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Nonproliferation & Export Control Update Briefing Steven Clagett Director Missile and Nuclear Technology Control Divisions. Trends in Export Control and Nonproliferation Policy after 9/11.

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Nonproliferation & Export Control

Update Briefing

Steven Clagett


Missile and Nuclear Technology

Control Divisions

Trends in Export Control and

Nonproliferation Policy after 9/11

  • The Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes remain focused on the fundamental goal of preventing the spread of technologies that may contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

  • The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australia Group (AG) recognize the increased need for effective multilateral export controls.

  • Regime members continue to update and modify the lists of controlled commodities and implement “catch all” controls.

U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls

  • Proposals to modify the Multilateral Export Control Regime Guidelines & Annexes (Control Lists)

  • NSG proposal to notify Partners of approvals for controlled nuclear items to non-partners

  • Support for multilateral initiatives, such as the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

  • Ensure effective implementation of “catch all controls” for all commodities to end users (countries, companies, or individuals) of concern

  • Provide multilateral notifications of U.S. denials to utilize the “no undercut” policies

U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls

  • Sanctions

  • Consultations with foreign governments and commercial entities

  • Outreach efforts with U.S. industry to stress the importance of export control compliance

  • Strong enforcement of the law against violators

  • International outreach programs to assist other nations implement a effective export controls

MTCR Update

  • Plenary: September 2002 Warsaw, Poland

  • Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) to discuss changes to Annex controls

  • Update on the new International Code of Conduct (ICOC) Against Missile proliferation

  • Focus on regional nonproliferation issues.

  • MTCR Plenary has added an Enforcement Experts component.

NSG Update

  • Plenary convened May 2002 in Prague, Czech Rep.

  • Enforcement experts meeting held in conjunction with the Plenary.

  • Member States continued discussions on sharing NSG license approval data and proposed notification requirements.

  • Regional nonproliferation issues.

Missile Technology

Applications Processed (2001)

Received: 1036

Value: $2.2 billion

Nuclear Technology

Applications Processed (2001)

Received: 949

Value: $154.3 million

EPCI “Catch All” Controls

  • The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) is designed to:

    • Strengthen multilateral non-proliferation efforts;

    • Prevent the export of technology that could contribute to missile, chemical, biological, and nuclear-weapons proliferation; and

    • Minimize the impact on legitimate commerce.

  • EPCI places export controls on end use and end users rather than a particular item.


  • License may be denied if destined for missile, nuclear, or CBW activities or facilities.

  • License must be obtained if the exporter knows the commodities will be used in CBW or missile activities or facilities.

  • BIS may inform exporters at anytime that a license is required for a specific end-user if there is a possibility of nuclear, CBW, or missile activities.

  • Any U.S. participation in nuclear, CBW, or missile activities or facilities requires a license.

Evaluation Factors

  • Country

  • Commodity

  • End-Use

  • Significance for Missile/Nuclear Development

  • Non-Proliferation Credentials

  • Assurances and Guarantees

  • Risk of diversion

  • Sanctions

Missile Technology Projects and Countries of Concern

  • Listed in Supplement #1 in Part 740 of the EAR

  • Programs in Countries:

    • China -- M-series, CSS-2

    • India -- Prithvi, Agni, SLV-3, Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), Polar Satellite LV (PSLV), Geostationary Satellite LV (GSLV)

    • Iran -- Surface-to-surface, Scud

    • No. Korea -- No Dong, Scud

    • Pakistan -- Hatf-series missiles

  • Other Countries: (Mostly Middle East)

    • Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen

Entities List

  • The Entities List notifies exporters of a requirement for exports/reexports to specified end users.

  • See Supplement Number 4 to part 744 of the EAR.

India/Pakistan Sanctions

  • On September 22, 2001, President Bush lifted missile sanctions placed on India and Pakistan.

  • On October 1, BIS reinstated a case-by-case license review policy for exports of MT and NP commodities to India and Pakistan and removed a significant number of entities from the Entity List.

  • Entities affiliated with Indian and Pakistani missile development and their nuclear programs remain listed entities.

  • The United States does not support Indian unsafeguarded nuclear power industry or the satellite launch vehicle development programs.

PRC Issues

  • Ongoing missile and nuclear proliferation concerns with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

  • All commodities controlled for missile proliferation concerns - except inertial navigation systems for commercial aircraft - require presidential certification prior to export.

  • The U.S. continues to conduct missile talks with the PRC in an effort to decrease Chinese proliferation activities.

  • Success of these talks could affect U.S. export licensing in the future.


Steve Clagett

Director, Missile and Nuclear Technology Divisions


[email protected]