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The Status of Food Security In Africa

The Status of Food Security In Africa. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Suxth Session of the Committee on Food Security and Sustainable Development (CFSSD-6) Regional Implementation Meeting (RIM) for CSD-18 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 27-30 October2009. Hamdou Raby Wane

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The Status of Food Security In Africa

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  1. The Status of Food Security In Africa United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Suxth Session of the Committee on Food Security and Sustainable Development (CFSSD-6) Regional Implementation Meeting (RIM) for CSD-18 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 27-30 October2009 Hamdou Raby Wane FSSDD/UNECA

  2. Structure of the Presentation • The Context of the Current Debate on Food Security in Africa • Food Security Issues and Challenges • The Global Food Price Surge and Its Impact on the Food Trade Balance • Policy Responses – Macroeconomic Implications and Food Price Impacts • Recommendations on The Way Forward

  3. The Context of the Current Debate on Food Security in Africa • “Food security” (FS): not only the availability of food, but also the ability to purchase food. • TO BE FOOD SECURE = to have a reliable source of food and sufficient resources to purchase it. • To Deal with FS Policy issues: 1) Assess the state of FS, 2) identify the underlying causes and the proximate factors of food shortages and of disruptions/losses in real incomes across the most food needy populations. • Global food crisis (2007 onwards) as a Systemic Factor • THREAT - has exacerbated these causes and factors of food insecurity • OPPORTUNITY CHALLENGE to Africa for long-term solutions to hunger through agriculture-led growth.

  4. Novelty of a Food Crisis to Africa? • More of the Same: food shortages and hardships • Additional stringent strains on households’ incomes, on external positions and to national budgets • FC can complicate, if not reverse any progress, towards the attainment of the MDGs-related poverty and hunger targets. • On the + side : use of the FC as an opportunity for the revitalization and the development of African agriculture on the medium to long term. • Imperative: build a strong consistency between: • the crisis response – i.e. the set of policy measures and actions deployed to mitigate its short term impacts, and • the medium to long term development policy.

  5. Food Security Issues and Challenges Over a decade (1995/97-2003-05), real progress has been made in many countries and across the sub-regions. However, the challenge seems unabated in very large populations and this is even more compounded by the setbacks that are stemming from the recent global food crisis. Undernourishment and Hunger on the Rise • Worldwide: People chronically hungry (undernourished): 923 million in 2007, up by 75 million from 2003-05 (FAO 2008 data) • Largest additional contingents in Asia (41 million) and in SSA (24 million, almost 1/3 of the total increase) • Setback more accentuated in the recent period & the progress made at the turn of the millennium has been completely wiped out in SSA as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean

  6. Trends in number and proportion of undernourished people • Undernourished in SSA • 236 million (2007); cumulated increase>67 million since 1990–92 – the base period for the World Food Summit (WFS) hunger reduction target • Annual growth rate 3 times higher between 2003-05 and 2007 than during the preceding decade • 11% of the world’s total population & 25% of the total of hungry people in 2003-05 • Proportion in 2003-05 : • North Africa: less than 5% • SSA: 30%; world average 13%; developing world 16% • Proportion: minus 4 percentage points from the 34% plateau of 1990-92

  7. High concentration of hunger (in number and in prevalence) in East and Central Africa • DRC & Ethiopia: 38% of the SSA’s hungry people; 80 percent and 41 percent of their respective sub-regions. Together with Nigeria and Tanzania, they account for almost half of the total of the sub-continent. • Central Africa • Proportion incr. by 6% between 1995-97 and 2003-05, mostly due to DRC (76% +2.4% per an). • 8 out of every 10 additional in SSA in 2003-05 / 1995-97 • Large and fast reductions in countries and regions (Centre, South, East) with the highest prevalence (40-50%) in the 90s Therefore, any substantial progress in these four countries would have an important impact on the containment of hunger, and therefore on poverty alleviation throughout the continent.

  8. Patterns and Trends of Food Emergency • Hunger Hotspots (HH) & critical problems of food insecurity (GIEWS/FAO List) • Exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies as a result of crop failure, natural disasters, interruption of imports, disruption of distribution, excessive post-harvest losses, or other supply bottlenecks; • Widespread lack of access, where a majority of the population is considered to be unable to procure food from local markets, due to very low incomes, exceptionally high food prices, or the inability to circulate within the country; or, • severe localized food insecurity due to the influx of refugees, a concentration of internally displaced persons, or areas with combinations of crop failure and deep poverty (FAO/GIEWS 2008).

  9. Dec.05-April 09: 16/46 countries as food secure – i.e. they did not face any food crisis that required emergency assistance • 350 million people – i.e. 40% of the continent’s population; • Small size countries have been more successful. Average pop. of 6.5 million (Gabon, Rwanda, Botswana, Mauritius & Namibia). • Countries facing food crises • 1993–2000: an average of 15 SSA annually • After 2001: up to ~ 25 • 2005 onward: with a core set of ~20 consistently listed and 12 others that appear occasionally, SSA contributed by 60% to 70% to the FAO/GIEWS world list. • East = 34% of the HH. All but Rwanda • West: 2 out of 3 countries yearly or occasionally • Centre and South: 18% of HH each

  10. Typology of food emergencies (2005-09) Overall • Severe localized food insecurity : 57% • Widespread lack of access: 23% • Exceptional shortfall in aggregate production/supply: 20% By sub-region • Severe localized food insecurity: 70% in Central & Eastern Africa; less than ½ of the cases in West Africa • Widespread lack of access: 53% in West Africa; where it is more than twice SSA’s average and more than 5 times the level of East Africa (10 percent); negligible in Southern and Central Africa • Exceptional shortfall in food production/supply: 80% of the cases in Southern Africa; East: 20%

  11. Main Causes of food emergencies (2005-09) • War and conflicts and the related social unrest in SSA (~2/3 of the cases): main causes of famine through destruction of assets, displacement of populations albeit the absolute number of such crises has been decreasing over the period. • More than ½ of the socio-economic and 1/3 of the weather-related food emergencies are associated with the conflict factor. Increasingproportion of natural disasters in SSA, especially floods – a feature that SSA shares with the rest of the world. • In 2002, about 6.3 million people (refugees, IDPs, returnees) were in need of assistance owing to conflicts and natural disasters in the Horn of Africa. Three quarter of them were in the IGAD member-countries • HIV/AIDS scourge: from 2006 onwards, identified, by GIEWS, as the main cause of the highly severe localized food insecurity that prevailed in many parts of Southern Africa, e.g. Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland, and in some Eastern Africa countries.

  12. Supply of major Foods groups,Energy supply and the Diet diversity • Average Daily Supply in 2003-05 • Cereals almost stagnated over a decade in all sub-regions except in Central Africa where it increased (at the expense of starchy roots) by 6.7 percent yearly since early 1990s albeit its share remained the lowest of the sub-regions. • Starchy roots decreasedin Eastern Africaby ~ 1/2 percent yearly. Dramatically increased In the 3 other sub-regions; almost doubled every 2 years in North Africa. • Animal products – namely milk and eggs (an important source of protein and of micronutrients) increased very substantially in all the sub-regions but Southern Africa and, to a lesser extent, in West Africa. In 2003-05, it regained in the other three sub-regions, the losses incurred between 1990-92 and 1995-97.

  13. The dietary energy supply increased only in North Africa and in few SSA countries. Overall, if not reversed, its increases were not sufficient to meet daily energy requirements. The higher the per capita income levels, the larger the supply of dietary energy from animal foods (rich in high-quality proteins and micronutrients, such as iron, zinc and vitamin A) and the bigger the intake of fruits and vegetables (which contain vitamin A precursor)as substitutes to starchy foods. These foods are usually the most expensive. The recent global prices hike has mostly impacted these food commodities and the cereals. This is one of the main factors of increased undernourishment and, therefore, of deepened poverty in sub-Saharan African and of likely reversals in the North

  14. Economic and agricultural growth performance • Evidence collected by the FAO shows a positive correlation between growth in African agricultural and level of performances on the MDG-1 target: • A steady and relatively rapid growth - characterized by gains in agricultural value added, food production, cereal production and cereal yields, in the 14 African countries on track on MDG-1 target; and, inversely • A sharp fall of food production and lower levels of agricultural value added (by ¼ of the rate of the former group) in the 14 African countries that either have failed to reduce the prevalence of undernourishment or have seen it increase since 1990–92. Countries that have scored stark successes include several that emerged from decades of civil war and conflict, offering striking evidence of the importance of peace and political stability for hunger reduction” (FAO 2008).

  15. Growth in agriculture output has been accompanied with a strong growth in overall productivity levels in the sector. • The best performers in overall agricultural productivity also recorded very substantive results in reducing the depth of hunger – a measurement of the intensity of food deprivation. The higher the annual growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), the more retrenched is hunger and the higher is the collective food security as measured by the share of food aid in the total consumption. • Most of the growth is explained by efficiency gains rather than technological change. Increased efficiency and accelerated output growth in SSA resulted from differential growth between sub-sectors. • Maize’s annual growth rates: 3.5% in 1984-1993 to 0.9% in the 1990s  • share in total output in 2003 = ~ 1984 levels. • Contributes to the stagnation of supply of cereals in all regions but Central Africa • increased supply of proteins from animal foods to compensate for the maize related losses of proteins and lipids.

  16. Top contributors (@ 70%)to total output growthof: Most dynamic sub-sectors • Oil crops - in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Ghana; • Roots and tubers - Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi, and Mozambique; • Other cereals - Ethiopia and Nigeria; • Milk - the highlands of East Africa and Sudan; • Vegetables: Nigeria and Cameroon. On the Downside • Tropical fruits - Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya; • Beef - Highlands of East Africa and Sudan • Rice production - Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Nigeria. • Sheep and goat meat - Nigeria and Sudan.

  17. Main Characteristics of the Best-performers Similar growth in TFP and increased labor and land productivity owing to an increased use of fertilizer per hectare and worker • Countries that are more likely to have improved rural living standards through increased labor income in agriculture. • However, acceleration of yields increase is needed to compensate the growth in rural population, improve rural income and sustain land management The main challenge is now to sustain, accelerate and broaden this in the medium to longer term in the current context of global food and fuel prices hike. This is imperative if Africa is to achieve the desired changes in poverty and malnutrition levels within the timeframe defined under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

  18. The Rising Urban Poverty: A Threat to Food Security • In absolute terms, rural poverty remains higher than urban poverty, but urban poverty is growing at a faster rate. • Rising urban poverty is a threat to food security: • it derives from much higher levels of inequality within the urban population than in the rural one, therefore compromising the food security of increasing segments of urban dwellers. • High income inequality in urban areas is the reason that more than 1/2 of the urban population is below the poverty line in SSA countries such as Angola, Chad, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Zambia • Unlike in rural areas, food-insecurity problems in urban areas are not related to a lack of available food. Instead, they are related to inadequate purchasing power. • This reduces the size of the internal agro-food markets, therefore, negatively impacting income earnings of farmers.

  19. In Africa, urban populations can use up to 60 percent (close to 100 percent for the poorest) of their income on food and, thus, creating, a growing market. • But, as a result of a changing urban diet of the wealthiest and of relatively lower cost of imports of staple foods derived from rice and wheat, the urban food demand is largely disconnected from the traditional food supply chain – i.e. most of local agriculture. • Breakdown in positive inter-sectoral linkages between agriculture and the rest of the economy. This is the main underlying factor to the high level of food import dependence, a major feature of the vulnerability of the LDCs.

  20. The food import-dependency • Since the early 90s, African LDCs have been exposed to increased import surges - in terms of numbers and of frequency. Between 40 and 60 percent of the total import surges occurred during 1990-2003 for any of the commodities considered. • In 2000–2003, African countries changed to being net food importers from their high surpluses of the 1980s. Continent’s share of global food exports stable @ ~3%, while the imports went up at 4-5 percent. • Therefore, these import surges affected the domestic production of processed – such as poultry meat – and unprocessed agricultural goods – such as rice and tomato paste since the concerned imported goods are produced locally or are substitutes.

  21. Yearly, on the average in 2000-2005, the total food trade bill was of US$ 17,340 billion of exports and of 24 billion of imports, leading to an average deficit of 6,600 billion. • Food import bill: ~US$ 20 billion in 2001 and >33 billion – i.e. 2/3 of the food market in 2006, year in which the deficit was close to 9,600 billion up by 45 percent on the year before.

  22. Cereals and preparations accounted for 37 percent of the total of the food groups. • Share of cereals in North Africa - 43-47% ; SSA 9.5-11.5%. • The global share of cereal imports by Africa: ~22% percent, while its share in exports is roughly 3% • Import growths were above average (2.1 percent annually) for cereals, oilseeds, meat, beverages and miscellaneous food products. • 33 countries in deficit and 18 net food exporters. However, converting traded food commodities into calories tells a different story of food trade.

  23. Over the period 2003-2005, total food consumption benefited quite substantially from the imports in only 2 food net exporters (Côte d’Ivoire and Malawi) and 2 food net importers (Mauritius and Swaziland). This is owing to more inward-oriented diets and to a more favorable caloric balance of internationally traded foodstuff. • All the other (48) countries were in deficit – i.e. the calorie-content of their food imports outpaced the equivalent in food exports. The net trade caloric balance of food was: • neutral or significantly in deficit (up to 25 percent) in either net food exporters (13) or net food importers (12). • as high as 50 percent at least in 13 others – including 2 net food exporters (Mauritania and Morocco and almost all but three L-MICs). • comprised between 1/4 and 1/2 of the total food consumption in the remaining 7 countries.

  24. Concentration of the most dependent along the Northern, the North-Western and South-Western coasts. Disconnected from the hinterland of the continent, they are as food dependent as more industrialized and wealthier countries like Mexico, Chile and Venezuela in Latin America or the big oil exporters in the Middle East or in the Arabian Gulf. Net Trade in Food, 2003-05

  25. The Vulnerability of the Households to Food Insecurity • Main factors of vulnerability stem from: • its status vis-à-vis the food market, primarily as net food seller/consumer. According to FAO data from nine developing countries, about 3/4 of rural households and 97% of urban households are net food buyers. • importance of the relative share of food consumption expenditure in its total consumption expenditures • More at risks are the vast majority of the poor urban and rural households (especially landless and female-headed households) depending on: • their dietary patterns, • expenditure shares of internationally traded food staples (such as wheat, rice, maize), • substitution options towards less-expensive foods, • access to assets usable to produce and sell food staples competitively and to earn incomes.

  26. THE GLOBAL FOOD PRICE SURGE AND ITS IMPACT ON AFRICA • The FAO Food Price Index: in June 2008, a record 214 points, or a 85 % increase up from last term of 2006. Then it decreased to reach an average 152 points in May 2009. • Highest price rises on oils and fats along with cereals - a reflection of the increased integration of agriculture and energy markets through the development of corn and vegetable oils-based biofuels as of the feeding needs of a booming meat-producing business in the emerging markets of Asia. • January 05 – June/July 08 • Maize prices almost tripled, rice and wheat prices increased 170% and 127%. More than doubled from end of 2007 well into 2008. • palm oil prices up by 200%, soybean oil by192% and other vegetable oil prices by similar amounts. In comparison, other food prices – i.e. of sugar and meat - increased by 30 to 50% • January-May 09 / same period of 2008, global prices of cereals decreased..

  27. Significant fall in international prices in the second half of 2008 by 31 percent and only by -0.1 percent for rice. rice prices are still well the above their 2007 international prices • But, The pass-through between international commodity markets and consumer prices was high in the phase of increasing prices. The reverse was not evident during the subsequent period of falling prices. • Purchasing food on the international market place has been a heavier burden to SSA than to any other region. In 2008, the increase was far less for developed countries and the expected drop in their 2009 bills is disproportionately higher. All forecasts expect food prices to remain high in the long run, mainly as a result of continuously rising biofuel demand and structural factors related to population and income growth (OECD-FAO, 2009, USDA, 2009). These are worrisome prospects for food security in African countries that are facing losses of shares on the international markets and depreciating value of exports.

  28. The effect on the food-trade balance Changes (in %) in export and import of selected countries, 2006-2008 • UN Comtrade Data - Sample of 25 African countries on 2006-2008. Includes 8 of the top-10 exporters and 6 of the top-10 importers over the period 2000-2005. • Total food trade of $ 43,270 billion, of which 23,137 billion of imports – i.e. 66 percent of the estimated imports of the region - it shows a deficit of 3 billion. • However, the balance deficit is in diminution by 2,723 billion – i.e. -48% on a year ago, when it increased by its highest figure – i.e. 3,878 billion between 2006 and 2007. • Among the Net Food Exporters • 6 substantially improved their surplus, • 3 registered a decreasing surplus – by as high as1/2 (Malawi), 60% (Zambia) or 85% (Seychelles). • 6 others became net food importing. Exp. * Mauritius – 90 million surplus in 2006 and a deficit of 190 million in 2008 – * Ethiopia – deficit of 40 million in 2008 from surpluses of 215 million and 339 million the preceding years. In 2008, the top-8 exporters – 60% of the food trade, an increase in exports faster (39%) than the average of the sample (22%). Contraction of food imports (-10.5%)> av. of the 25 countries (-4%).

  29. THE POLICY RESPONSES The Country Level • Use of a mix of market-based and command and control short-term measures aiming at reducing consumer prices, providing safety nets to the most food insecure, and guaranteeing an adequate food supply and, performances permit, to export surplus. • Set of measures have included: • releasing food stock to market, and waiving/easing import taxes and/or imposing export restrictions to maintain domestic food availability; • applying price controls, subsidies and cash and food transfers to keep food affordable to different segments of the society; • iii) drawing down on stocks to stabilize supplies and prices; and, • providing support measures to increase local production on the medium to the long-term • At least initially, very few governments have tried to foster an agricultural supply response. But now, almost all of them have taken action to provide farmers with the support needed to boost agricultural production.

  30. In 24 countries: in 2007 and early 2008, 7/10 reduced cereal import taxes and roughly the same proportion applied export restrictions, and price controls or consumer subsidies in an attempt to keep domestic food prices below world prices. Almost 40 percent of the governments took action to increase supply, drawing down on food grain stock. • Due to shortage of foreign exchange, many poor food-deficit countries have been importing much less and have been resorting to food aid or external assistance to bridge the gap

  31. Unexpected consequences of export restrictions or bans: exp. of a cross-examination on both sides of the chains in the Sahel and West Africa around Nigeria and between the coast and the Sahelian hinterland (Staatz 2008). Given their production potential or market size – both internally and at sub-regional levels, non-coordinated measures of the kind can jeopardize efforts towards regional markets integration, are short of: • taking advantage of agro-ecological complementarities, • tend to hurt producers and trade partners, and • may actually increase prices of local staple produces, taking them out of reach of the common diet.

  32. The biggest challenges faced by the existing social policies revolve around the following issues: • efficient targeting to ensure that benefits reach the neediest; • level and sustainability of funding in the context of scarcity of donors’ support; and, • resources mobilization and allocation – i.e. alignment with agricultural policies. This is particularly relevant as the other main axis of action aims at fostering commercial agriculture and at promoting smallholder agriculture for poverty reduction.

  33. The Regional level AU/NEPAD Initiative to assist countries to address the food price crisis through acceleration of CAADP country roundtable process. It involves all key AU institutional partners. • Overall objective: to develop a Government/UN Country Action Plan that will include a call for assistance. Draft country action plans and roadmaps for short, medium and long term have been designed. • Inter—agency assessment missions conducted. Components: 1) Humanitarian assistance: social safety nets; 2) Agricultural production (short term leading to longer term solutions); 3) Policies to respond to high food prices; 4) Budget adjustment to assist countries. • Completed Action plans for Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Somalia and The Gambia.

  34. International Action and Commitments • UNSG established, on 29 April 2008, a High Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis (HLTF) with the aim of drawing a prioritized plan of action and coordinate its implementation. • Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA): Joint position of HLTF members reiterated by the High Level Conference on World Food Security attended by Heads of States, Gov. and Rep. of 108 countries, 3-5 June 2008, FAO, Rome. Common Declaration recommending: 1) to meet immediate needs of vulnerable populations; and, 2) to build longer term resilience and contribute to global food and nutrition security • UN System (FAO, WFP, IFAD Funds) and Others: The World Bank’s New Deal for Global Food Policy; IMF Action Plan • More recently, “L’Aquila” Joint Statement on Global Food Security, 10 July 2009

  35. Impact on Current Account Balance and on Balance of Payments Simulations by IMF (2008a & 2008b) of fuel & food prices shocks • Food price increase: severe negative effect for 5 LICs countries. DRC: - 4 years of reserves; Eritrea & Liberia, resp. ¾ & 2/3 of their initial position. • Combined price hikes would take a heavy toll from 24 countries. Morocco and South Africa and, marginally, Tunisia – would compensate partly the oil price shock by taking advantage of the food prices surge. • Severe reduction in coverage in 18 LICs. Stronger impact from food price increase (- 0.7 months of reserve coverage) than from the oil price (– 0.4 months)

  36. Among ten countries surveyed by the IMF in the CFA Franc Zone, it is in only one – i.e. Senegal, that the predicted increase in the food import bill would widen the deficit of the current account balance as a share of their 2007 GDP, by 1 percent point

  37. The transmission – “pass-through” – of international price changes to domestic food markets • Weak urban-rural linkages buffer the rural communities from both urban and global economic downturns; also limit the benefits of an economic upturn. Higher prices were, however, transmitted to consumers in most cases in spite of governments’ interventions • Despite the decline of prices on the world market in the second half of 2008 and early 2009, prices of main staple foods in many countries of the region remain higher than a year ago.

  38. The main factor limiting the impact of global food price increases on domestic food prices has been the existence of a diversified base for domestic production of several food commodities in combination with a partial insulation from the from most global food markets, and from shifts in international food prices. Due to poor infrastructure and/or trade barriers, such as the early export bans in Ethiopia, Mali, Tanzania. • In such cases, exchange rate movements also mitigated the impact of world market price increases on domestic prices. Exp: in West of Africa (, e.g. in Ghana and Niger) and East Africa (e.g. in Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia). • Prices of crops that are mainly domestically produced, e.g. maize, other coarse grains in the Sahel for instance, have been more closely related to domestic supply conditions and regional markets. Should the price of these local staples also rise, as demand for them increases, rising food prices would have a much stronger impact

  39. The Household-Level effects: An encroaching Poverty • Ivanic and Martin (2008): Increased poverty for a majority of the low-income countries covered in their sample, mainly due to the negative impact of higher wheat prices, followed by the prices of rice, dairy and maize. • Few cases where higher commodity prices lowered rural poverty. West and Central Africa. The negative impact of food prices hike for consumers larger than the positive impact for net sellers of locally produced foods (Wodon & Zaman 2008). • An increase of 50% to Price  • add 4.4 percentage points to the proportion of poor if only the impact on consumers is taken into account. In countries that are highly dependent on food imports such as Liberia, 8 additional percentage points with a 50% increase in rice prices. • Factoring in potential gains for producers, poverty would still increase by 2.5 percentage points (Quentin Wodon et al 2008).

  40. 88% of the increase in urban poverty depth - gap in consumption between the average poor household and the poverty line - is from poor households becoming poorer and only 12 percent from households falling into poverty. • This increase in poverty depth is roughly equivalent to 1 percent of GDP for a typical less developed country • Of the 60 countries with high malnutrition burdens, 44 countries have experienced negative terms-of-trade impacts of recent food price changes (World Bank, 2008a). This is likely to result from cuts on food expenditures that poor households are to make as coping strategies. These cuts  reduced diet quality and increased micronutrient malnutrition

  41. Liberia Joint High Food Price Assessment (May-June 08): at: 1) households spend more on transport and basic food commodities and less on higher quality food commodities, health, education and housing; 2) the proportion of households with poor or borderline consumption has increased; 3) households consume slightly more staple commodities but less protein sources, fruits, vegetables and oil; 4) restricted sources of income, indebtedness, weak asset – such as land - ownership are driving reduced food consumption – fewer meals a day and more no-meal days, food on credit ( WFP 2008). Even though high food prices may be a temporary shock, they are here to stay at a high level and, more importantly, they may have long lasting effects on physical and mental growth if proper actions are not taken targeting the most vulnerable groups, and women and children among them.

  42. Recommendations on The Way Forward • Making the best of the food crisis by mitigating its negative effects and seizing the moment to think and act strategically – return to Long term perspective and to Planning – in a coordinated way at the national, sub-regional and regional levels. • Identify the main structural factors that hamper the supply-response to the FC. Supply response should be perceived in a regional as well as national contexts. This require open trade in staples and reduced transaction costs between neighboring countries, and strengthening the capacity of the private sector to respond in medium and long term • Design and pilot-test on 2-3 countries per sub-region a Conceptual Framework for the M&E of the sub-regional and regional impact of the national response-policies. Possible expected results: improved coherence, better understanding of impacts; strengthening of the governance of regional and sub-regional commitments

  43. Achieving a balance between investments in export oriented agriculture and locally oriented agriculture in order to: generate revenues, and to guarantee production not just of grains, but of a diversity of foods for local consumption. Improving the productivity of small farmers has a ripple effect that spreads benefits throughout poor rural communities, and stimulates urban economic activity as well: market for labour-intensive goods and services from the rural non-farm sector, • Strengthening The Links Between Nutrition and Agricultural development. Indeed, remaining malnourished for more than two years increases risks of stunting in children. On top of physical growth, stunting impairs mental potential and becomes an inherited genetic marker. So, should they remain unabated for the next few years, high food prices would become a huge toll on Africa’s future. Bringing down the global food crisis is a moral and a survival imperative. To start tackling this challenge, the solution resides less on the demand side but more on the supply sides – i.e. ultimately on the demand side through income multiplier.

  44. Establishing food and nutrition surveillance systems that can inform decision making at all levels, not just by central policy makers. Such information can provide the elements of predictability and accountability that are required in a human rights based approach to developing national government responses to the food price crisis. • Establishing a Market Information System, including an Early Warning component on prices and cross-border flows of Grains vegetables, and oil-fats to inform the M&E tool. ______________________________________________________________________

  45. THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND ATTENTION

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