Subway Station Design: Lessons Learned from Case Studies of Contemporary Terrorism Incidents

1. Subway Station Design: Lessons Learned from Case Studies of Contemporary Terrorism Incidents Christopher R. Cherry University of California, Berkeley Project Sponsored by: Mineta Transportation Institute, San Jose State University University of California, Los Angeles International Institute

2. Outline Background of Transit Counter-Terrorism Strategies Case Studies of Significant Rail Terrorism Incidents The IRA (Irish Republican Army) bombings against the London rail system The Fulton Street Station fire bombing in New York The Sarin gas release on the Tokyo subway The GIA (Armed Islamic Group) bombings against the Paris rail system The Al Qaeda Attack on the Madrid Subway System Conclusion and Recommendations

3. Rail Transit Terrorism �For those determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, public transportation offers an ideal target.� (Jenkins and Gersten 2001) Public Transit is inherently open and accessible. Rail Transit operates on fixed routes and schedules Volume of passengers make traditional screening impossible Security goals often conflict with transit goals of accessibility, convenience and affordability

4. Framework to Address Terrorism Deterrence, Mitigation, Response, Recovery Four stages to plan for terrorism Planning, Designing and Building Planning for incident response Immediate Response to Incident Long-term recovery Investigate terrorism incidents that span different regions have different characteristics to learn lessons on how to plan and design against terrorism

5. The IRA (Irish Republican Army) bombings against the London rail system The IRA conducted two terrorism campaigns on the British Rail system in London (1973-1976 and 1991-1992) IRA bombed or attempted to bomb system 22 times in those spans The most significant attack was on 2/18/1991 at Victoria and Paddington Stations (43 injuries, 1 fatality) Paddington station bomb was �warning� at 4:20 am Victoria station bomb exploded in trash at 7:45 am

6. The IRA (Irish Republican Army) bombings against the London rail system Most of the injuries were a result of secondary fragmentation

7. Design and Policy Response London-Effectively eliminated station bombings by: reducing the hiding places for bombs increasing CCTV coverage improved lighting removal of secondary fragmentation sources public outreach and cooperation systematic threat assessment system

8. Fulton Street Firebombing-New York Edward Leary detonated two incendiary devices on December 15th and 21th 1994 Both devices were on timers and intended to ignite while in tunnels December 15th 3:15 pm-Two injured when device exploded under a seat at the 145th street station December 21st 1:30 pm-48 injured when device malfunctioned and prematurely exploded under Leary�s seat at Fulton Street Station

9. Fulton Street Firebombing-New York Most of injuries were due to smoke inhalation and burns The effects were mitigated greatly by alert off-duty officer who found a fire extinguisher Several train lines taken out of service for three hours, stranding commuters Response very rapid resulting in lower severity of injuries

10. Design and Policy Response New York -The Fulton Street Station attack did not elicit a major response to design trains and stations against terrorism. In light of more recent attacks: Transit officials are beginning to draft emergency response documents Much of the security concern is crime driven Passenger vigilance could have mitigated the effects of Leary�s first bomb Because of the availability of a fire extinguisher, an alert passenger, and effective emergency response, the effects of the second bomb was mitigated significantly

11. Sarin Gas Attack-Tokyo Aum Shinrikyo attacked five trains of the Tokyo Subway at 8:00 am on March 20, 1995 Utilized an impure mixture of Sarin Gas in sealed plastic bags Punctured the bags with sharpened umbrella tips and quickly exited the trains All affected trains were converging on Kasumigaseki Station where the Police headquarters was located

12. Sarin Gas Attack-Tokyo Sarin began affecting people almost instantly Most of the injuries occurred on the trains and platforms where the Sarin was left 43% platform, 32% train, 15% station, 10% other places Because of non-severe symptoms there was no urgency to evacuate During evacuation, the trains were parked, with doors and windows open to the crowded platform Because of poor interagency communication there were high levels of secondary contamination

13. Design and Policy Response Tokyo-Officials and researchers have been attempting to develop isolation strategies for chemical or biological attacks. Platform edge doors that separate the railway from the platform would have mitigated the effect of the gas. Remote incident detection CCTV system are potentially more effective than chemical detection devices. Smoke ventilation must be carefully used because it could potentially aggravate the situation. Rolling stock was redesigned to provide more ventilation. Cross-agency communication protocol was developed and employees trained.

14. Algerian (GIA) Bombing Campaign � Paris From July 1995 to December 1996 the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) bombed Paris subway system six times Most severe was the July 27, 1995 bomb detonated on a train as it entered St Michel Station during the evening rush (80 injuries, 8 fatalities) A 28-pound gas cylinder packed with shrapnel was set on a timer and left under a seat Similar bombs were detonated on other trains and station areas in the year that followed

15. Algerian (GIA) Bombing Campaign � Paris The response was very rapid and efficient The train was heavily damaged and could not fit through the tunnel The station sustained minor damage to communication lines Emergency workers set up a first aid station to treat and stabilize the injured at the station The system was shut down for the night and service restored in by morning

16. Design and Policy Response Paris-Similar approach as London. Even before attacks, officials had well planned response protocol: removed combustible materials, and introduced a smoke evacuation system. After attack, relied upon high profile policing and terrorist profiling (vigipirate). Officials sealed trash cans or replaced them by plastic bags. New stations are designed with transparent materials, employ natural lighting and improve line-of-sight from security stations.

17. Al Qaeda Bombing RENFE Subway-Madrid Terrorists detonated ten bombs on four trains on March 11, 2004 1800 injuries and nearly 200 fatalities Three bombs were found and safely detonated in the Atocha Station Stations attacked were suburban and did not fit the profile for the most vulnerable station There was no anti-terrorist system in place on the subway prior to attack High profile security instituted after the attack

18. Design and Policy Response Madrid- Thus far: Officials have heavily increased policing They have improved CCTV coverage They are in the process of acquiring X-ray machines, mobile scanners, and �portabombas� in which to place suspicious objects. They have decided against sealing trash cans because of the inconvenience to passengers. Additionally, because of high levels of fear the are not posting signs promoting passenger vigilance.

19. Recommendations and Conclusions Improving systems to counter an extremely rare terrorist attack is costly and improvements should also serve the dual purpose of crime or safety improvement Remove or closely monitor hiding places for devices (trash cans, lockers, bathrooms, etc) Improve CCTV coverage of station areas Reduce sources of secondary fragmentation (ground level glass, vending machines, chairs, decorations, etc) Improve transparency, visibility and lighting to all areas of station Control air circulation and establish ventilation procedures in the event of a chemical or biological attack Use non-combustible and non-toxic materials in stations and rolling stock Improve interagency communication systems and protocol Encourage passenger vigilance

20. Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge the research team that worked on this project and provided valuable input: Martin Wachs, Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Brian Taylor, Robin Liggett, Peter Haas, Ellen Cavanagh, and Camille Fink The results of this work are preliminary Questions/Comments?