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High Prices and the 2007 Farm Bill

High Prices and the 2007 Farm Bill. Daryll E. Ray University of Tennessee Agricultural Policy Analysis Center. Henderson County Cooperative Extension Ag Oulook Henderson, Kentucky July 17, 2007. In Times of Exploding Demand. The current program will work Any farm program will work

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High Prices and the 2007 Farm Bill

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  1. High Prices and the 2007 Farm Bill Daryll E. Ray University of Tennessee Agricultural Policy Analysis Center Henderson County Cooperative Extension Ag Oulook Henderson, Kentucky July 17, 2007

  2. In Times of Exploding Demand • The current program will work • Any farm program will work • NO program at all will work • The key question is:Are high prices the future?

  3. Are High Prices the Future? • The 2007 USDA Baseline projects: • Corn demand for ethanol • 3.4 billion bushels for 2007—double 2005 • 3.7 billion bushels in 2008 (AFBF says 4.9) • Over 10 years, baseline prices are north of $3/bu – closer to $4 most years • Very low corn stock levels by historical standards

  4. Logical Implications • Subsidies for program crops would: • Largely be replaced by market receipts • Cease to be a budgetary problem for the US Federal Government • Could even transition the direct (AMTA) payments like Congress’ 1996 intentions • Cease to be a stumbling block in trade negotiations

  5. Short-Term Considerations • US supply response • Arbitrage of crop acres in US to corn • 92.9 million acres • 14 million more acres than 2006, highest since the 1940s • Means 11 million acres less soybeans and millions of acres less cotton • Some land converted to cropland; more of such conversion in long-run

  6. Short-Term Considerations • International corn supply response • Increased international production • Mexico: 4 million ac. increase • Argentina: 30 percent increase in acreage • Brazil: 230 million bushels more “second season corn—80 million to be exported • Canada: 20 percent increase in acreage? • Internationally there may be a decreased need for corn imports from the US

  7. Long-Term Considerations • US supply response • Conversion of pasture and grassland—some in CRP?—to crop production • Investment in yield enhancing technology (300 bu./ac on best land?) • Conversion of land to cellulosic feedstocks, some of which will not be from current cropland

  8. Long-Term Considerations • International supply response • Development and adoption of drought and saline resistant crops • Globalization of agribusiness: Near universal access to the new technologies world-wide • Narrowing of technology and yield differentials between US and the rest of the world

  9. Long-Term Considerations • International supply response • Long-run land potentially availability for major crops • Savannah land in Brazil(250 mil. ac. -- USDA says 350) • Savannah land in Venezuela, Guyana, and Peru(200 mil. ac.) • Land in former Soviet Union(100 mil. ac.) • Arid land in China’s west(100 mil. ac. GMO wheat) • Savannah land in Sub-Saharan Africa(300 mil. ac. -- 10 percent of 3.1 bil. ac. of Savannah land) • Easy to underestimate supply growth

  10. Greatest Short-Term Risk • Weather event • The 2007 USDA baseline shows a string of years in which corn carry-out stocks are projected to be below 6 percent of utilization • Recent historic range has been 10% to 20% • In five of the last 10 years, we have seen production fall by 300 mil. bu. from the previous year • A shortfall of that magnitude in an era of tight supplies would trigger skyrocketing prices • $6 or more per bushel

  11. Uncharted Territory 1974 (7.4%) 1983 (5.4%) 1995 (4.6%) 2009 (4.5%) Year ending commercial stocks-to-use ratio for US corn 1960-2005 (actual), 2006-2016 (2007 USDA Baseline)

  12. Greatest Short-Term Risk • Weather event • The 2007 USDA baseline shows a string of years in which corn carry-out stocks are projected to be below 6 percent of utilization • Recent historic range has been 10% to 20% • In five of the last 10 years, we have seen production fall by 300 mil. bu. from the previous year • A shortfall of that magnitude in an era of tight supplies would trigger skyrocketing prices • $6 or more per bushel

  13. Short-Term Impact of $6 Corn • Demanders • Outrage & economic pain by • Livestock and ethanol producers • Food processors and consumer groups • “Dependable supplier” issue returns • Can the US really guarantee that export embargoes will never again be imposed? • Suppliers • Switch more acres to corn • US (road-ditch to road-ditch?) • Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Canada, and elsewhere

  14. Greatest Long-Term Risk • Acreage and yields greatly increase worldwide—just a question of how fast • With $6 per bushel corn • Acreage shifts in the short-run • Longer-run investments that increase acreage and yields • With $3 to $4 corn or somewhat lower • Increases in acreage & yields but at slower rate • Lower prices return • Recreate problems for farmers worldwide and for the US treasury

  15. On Knife’s Edge • Short-term object lesson? • Need strategic reserves • Like a properly managed Farmer-Owned-Reserve • Reduce economic dislocation • Long-term reality? • “New Era?” (fourth “New Era” in my lifetime) • Supply growth has always caught and then surpassed demand growth (and it does not take long) • This time, surge in productive capacity will be global

  16. Can’t the Market Take-ith Away The Production It Brought Forth? • Lower prices should automatically correct itself • Consumers buy more • Producers produce less • Prices recover—problem solved! • But in agriculture lower prices do not solve the problem • Little self-correction on the demand side • People do consume significantly more food • Little self-correction on the supply side • Farmers do not produce significantly less output

  17. Characteristics of Ag Sector • Agriculture is different from other economic sectors.On the demand side: • With low food prices— • People don’t eat more meals a day • They may change mix of foods • Aggregate intake remains relatively stable

  18. Characteristics of Ag Sector • Agriculture is different from other economic sectors.On the supply side: • With low crop prices— • Farmers continue to plant all their acres • Farmers don’t and “can’t afford to” reduce their application of fertilizer and other major yield-determining inputs • Who farms land may change • Essential resource—land—remains in production in short- to medium-run

  19. Why Chronic Problems In Ag? • Technology typically expands output faster than population and exports expand demand • Much of this technology has been paid for by US taxpayers • The growth in supply now is being additionally fueled by • increased acreages in Brazil, etc. • technological advance worldwide

  20. Why Chronic Problems In Ag? • Lower prices should automatically correct itself • Consumers buy more • Producers produce less • Prices recover—problem solved! • But in agriculture lower prices do not solve the problem • Little self-correction on the demand side • People do not consume significantly more food • Little self-correction on the supply side • Farmers do not produce significantly less output

  21. Exports, Exports, Exports • For the last quarter century, exports have been heralded—and continue to be by some—as crop agriculture’s salvation • Exports is the production safety valve that can rebalance agricultural markets • Exports will grow at accelerating rates • As Dr. Phil would say, “So, how has that been workin’ for ya?”

  22. China Net Corn TradeWhat We Expected During Debate of 1996 FB: Mil. Bu. 1996 FAPRI Projections of Net Corn Trade Corn Imports Corn Exports 1996 FAPRI Projections

  23. China Net Corn TradeWhat We Got: Mil. Bu. 1996 FAPRI Projections of Net Corn Trade Corn Imports Corn Exports PS&D Actual Net Corn Trade with 2004 Projection

  24. China Net Corn TradeComparison between 1996 and 1999 FAPRI projections, 2007 USDA projections and USDA PS&D actual Mil. Bu. 1996 FAPRI Projections of Net Corn Trade Corn Imports 1999 FAPRI Projections of Net Corn Trade 2007 USDA Projections of Net Corn Trade Corn Exports Actual Net Corn Trade What’s a billion bushel error among friends? What do you think $4.00 corn will do to China’s corn production and exports?

  25. Total Agricultural Exports Billion Dollars Bulk Exports What About Exports?

  26. What About Exports US Domestic Demand US Population US Exports *Adjusted for grain exported in meat Index of US Population, US Demand for 8 Crops and US Exports* of 8 Crops 1979=1.0

  27. What About Exports? • Why have exports not fulfilled our hopes? • Export demand is braked by issues of food security/food sovereignty • International crop production is impacted by: • Increased acreage: Stage of development • Yield advances: World-wide distribution of technology • US role as the leading nation in the world • Politically, economically, technologically, and militarily • And in prices too: Others price off US prices

  28. Implications for the WTO • Market access may not be sufficient • May benefit beef and Anjou pears • What about crops covered by the Farm Bill?

  29. What About Exports? US Exports Thousand Metric Tons Developing Competitors’ Exports Developing competitors: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam 15 Crops: Wheat, Corn, Rice, Sorghum, Oats, Rye, Barley, Millet, Soybeans, Peanuts, Cottonseed, Rapeseed, Sunflower, Copra, and Palm Kernel

  30. Implications for WTO • WTO negotiations drastically limit the ability to set domestic farm policy in this and other countries • Seems as if it subscribes to the “What is good for General Motors (multinationals)…” syndrome • To me: • The whole WTO process shows a complete lack of understanding of the unique characteristics of food and agriculture • Food security and other social objectives often trump economic considerations in the case of food and agriculture • Multinationals may benefit but maybe not major-crop farmers

  31. “We” Seem Willing to Believe that: • Staple crops are not sufficiently important to have emergency reserves(oil is sufficiently important) • Less than full use of farm productive capacity is inefficient (SOP to not to use full capacity in other sectors—currently at 77% of capacity) • Farmers can extract billions of dollars for commodity programs—so they do • Hence, commodity programs are a waste • do away with them or • pay out the money on some other basis

  32. What for, Farm Programs? • To address self-correction problems • Not to enrich agribusinesses • Not to provide cheap feed to livestock integrators • Not to dump commodities on international markets • Not to crash commodity prices in developing countries • Not to be a mark for entrepreneurs to pull government money through loopholes

  33. Complete This Phrase • A commodity policy should… • Be realistic about the way aggregate agricultural markets work • Take into account consumer behavior • Take into account producer behavior • Recognize limited ability of exports to rebalance aggregate agricultural markets • Recognize demand growth seldom outstrips supply growth for long

  34. Decoupled/Direct Payments • Examine these using the test I have suggested: • Direct payments— • Do not affect consumer behavior • Do not result in increased exports • Do not result in fewer planted acres when prices are low • Are paid out even when farm prices and income are high • Same is paid when prices are in the tank

  35. Some Policy Options • Do the Exports/Trade Liberalization Will Save Us Course – Or All We Really Need is Market Access • Switch to Green Payments based on Conservation/Environmental/ Rural Development Considerations • Insurance/Risk Management Accounts (RMA)/Farm Savings Accounts • Policy to Address Crop Agriculture’s Long-Standing Problem—“A Policy for all Seasons” • Continue with current program with slight modifications

  36. Current Buzz • Lugar: Extend the 2002 FB. Prefers RMA accounts. • Peterson: Rebalance loan rates and target prices. Stricter payment limits would be “FB reform.” • Harkin: Senate has not started writing the FB yet. Favors CSP; perhaps a form of revenue insurance • Kind & Others: Shift commodity program funding to Risk Management Accounts (RMA). Broadens recipients of farm payments. • FB/NCGA/USDA: Revenue insurance (moving ave.) • FU & Others: Revenue insurance (tied to costs); stock reserve

  37. In Times of Exploding Demand • Any farm program will work • NO program at all will work • But times of exploding demand always come to an end • And crop agriculture is no better at adjusting to low prices now than decades ago

  38. Thank You

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