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THIS BRIEFING DOES NOT MEET ANNUAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS!!!This briefing does NOT meet the requirements of AR 381-12 for annual training. Annual training for compliance with this regulation requires that a trained Counterintelligence Agent present the briefing. These slides can be used as a refresher, to meet pre-deployment requirements, or by family members and other personnel not required by regulation to receive the training..
THREAT AWARENESS and REPORTING PROGRAM

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1. This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED. TARP is the new SAEDA.This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED. TARP is the new SAEDA.

4. NATIONAL SECURITY CRIMES Subversion: Advocating, causing, or attempting to cause insubordination, disloyalty, or refusal of duty by any member of the armed forces or civilian personnel with the willful intent to interfere with, impair or influence loyalty, discipline, or morale. Espionage: The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving national defense information with the intent or reason to believe that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. Sabotage: Act(s) with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and national resources. Terrorism: Activity that: Uses violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, political, religious, or ideological in nature. ?involves criminal act that is often symbolic, intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.Subversion: Advocating, causing, or attempting to cause insubordination, disloyalty, or refusal of duty by any member of the armed forces or civilian personnel with the willful intent to interfere with, impair or influence loyalty, discipline, or morale. Espionage: The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving national defense information with the intent or reason to believe that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. Sabotage: Act(s) with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and national resources. Terrorism: Activity that: Uses violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, political, religious, or ideological in nature. ?involves criminal act that is often symbolic, intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.

5. In early 1992, the FBI changed its strategy to counterintelligence and began to investigate any country that was targeting the US with their intelligence services. The FBI uncovered over 100 countries collecting against the US, with 28 different countries publicly identified as involved in running ESPIONAGE operations against the US. This list includes both allies and adversaries. Russia has been the predominate recipient of information from American spies, but 17 other countries have also been willing recipients. The key point is that threat comes not ONLY from those countries that we TRADITIONALLY think as threats to the US, i.e. Russian, China, Republic of Iran, North Korea, Cuba?. But also from countries that WOULD normally we thought as friendly to the US, i.e. Israel, France, Jordan, Iraq, Taiwan, Philippines?.In early 1992, the FBI changed its strategy to counterintelligence and began to investigate any country that was targeting the US with their intelligence services. The FBI uncovered over 100 countries collecting against the US, with 28 different countries publicly identified as involved in running ESPIONAGE operations against the US. This list includes both allies and adversaries. Russia has been the predominate recipient of information from American spies, but 17 other countries have also been willing recipients. The key point is that threat comes not ONLY from those countries that we TRADITIONALLY think as threats to the US, i.e. Russian, China, Republic of Iran, North Korea, Cuba?. But also from countries that WOULD normally we thought as friendly to the US, i.e. Israel, France, Jordan, Iraq, Taiwan, Philippines?.

7. Keep in mind that you do not have to possess a SECRET or TOP SECRET CLEARANCE, to be of interest to an intelligence service. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED information can be as critical to a Foreign Intelligence Service as CLASSIFIED information. Keep in mind that you do not have to possess a SECRET or TOP SECRET CLEARANCE, to be of interest to an intelligence service. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED information can be as critical to a Foreign Intelligence Service as CLASSIFIED information.

8. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE METHODOLOGY The collection cycle for recruiting an agent or source, consists of three basic phases: SPOTTING, ASSESSING, and the RECRUITMENT. All three phases revolve around MOTIVATION ? Money was always the traditional motivating factor, especially for Americans. That has changed in recent years, and IDEOLOGY has become more and more the principle motivator for Americans to commit espionage. The collection cycle for recruiting an agent or source, consists of three basic phases: SPOTTING, ASSESSING, and the RECRUITMENT. All three phases revolve around MOTIVATION ? Money was always the traditional motivating factor, especially for Americans. That has changed in recent years, and IDEOLOGY has become more and more the principle motivator for Americans to commit espionage.

9. The PURPOSE of this briefing is AWARENESS. To HELP make YOU aware of the indicators of espionage -- INORDER FOR YOU TAKE THE NEXT STEP AND REPORT SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY. Past espionage cases have demonstrated that co-workers and supervisors have overlooked obvious indicators of espionage which, had they been reported, would have minimized the damage to national security. Profile of an American Spy - SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES Most espionage by Americans is committed by men Before 1990, most spies were white Since 1990, less than half have been white Since 1990, 83% were 30 years or older FOREIGN INFLUENCES, FOREIGN PREFERENCES, AND DIVIDED LOYALTIES Before 1990, roughly 80% of American spies were native-born citizens Since 1990, this has fallen to 65% Since 1990, the percentage of American with foreign connections (relatives or close friends overseas) increased to almost 60%. Divided loyalties, holding or acting on allegiance to a foreign country, has increased dramatically since 1990 ? almost 60% today. EMPLOYMENTS AND CLEARANCE During the Cold War periods, equal number of civilians and military engaged in espionage. Since 1990, almost 70% of spies have been civilians. Among civilian spies, one-fourth have been employees of government contractors. Proportion of individuals holding NO security clearances have increase steadily over time, from 20% in 1980 to 40% in 1990. CHARACTERISTICS OF ESPIONAGE Most espionage by Americans has been short lived and poorly paid. Almost half of American spies received nothing for the risks they took. Only four individuals over 50 years may have received $1 million or more. Since 1990, 40% of spies were caught immediately or in less than 1 year Only one-fifth of known cases lasted 5 years or longer. 70% of RECENT American spies have volunteered and were not recruited Seven of the 11 most recent cases since 2000, the individuals used the internet to volunteer their services The former Soviet Union used to be the ultimate recipient for information, with almost 80% of US spies passing information to the Russians However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, few ? only 15%-- of Americans have sent information to Russia Asian and Southeast Asian countries have now become the more common recipients Also Central and South American countries, especially Cuba, have significantly increased their collection efforts Five Americans are known to have, or in one case are alleged to have, volunteered to spy for Al Qaeda or related terrorist groups The PURPOSE of this briefing is AWARENESS. To HELP make YOU aware of the indicators of espionage -- INORDER FOR YOU TAKE THE NEXT STEP AND REPORT SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY. Past espionage cases have demonstrated that co-workers and supervisors have overlooked obvious indicators of espionage which, had they been reported, would have minimized the damage to national security. Profile of an American Spy - SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES Most espionage by Americans is committed by men Before 1990, most spies were white Since 1990, less than half have been white Since 1990, 83% were 30 years or older FOREIGN INFLUENCES, FOREIGN PREFERENCES, AND DIVIDED LOYALTIES Before 1990, roughly 80% of American spies were native-born citizens Since 1990, this has fallen to 65% Since 1990, the percentage of American with foreign connections (relatives or close friends overseas) increased to almost 60%. Divided loyalties, holding or acting on allegiance to a foreign country, has increased dramatically since 1990 ? almost 60% today. EMPLOYMENTS AND CLEARANCE During the Cold War periods, equal number of civilians and military engaged in espionage. Since 1990, almost 70% of spies have been civilians. Among civilian spies, one-fourth have been employees of government contractors. Proportion of individuals holding NO security clearances have increase steadily over time, from 20% in 1980 to 40% in 1990. CHARACTERISTICS OF ESPIONAGE Most espionage by Americans has been short lived and poorly paid. Almost half of American spies received nothing for the risks they took. Only four individuals over 50 years may have received $1 million or more. Since 1990, 40% of spies were caught immediately or in less than 1 year Only one-fifth of known cases lasted 5 years or longer. 70% of RECENT American spies have volunteered and were not recruited Seven of the 11 most recent cases since 2000, the individuals used the internet to volunteer their services The former Soviet Union used to be the ultimate recipient for information, with almost 80% of US spies passing information to the Russians However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, few ? only 15%-- of Americans have sent information to Russia Asian and Southeast Asian countries have now become the more common recipients Also Central and South American countries, especially Cuba, have significantly increased their collection efforts Five Americans are known to have, or in one case are alleged to have, volunteered to spy for Al Qaeda or related terrorist groups

10. In 1985 the CIA began an investigation for a possible mole in the Agency. Nine years after the compromises began the Agency found their spy. Ames was arrested February 1994 and pled guilty to espionage in April 1994. Brief history. In June 1962, Ames was first employed by the Agency as a GS-4, document analyst. Ames's first overseas posting took place between 1969 and 1972. It was not a successful tour, and the last performance appraisal stated that he was unsuited for field work and should spend the remainder of his career at CIA Headquarters. In 1981 ? 1983 he was again assigned as a field agent to Mexico City. In Mexico City, Ames became involved in an intimate relationship with the Colombian cultural attach?, Maria del Rosario. Ames also developed a problem with alcohol. In 1983 he returned to CIA Headquarters, to a position which gave him access to the Agency's worldwide Soviet operations. In the spring and summer of 1985, Aldrich H. Ames began his espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union. In 1986, he was re-assigned to Rome. He once again began to drink heavily, particularly at lunch and had less than a successful assignment. In 1989, he returned to CIA Headquarters. In 1991 he was assigned to the Counter-Narcotics Center, until his arrest in 1994. WHAT WERE AMES'S STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES? poor overall job performance history, bottom 10% of the CIA's GS-14s. failed to report foreign travel never reported his intimate relationship with Rosario as a "close and continuing" relationship committed repeated serious security violations, in 1976 he left a briefcase full of classified information on a New York subway train in 1985 he left his office safe open and unlocked upon departure for the evening, he also began using his home computer for classified work and in the most extreme example, Ames wrapped up five to seven pounds of classified documents in plastic bags in June 1985 and carried it out of Headquarters to deliver to the KGB. Alcohol abuse ? started in 1983 and only worsened over the years, BUT was never seen as a serious problem by his bosses Finances ? In 1983-85, he was facing severe financial problems. Rosario moved in with him in December 1983 and he was faced with a credit squeeze that included a new car loan, a signature loan that had been "tapped to the max," mounting credit card payments, and, finally, a divorce settlement that he believed threatened to bankrupt him. He first contemplated espionage between 1984 and early 1985 as a way out of his mounting financial dilemma. Confronting a divorce and facing added expenses connected with his imminent marriage to someone with already established extravagant spending habits. In late 1989, after his return from Rome, Ames' s lifestyle and spending habits had changed as a result of the large amounts of money he had received from the KGB in return for the information he provided. Ames made no special efforts to conceal his newly acquired wealth and, for example, paid cash for a $540, 000 home. This unexplained affluence was brought to the attention of the CIA in late 1989. The preliminary results of the inquiry were not considered particularly significant at the time. WHY DID HE COMMIT ESPIONAGE? Ames said the primary motivating factor for his decision to commit espionage was his DESPERATION regarding financial indebtedness he incurred at the time of his separation from his first wife, their divorce settlement and his cohabitation with Rosario. his fading respect for the value of his work his belief that the rules that governed others did not apply to him By and large his professional weaknesses were observed by Ames's colleagues and supervisors and were TOLERATED BY MANY who did not consider them highly unusual. Ames was seen by his supervisors and co-workers on the "not going anywhere" promotion track. He was sentenced to DEATH, but agreed to a plea bargain of LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE for his cooperation in doing a damage assessment. Ames revealed more than 100 covert operations and betrayred more than 30 operatives spying for Western intelligence services. Ames was the old school spy. Spied for MONEY, spied for the Soviet Union. AN INSIDER.In 1985 the CIA began an investigation for a possible mole in the Agency. Nine years after the compromises began the Agency found their spy. Ames was arrested February 1994 and pled guilty to espionage in April 1994. Brief history. In June 1962, Ames was first employed by the Agency as a GS-4, document analyst. Ames's first overseas posting took place between 1969 and 1972. It was not a successful tour, and the last performance appraisal stated that he was unsuited for field work and should spend the remainder of his career at CIA Headquarters. In 1981 ? 1983 he was again assigned as a field agent to Mexico City. In Mexico City, Ames became involved in an intimate relationship with the Colombian cultural attach?, Maria del Rosario. Ames also developed a problem with alcohol. In 1983 he returned to CIA Headquarters, to a position which gave him access to the Agency's worldwide Soviet operations. In the spring and summer of 1985, Aldrich H. Ames began his espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union. In 1986, he was re-assigned to Rome. He once again began to drink heavily, particularly at lunch and had less than a successful assignment. In 1989, he returned to CIA Headquarters. In 1991 he was assigned to the Counter-Narcotics Center, until his arrest in 1994. WHAT WERE AMES'S STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES? poor overall job performance history, bottom 10% of the CIA's GS-14s. failed to report foreign travel never reported his intimate relationship with Rosario as a "close and continuing" relationship committed repeated serious security violations, in 1976 he left a briefcase full of classified information on a New York subway train in 1985 he left his office safe open and unlocked upon departure for the evening, he also began using his home computer for classified work and in the most extreme example, Ames wrapped up five to seven pounds of classified documents in plastic bags in June 1985 and carried it out of Headquarters to deliver to the KGB. Alcohol abuse ? started in 1983 and only worsened over the years, BUT was never seen as a serious problem by his bosses Finances ? In 1983-85, he was facing severe financial problems. Rosario moved in with him in December 1983 and he was faced with a credit squeeze that included a new car loan, a signature loan that had been "tapped to the max," mounting credit card payments, and, finally, a divorce settlement that he believed threatened to bankrupt him. He first contemplated espionage between 1984 and early 1985 as a way out of his mounting financial dilemma. Confronting a divorce and facing added expenses connected with his imminent marriage to someone with already established extravagant spending habits. In late 1989, after his return from Rome, Ames' s lifestyle and spending habits had changed as a result of the large amounts of money he had received from the KGB in return for the information he provided. Ames made no special efforts to conceal his newly acquired wealth and, for example, paid cash for a $540, 000 home. This unexplained affluence was brought to the attention of the CIA in late 1989. The preliminary results of the inquiry were not considered particularly significant at the time. WHY DID HE COMMIT ESPIONAGE? Ames said the primary motivating factor for his decision to commit espionage was his DESPERATION regarding financial indebtedness he incurred at the time of his separation from his first wife, their divorce settlement and his cohabitation with Rosario. his fading respect for the value of his work his belief that the rules that governed others did not apply to him By and large his professional weaknesses were observed by Ames's colleagues and supervisors and were TOLERATED BY MANY who did not consider them highly unusual. Ames was seen by his supervisors and co-workers on the "not going anywhere" promotion track. He was sentenced to DEATH, but agreed to a plea bargain of LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE for his cooperation in doing a damage assessment. Ames revealed more than 100 covert operations and betrayred more than 30 operatives spying for Western intelligence services. Ames was the old school spy. Spied for MONEY, spied for the Soviet Union. AN INSIDER.

11. Former civilian employee has been indicted by the federal government for allegedly conspiring to pass U.S. military secrets to Israel. Kadish's handler was the same Israeli intelligence officer who worked as the Scientific Attach? in the Israeli Consulate General in Manhattan and was the handler for Jonathan Pollard, who spied for Israel and China, and is currently serving a life sentence for espionage in North Carolina. Kadish went underground in 1986 when Pollard was arrested, but maintained contact with his handler as late as a day before his arrest. Kadish worked for 18 years at Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center at the Picatinny Arsenal, from 1963 ? 1990. When he retired in 1990, he was a supervisory engineer in Fuze Division. Prosecutors say Kadish for six years routinely checked out classified documents from the Research Center's library and let his Israeli handler photograph them in his basement. The FBI reports that he provided between 50 and 100 classified documents. The Israeli agent would give him a list of "specific items to obtain from the library." He accepted no cash in return, only small gifts and occasional dinners for him and his family. Kadish was born in the United States, but grew up in what was then the British Mandate of Palestine and fought with the Israeli resistance against the British. He also served in both the British and American military during World War II.Former civilian employee has been indicted by the federal government for allegedly conspiring to pass U.S. military secrets to Israel. Kadish's handler was the same Israeli intelligence officer who worked as the Scientific Attach? in the Israeli Consulate General in Manhattan and was the handler for Jonathan Pollard, who spied for Israel and China, and is currently serving a life sentence for espionage in North Carolina. Kadish went underground in 1986 when Pollard was arrested, but maintained contact with his handler as late as a day before his arrest. Kadish worked for 18 years at Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center at the Picatinny Arsenal, from 1963 ? 1990. When he retired in 1990, he was a supervisory engineer in Fuze Division. Prosecutors say Kadish for six years routinely checked out classified documents from the Research Center's library and let his Israeli handler photograph them in his basement. The FBI reports that he provided between 50 and 100 classified documents. The Israeli agent would give him a list of "specific items to obtain from the library." He accepted no cash in return, only small gifts and occasional dinners for him and his family. Kadish was born in the United States, but grew up in what was then the British Mandate of Palestine and fought with the Israeli resistance against the British. He also served in both the British and American military during World War II.

12. ARAGONCILLO worked under two administrations in the Office of the Vice President of the United States, VP Gore and VP Cheney. Pled guilty to transferring national security documents classified as high as TOP SECRET to his Philippine co-conspirators between October 2000 and February 2002. Motivation was to assist senior Philippine politicians in their attempts to destabilize and overthrow the president and Government of the Philippines. He was recruited by senior Philippine government officials in the Summer of 2000, who he met as part of his official Marine Corps duties. They appealed to his Philippine loyalties. He also had $500,000 in debts at the time. $200,000 in personal debt and $300,000 mortgage. He was a naturalized US citizen born in the Philippines. He was a retired US Marine Gunnery Sergeant with 21 years of service. Wife and two children. At the time of his arrest he was an FBI intelligence analyst at Fort Monouth, NJ. He admitted that he sought positions with the FBI, the CIA and NSA, to gain access to classified documents and information that would be useful to his co-conspirators. Methodology: He searched FBI computers for information, which was outside his work duties. Downloaded documents from FBI computers onto disk, put disk in bag and took home. Emailed classified documnts to contacts in Philippines. 15 foreign travels to the Philippines over 5 years. He was arrested in Sep 2005. He was sentenced May 4, 2006 to 10 years in prison and fined $40,000 for espionage and other charges for taking and transferring classified information. He was never paid for his crimes. ARAGONCILLO worked under two administrations in the Office of the Vice President of the United States, VP Gore and VP Cheney. Pled guilty to transferring national security documents classified as high as TOP SECRET to his Philippine co-conspirators between October 2000 and February 2002. Motivation was to assist senior Philippine politicians in their attempts to destabilize and overthrow the president and Government of the Philippines. He was recruited by senior Philippine government officials in the Summer of 2000, who he met as part of his official Marine Corps duties. They appealed to his Philippine loyalties. He also had $500,000 in debts at the time. $200,000 in personal debt and $300,000 mortgage. He was a naturalized US citizen born in the Philippines. He was a retired US Marine Gunnery Sergeant with 21 years of service. Wife and two children. At the time of his arrest he was an FBI intelligence analyst at Fort Monouth, NJ. He admitted that he sought positions with the FBI, the CIA and NSA, to gain access to classified documents and information that would be useful to his co-conspirators. Methodology: He searched FBI computers for information, which was outside his work duties. Downloaded documents from FBI computers onto disk, put disk in bag and took home. Emailed classified documnts to contacts in Philippines. 15 foreign travels to the Philippines over 5 years. He was arrested in Sep 2005. He was sentenced May 4, 2006 to 10 years in prison and fined $40,000 for espionage and other charges for taking and transferring classified information. He was never paid for his crimes.

13. For 16 years, the entire time she worked at DIA, she was a clandestine agent of the Cuban intelligence service. In her remarks to the judge at her sentencing, she stated she decided to obey her conscience rather than the law. Montes admitted that giving classified information to Cuba to defend itself was probably morally wrong and not justified. But that she did what she thought was right to counter a greater injustice. As DIA's senior Cuban analyst, she was responsible for preparing the national intelligence assessments on Cuba. She was recruited by Cuban intelligence in 1985. Puerto Rican by birth. Educated at John Hopkins. Motivated solely by her political beliefs. Took no money other than minor payment for travel expenses and a laptop computer. Three of her siblings work for the FBI, her mother worked for the US government and her father was an Army physician. Cuban intelligence, its secret police, received virtually everything it needed to know about U.S. intelligence, including the names of three US agents as well as material classified as "Top Secret". Montes was so intent on fulfilling her commitment to Castro that she refused promotion and other career advancement opportunities at the DIA in order to not lose access to classified information of particular interest to Cuban intelligence. Montes was in many ways the perfect spy. With access to top secret intelligence agency day, she could provide the Castro regime with material of the greatest value. As an analyst responsible for providing information to be used by policy makers, she worked both ends of the operation.For 16 years, the entire time she worked at DIA, she was a clandestine agent of the Cuban intelligence service. In her remarks to the judge at her sentencing, she stated she decided to obey her conscience rather than the law. Montes admitted that giving classified information to Cuba to defend itself was probably morally wrong and not justified. But that she did what she thought was right to counter a greater injustice. As DIA's senior Cuban analyst, she was responsible for preparing the national intelligence assessments on Cuba. She was recruited by Cuban intelligence in 1985. Puerto Rican by birth. Educated at John Hopkins. Motivated solely by her political beliefs. Took no money other than minor payment for travel expenses and a laptop computer. Three of her siblings work for the FBI, her mother worked for the US government and her father was an Army physician. Cuban intelligence, its secret police, received virtually everything it needed to know about U.S. intelligence, including the names of three US agents as well as material classified as "Top Secret". Montes was so intent on fulfilling her commitment to Castro that she refused promotion and other career advancement opportunities at the DIA in order to not lose access to classified information of particular interest to Cuban intelligence. Montes was in many ways the perfect spy. With access to top secret intelligence agency day, she could provide the Castro regime with material of the greatest value. As an analyst responsible for providing information to be used by policy makers, she worked both ends of the operation.

14. Robert Hanssen was born in Chicago, his father was a Chicago police officer. Initially he planned to become a dentist, but soon switched to business. But soon took a job with the Chicago Police Department Internal Affairs. Married while in college, and converted to Catholicism. Became a member of Opus Dei, a radical branch of the Catholic church. After two years with the Chicago PD, he joined the FBI in January 1976. Worked most of his career in the National Security Division. In his capacity as an investigator and manager, Hanssen had access to the most sensitive classified information about the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the FBI and other agencies in the US Intelligence Community. Only three years after joining the FBI he began his career spying for the Russians. His initial motivation was "to get a little money" and then "get out of it". His initial payment was for $30,000. For this he identified known and suspected Soviet intelligence officers, to include the highest ranking military intelligence officer ever to spy for the West. His wife became aware of his activities in 1981. She insisted he talk to a priest, who advised him to give the money to charity. He then cut off contact with the Soviets. In 1985, he walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington and disclosed the identities of several Russian double-agents. He continued his espionage activities on and off again until 1991, primarily to raise money. In 1990, Hanssen's brother-in-law, Mark Wauck, who was also a FBI employee, reported his suspicious on Hanssen, when his sister-in-law discovered piles of cash sitting on the Hanssens' bedroom dresser in 1990. Five years before this, Hanssen's wife, Bonnie, had told him that they were planning to retire to Poland, which at that time was in the Eastern Bloc. Wauck knew the FBI was looking for a mole. He talked to his supervisor, who took no action. The Soviet Union ceased to exist in December of 1991. Hanssen broke off communication and was out of contact for years. In 1996, another FBI agent accused Hanssen of being a mole, because Hanssen had hacked into another agent's computer. No action was taken. By late 1999, he was running up credit card debt, a mortgage on his house, some of his six children were in college; and "financial pressures" were creating an "atmosphere of desperation." Hanssen led an apparently frugal life, using some of the money he received on home improvements and private schooling for his children. He also spent a significant sum on a stripper he was trying to reform. In 2000, the FBI, who had been hunting for a mole since 1994, decided to change tactics and buy the mole's identity. A former KGB officer was located who had the actual intelligence file of the mole's communications. Which he sold to the FBI for seven million dollars and asylum. In the file was an audio tape, with Bob Hanssen's voice on it. Hanssen was arrested on February 18, 2001 in the act of taking a sealed garbage bag of classified material and taping it to the bottom side of a wooden footbridge over a creek. He was arrested on the spot. Over 22 years and more than forty passes of classified information, Hanssen turned over to the Soviets and Russian intelligence an estimated 26 diskettes and 6,000 pages of classified information. Hanssen's only comment was, "What took you so long?" He plea bargained a death penalty to life in prison without parole, and his wife was allowed to keep the survivor's portion of his pension, $38,000 a year. In his final statement at his sentencing he showed no remorse for his actions. Robert Hanssen was born in Chicago, his father was a Chicago police officer. Initially he planned to become a dentist, but soon switched to business. But soon took a job with the Chicago Police Department Internal Affairs. Married while in college, and converted to Catholicism. Became a member of Opus Dei, a radical branch of the Catholic church. After two years with the Chicago PD, he joined the FBI in January 1976. Worked most of his career in the National Security Division. In his capacity as an investigator and manager, Hanssen had access to the most sensitive classified information about the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the FBI and other agencies in the US Intelligence Community. Only three years after joining the FBI he began his career spying for the Russians. His initial motivation was "to get a little money" and then "get out of it". His initial payment was for $30,000. For this he identified known and suspected Soviet intelligence officers, to include the highest ranking military intelligence officer ever to spy for the West. His wife became aware of his activities in 1981. She insisted he talk to a priest, who advised him to give the money to charity. He then cut off contact with the Soviets. In 1985, he walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington and disclosed the identities of several Russian double-agents. He continued his espionage activities on and off again until 1991, primarily to raise money. In 1990, Hanssen's brother-in-law, Mark Wauck, who was also a FBI employee, reported his suspicious on Hanssen, when his sister-in-law discovered piles of cash sitting on the Hanssens' bedroom dresser in 1990. Five years before this, Hanssen's wife, Bonnie, had told him that they were planning to retire to Poland, which at that time was in the Eastern Bloc. Wauck knew the FBI was looking for a mole. He talked to his supervisor, who took no action. The Soviet Union ceased to exist in December of 1991. Hanssen broke off communication and was out of contact for years. In 1996, another FBI agent accused Hanssen of being a mole, because Hanssen had hacked into another agent's computer. No action was taken. By late 1999, he was running up credit card debt, a mortgage on his house, some of his six children were in college; and "financial pressures" were creating an "atmosphere of desperation." Hanssen led an apparently frugal life, using some of the money he received on home improvements and private schooling for his children. He also spent a significant sum on a stripper he was trying to reform. In 2000, the FBI, who had been hunting for a mole since 1994, decided to change tactics and buy the mole's identity. A former KGB officer was located who had the actual intelligence file of the mole's communications. Which he sold to the FBI for seven million dollars and asylum. In the file was an audio tape, with Bob Hanssen's voice on it. Hanssen was arrested on February 18, 2001 in the act of taking a sealed garbage bag of classified material and taping it to the bottom side of a wooden footbridge over a creek. He was arrested on the spot. Over 22 years and more than forty passes of classified information, Hanssen turned over to the Soviets and Russian intelligence an estimated 26 diskettes and 6,000 pages of classified information. Hanssen's only comment was, "What took you so long?" He plea bargained a death penalty to life in prison without parole, and his wife was allowed to keep the survivor's portion of his pension, $38,000 a year. In his final statement at his sentencing he showed no remorse for his actions.

15. National Guardsman convicted of passing information on US troops and weapons to al-Qaida. Arrested in Feb 2004, just weeks before he was to deploy to Iraq with the Washington National Guard 81st Armored Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA. He converted to Islam in 1998 and began using the name 'Amir Abdul Rashid'. Anderson attend Washington State University and studied Middle Eastern military history. He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in 2002 and joined the Washington State National Guard the same year. He was married, no children. Anderson attempted to contact Muslim extremists through Internet chat rooms that catered to jihadism. In a sting operation involving the Army, the FBI and the Department of Justice, he ended up communicating with undercover operatives. A Montana city judge who doubles as an Internet sleuth first discovered Anderson on a jihadist chat room and reported him to the FBI. Anderson passed to a FBI undercover agent sketches of M1A1 and M1A2 tanks and a computer disk with his passport photo, military ID card, and military weapons card. Anderson was charged with: Attempting to provide intelligence to the enemy; Attempting to aid the enemy; and Discrediting the Armed Forces by providing military information to people he thought were terrorists. "I wish to desert from the U.S. Army. I wish to defect from the United States. I wish to join al-Qaeda, train its members and conduct terrorist attacks." Attempted to plead guilty by reason of insanity. However, was found guilty on all five charges against him. Demoted to E-1, received a Dishonorable Discharge, and sentenced to Life with the possibility of parole. National Guardsman convicted of passing information on US troops and weapons to al-Qaida. Arrested in Feb 2004, just weeks before he was to deploy to Iraq with the Washington National Guard 81st Armored Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA. He converted to Islam in 1998 and began using the name 'Amir Abdul Rashid'. Anderson attend Washington State University and studied Middle Eastern military history. He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in 2002 and joined the Washington State National Guard the same year. He was married, no children. Anderson attempted to contact Muslim extremists through Internet chat rooms that catered to jihadism. In a sting operation involving the Army, the FBI and the Department of Justice, he ended up communicating with undercover operatives. A Montana city judge who doubles as an Internet sleuth first discovered Anderson on a jihadist chat room and reported him to the FBI. Anderson passed to a FBI undercover agent sketches of M1A1 and M1A2 tanks and a computer disk with his passport photo, military ID card, and military weapons card. Anderson was charged with: Attempting to provide intelligence to the enemy; Attempting to aid the enemy; and Discrediting the Armed Forces by providing military information to people he thought were terrorists. "I wish to desert from the U.S. Army. I wish to defect from the United States. I wish to join al-Qaeda, train its members and conduct terrorist attacks." Attempted to plead guilty by reason of insanity. However, was found guilty on all five charges against him. Demoted to E-1, received a Dishonorable Discharge, and sentenced to Life with the possibility of parole.

16. Hassan Abu_Jihaad is another example of today's face of espionage as he SPIED FOR HIS IDEOLOGY. Hassan Abu-Jihaad was a homegrown religious extremist who secretly contacted an al-Qaeda support cell in Great Britain and provided classified information while serving as a Seaman in the US Navy. He began his career in espionage in the Spring of 2001, just six months after the attack on the USS Cole in the port of Yemen, which he described as a "martyrdom operation". He was uncovered in December 2003, when British authorities, MI6, raided the apartment of a Briton, later charged with raising money for al Qaeda. MI6 discovered a floppy disk with a password-protected document detailing what was then classified information about the details of his battle group's movements and perceived vulnerability of the battle group to terrorist attacks. Further investigations, uncovered a trail of e-mail messages expressing support for Osama bin Laden, praise of the Cole attack, and orders for various jihadist videos and other materials. Described as mild-mannered, polite and unobtrusive. He converted to Islam in 1997, changing his name. He chose a surname that means "father of holy war". He entered the Navy in 1998, where he was stationed aboard the Navy destroyer USS Benfold. He left the Navy in 2002, with a better-than-average service record. He returned to UPS in Phoenix, where he worked before the Navy. He married in 2000, and had two children over the next two years. He and his wife divorced in 2005 and he retained custody of both of his children. After his divorce, Abu-Jihaad roomed with an individual, who later pled guilty to plotting an attack on a suburban mall using hand grenades during the 2006 Christmas season. On wiretaps Abu-Jihaad was overheard discussing plans to attack military recruiting office in Phoenix and in Sand Diego; and the purchase two AR-15s. He was arrested in March 07, and convicted in a federal court a year later on all charges of espionage and providing material support to terrorism. He is facing 25 years in federal prison. His sentencing is scheduled for late May 2008. Hassan Abu_Jihaad is another example of today's face of espionage as he SPIED FOR HIS IDEOLOGY. Hassan Abu-Jihaad was a homegrown religious extremist who secretly contacted an al-Qaeda support cell in Great Britain and provided classified information while serving as a Seaman in the US Navy. He began his career in espionage in the Spring of 2001, just six months after the attack on the USS Cole in the port of Yemen, which he described as a "martyrdom operation". He was uncovered in December 2003, when British authorities, MI6, raided the apartment of a Briton, later charged with raising money for al Qaeda. MI6 discovered a floppy disk with a password-protected document detailing what was then classified information about the details of his battle group's movements and perceived vulnerability of the battle group to terrorist attacks. Further investigations, uncovered a trail of e-mail messages expressing support for Osama bin Laden, praise of the Cole attack, and orders for various jihadist videos and other materials. Described as mild-mannered, polite and unobtrusive. He converted to Islam in 1997, changing his name. He chose a surname that means "father of holy war". He entered the Navy in 1998, where he was stationed aboard the Navy destroyer USS Benfold. He left the Navy in 2002, with a better-than-average service record. He returned to UPS in Phoenix, where he worked before the Navy. He married in 2000, and had two children over the next two years. He and his wife divorced in 2005 and he retained custody of both of his children. After his divorce, Abu-Jihaad roomed with an individual, who later pled guilty to plotting an attack on a suburban mall using hand grenades during the 2006 Christmas season. On wiretaps Abu-Jihaad was overheard discussing plans to attack military recruiting office in Phoenix and in Sand Diego; and the purchase two AR-15s. He was arrested in March 07, and convicted in a federal court a year later on all charges of espionage and providing material support to terrorism. He is facing 25 years in federal prison. His sentencing is scheduled for late May 2008.

25. What in the 1970s and 1980 was the threat from the communist inspired Red Army Faction (RAF) fighting against the great capitalist enemy, the United States, has been replaced by the ideologues of Islam who oppose U.S. policy as the great Satan. The Sauerland Group is the most recent iteration of homegrown, foreign trained and ideologically motivated terrorists. Their arrest was only the tip of sympathizers radicalized in Mosques. At least nine others have been identified as supporters and direct sympathizers with this group. The four men on this slide have confessed to their conspiracy and provided details of their actions ? they are however, unrepentant. What in the 1970s and 1980 was the threat from the communist inspired Red Army Faction (RAF) fighting against the great capitalist enemy, the United States, has been replaced by the ideologues of Islam who oppose U.S. policy as the great Satan. The Sauerland Group is the most recent iteration of homegrown, foreign trained and ideologically motivated terrorists. Their arrest was only the tip of sympathizers radicalized in Mosques. At least nine others have been identified as supporters and direct sympathizers with this group. The four men on this slide have confessed to their conspiracy and provided details of their actions ? they are however, unrepentant.

29. The insider threat focuses on the employee who may be disgruntled and unhappy with his job relationship, but beyond that also takes on added anti-US ideas and sympathies. Based on the shooting at Fort Hood, indicators were developed to help identify those people who may not just be unhappy with their job, but ready to take violent action against their fellow soldiers and army peers. The insider threat focuses on the employee who may be disgruntled and unhappy with his job relationship, but beyond that also takes on added anti-US ideas and sympathies. Based on the shooting at Fort Hood, indicators were developed to help identify those people who may not just be unhappy with their job, but ready to take violent action against their fellow soldiers and army peers.

30. Most people don?t start their jobs hating them and in most cases, even if one dislikes their job, the discontent is either managed or the person moves on. Those who chose to remain and fester on their real or imagined grievances may also express their opinions about their employers and the reasons for their discontent. Care must be taken to distinguish between legitimate gripes and passing complaints in comparison to long term, on-going disillusionment, opposition to, or hatred of the job, the co-workers or the institution. As the internet takes on ever greater importance in daily interactions, so to the use of the internet by terrorists, their sympathizers and supporters is gaining momentum. Forums, both public and private, discuss the flaws in U.S. policy and suggest a host of actions against the U.S. from lawful disobedience to violent acts against U.S. interests and U.S. persons. The armed forces are a ready and visible target with daily news reports featuring military developments and focused on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the greater middle east policies. Those who oppose U.S. policy and action are as active on the internet as major corporations and post blogs, forums and discussion groups where they spread their ideology and hatred influencing people on a global scale. They may also provide the means to take action by providing plans and tactics on how to build and then use explosive devices or take armed action against people and facilities. Most people don?t start their jobs hating them and in most cases, even if one dislikes their job, the discontent is either managed or the person moves on. Those who chose to remain and fester on their real or imagined grievances may also express their opinions about their employers and the reasons for their discontent. Care must be taken to distinguish between legitimate gripes and passing complaints in comparison to long term, on-going disillusionment, opposition to, or hatred of the job, the co-workers or the institution. As the internet takes on ever greater importance in daily interactions, so to the use of the internet by terrorists, their sympathizers and supporters is gaining momentum. Forums, both public and private, discuss the flaws in U.S. policy and suggest a host of actions against the U.S. from lawful disobedience to violent acts against U.S. interests and U.S. persons. The armed forces are a ready and visible target with daily news reports featuring military developments and focused on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the greater middle east policies. Those who oppose U.S. policy and action are as active on the internet as major corporations and post blogs, forums and discussion groups where they spread their ideology and hatred influencing people on a global scale. They may also provide the means to take action by providing plans and tactics on how to build and then use explosive devices or take armed action against people and facilities.

31. DON?Ts DON?Ts

32. DO?s DO?s

35. The federal Espionage Laws along with other related crimes date back to a terrorist attack of 1916 on Black Tom Island, NJ. The Black Tom explosion of July 30, 1916 in Jersey City was an act of sabotage on American ammunition supplies by German intelligence agents. This event was possibly the worst act of terrorism on American soil, until the World Trade Center attack, eighty-five years later. Black Tom was a major munitions depot supplying the Allied war effort during WWI. The night of attack, two million pounds of ammunition was stored at the depot in freight cars, including one-hundred thousand pounds of TNT, all awaiting shipment to Britain and France. German agents set a series of small fires on the pier. At 2:08 am the first explosion took place. Windows were broken 25 miles away from the force of the explosion. Property damage was estimated at nearly $400 million (in today's dollars). This event had such an impact that proposals were made to court martial civilians, since there were no viable laws to deal with espionage at the time. The result was the 1917 Espionage Law. There was a period in America's history that we did not prosecute spies, mostly because we did not have the laws or the political will to do so. To illustrate this, from 1967 to 1974, there were no federal prosecutions for espionage and only ten individuals were convicted in military courts for espionage-related activity. The FBI didn't begin to train their agents in counterintelligence until 1973, and it wasn't until the early 1980's that FBI agents received training in counter-espionage. Since 1945 to date, there have been 251 individuals arrested in the US for espionage or espionage related crimes. Since the end of the Cold War, 1989, 78 individuals have been arrested for espionage or espionage-related crimes. The federal Espionage Laws along with other related crimes date back to a terrorist attack of 1916 on Black Tom Island, NJ. The Black Tom explosion of July 30, 1916 in Jersey City was an act of sabotage on American ammunition supplies by German intelligence agents. This event was possibly the worst act of terrorism on American soil, until the World Trade Center attack, eighty-five years later. Black Tom was a major munitions depot supplying the Allied war effort during WWI. The night of attack, two million pounds of ammunition was stored at the depot in freight cars, including one-hundred thousand pounds of TNT, all awaiting shipment to Britain and France. German agents set a series of small fires on the pier. At 2:08 am the first explosion took place. Windows were broken 25 miles away from the force of the explosion. Property damage was estimated at nearly $400 million (in today's dollars). This event had such an impact that proposals were made to court martial civilians, since there were no viable laws to deal with espionage at the time. The result was the 1917 Espionage Law. There was a period in America's history that we did not prosecute spies, mostly because we did not have the laws or the political will to do so. To illustrate this, from 1967 to 1974, there were no federal prosecutions for espionage and only ten individuals were convicted in military courts for espionage-related activity. The FBI didn't begin to train their agents in counterintelligence until 1973, and it wasn't until the early 1980's that FBI agents received training in counter-espionage. Since 1945 to date, there have been 251 individuals arrested in the US for espionage or espionage related crimes. Since the end of the Cold War, 1989, 78 individuals have been arrested for espionage or espionage-related crimes.

36. ESPIONAGE INDICATORS Clues to watch for: Unreported or Concealed Contacts with Foreign Nationals

37. ESPIONAGE INDICATORS Clues to watch for: Finances

38. See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information. See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.

39. See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information. See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.

40. See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information. See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.

41. BOONE A former Army signals analyst for the National Security Agency, was arrested 10 October and charged with selling Top Secret documents to agents of the Soviet Union from 1988 to 1991, including a 600-page manual describing US reconnaissance programs and a listing of nuclear targets in Russia. Boone was arrested at a suburban Virginia hotel after being lured from his home in Germany to the United States in a FBI sting operation. He had worked for the NSA for three years before being reassigned to Augsburg, Germany, in 1988, and retired from the Army in 1991. In October 1988, the same month that he separated from his wife and children, Boone walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington and offered his services. According to a FBI counterintelligence agent?s affidavit, Boone was under ?severe financial and personal difficulties? when he began spying. His former wife had garnished his Army sergeant?s pay, leaving him with only $250 a month. According to the federal complaint, Boone met with his handler about four times a year from late 1988 until June 1990, when his access to classified information was suspended because of ?his lack of personal and professional responsibility." He held a Top Secret clearance from 1971 and gained access to SCI information in 1976. He is alleged to have received payments totaling more than $60,000 from the KGB. Boone was indicted on three counts: one for conspiracy to commit espionage and the other two related to his alleged passing of two Top Secret documents to his Soviet handler. On 18 December, Boon pleaded guilty to conspiracy, and on 26 February 1999 he was sentenced to 24 years and four months in prison. Under a plea agreement Boone was also required to forfeit $52,000 and a hand-held scanner he used to copy documents. See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information. BOONE A former Army signals analyst for the National Security Agency, was arrested 10 October and charged with selling Top Secret documents to agents of the Soviet Union from 1988 to 1991, including a 600-page manual describing US reconnaissance programs and a listing of nuclear targets in Russia. Boone was arrested at a suburban Virginia hotel after being lured from his home in Germany to the United States in a FBI sting operation. He had worked for the NSA for three years before being reassigned to Augsburg, Germany, in 1988, and retired from the Army in 1991. In October 1988, the same month that he separated from his wife and children, Boone walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington and offered his services. According to a FBI counterintelligence agent?s affidavit, Boone was under ?severe financial and personal difficulties? when he began spying. His former wife had garnished his Army sergeant?s pay, leaving him with only $250 a month. According to the federal complaint, Boone met with his handler about four times a year from late 1988 until June 1990, when his access to classified information was suspended because of ?his lack of personal and professional responsibility." He held a Top Secret clearance from 1971 and gained access to SCI information in 1976. He is alleged to have received payments totaling more than $60,000 from the KGB. Boone was indicted on three counts: one for conspiracy to commit espionage and the other two related to his alleged passing of two Top Secret documents to his Soviet handler. On 18 December, Boon pleaded guilty to conspiracy, and on 26 February 1999 he was sentenced to 24 years and four months in prison. Under a plea agreement Boone was also required to forfeit $52,000 and a hand-held scanner he used to copy documents. See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.

42. See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information. See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.

43. See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.

44. Stress two points: Spies have no friends. They do not deserve loyalty. If somebody suspects a coworker of espionage, it is not ?snitching?, rather it could be a matter of their own life and death. Even if a spy has the greatest security (shows no indicators) they can still be revealed by a Defector. Sooner or later, they will be uncovered.Stress two points: Spies have no friends. They do not deserve loyalty. If somebody suspects a coworker of espionage, it is not ?snitching?, rather it could be a matter of their own life and death. Even if a spy has the greatest security (shows no indicators) they can still be revealed by a Defector. Sooner or later, they will be uncovered.

45. Espionage, for the most part, involves finding a person who knows something or has something that you can induce them secretly to give to you. That always involves a betrayal of trust. Espionage revolves around the many different forms of betrayals of trust ? Here is a list of weaknesses/ factors Since 1990, American spies have been poorly paid. 81% were not paid since 1990. Reason is, since 1990 more spies have acted from divided localities and have refused payment. Espionage, for the most part, involves finding a person who knows something or has something that you can induce them secretly to give to you. That always involves a betrayal of trust. Espionage revolves around the many different forms of betrayals of trust ? Here is a list of weaknesses/ factors Since 1990, American spies have been poorly paid. 81% were not paid since 1990. Reason is, since 1990 more spies have acted from divided localities and have refused payment.


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