Supply chain to focus on workmanship standards • Resolve ‘producibility issues, i.e., schedule and throughput • Use the Facility Checklist as a catalyst to: • Raise the level of compliance among all suppliers • Provide common framework for evaluating mission-critical component productivity risks • Identify weaknesses within individual supplier’s production processes