Carbon and Energy Efficiency: the Marriage of Need and Potential

1. Carbon and Energy Efficiency: the Marriage of Need and Potential Restructuring Roundtable September 22, 2006 Richard Cowart Website: http://www.raponline.org

2. 2 billion villagers want a better life

3. Why us? …most of the CO2 in the atmosphere will be from N. America and Europe for years to come. Explanatory note: Despite rapid increases in the emissions from developing countries such as China that are anticipated in the coming decades, the U.S., Europe and Russia will continue to be the source of most of what is in the atmosphere for many decades because carbon dioxide has a long residence time in the atmosphere. The projections shown assume that the Russian economy recovers and resumes its past practices in energy use.

4. State and regional power sector carbon caps California & Oregon RGGI - 7 to 10 states Together, their carbon profiles exceed most nations.

5. The high cost of carbon • Not just environmental impacts • Economic challenge: • New England exports well over $22 Billion per year to import fossil carbon*… • That we DON’T want to release into the atmosphere • The answer isn’t cheaper carbon, it’s greater efficiency Source: EIA (2002 data) The total is undoubtedly much higher now

6. Efficiency in New England can reverse demand growth Source: NEEP, 2004

7. Today’s main points: Three lessons in cap-and-trade architecture • 1.The Acid Rain program design – smokestack-based, free allocations based on historic emissions – is not the best design for a carbon cap/trade system for the power sector. • 2. An effective power sector carbon program requires focus on the load side of the power system, not just the generation side. • 3. Energy efficiency is not a “collateral energy policy,” it is thekey to success of power-sector carbon programs.

8. Architectural mistakes: Three wrong assumptions • 1. Generators lose money under carbon cap and trade, so designers must give them allowances for free • 2. Just manage pollution, price increases and demand elasticity will deliver needed efficiency • 3. Initial allocation does not affect program cost to consumers

9. Reality #1 Most generators make money with free historic allocation

10. What free % would make generators whole? • (IF WE DECIDE TO COMPENSATE GENERATORS) • CBO:“Producers would have to receive only a modest portion of the allowances to offset their costs from a cap on carbon emissions, because they would be expected to pass a large share of those costs on to consumers.” • RGGI study (by RFF): Generators need less than 25% of allowances • Goulder (Stanford): Generators could be made whole with just 13% free allowances • UK Parliament: EUTS is creating windfall gains for generators in the UK

11. Reality #2:EE programs are more powerful than rate increases • Economic theory: just raise the price of power • DSM reality: Programs are needed to surmount market barriers to efficiency • $ spent through programs will deliver 5x the efficiency savings of $ spent in higher prices • Key conclusion: Build efficiency support into program architecture. • BUT: Generators don’t deliver efficiency • Who has relationships with customers?

12. What does it cost to avoid a ton of electric carbon?* *Generation cost data from EPRI (“Generation Technologies in a Carbon-constrained World,” 2005, assuming gas at $6MMbtu); EE data from Efficiency Vermont. For the point made here the precise numbers are not so important.

13. Reality #3: Carbon credit allocation can mobilize efficiency • Key point: A carbon program that directly mobilizes end use efficiency will cost less and achieve more than one that focuses only on smokestacks. • Two possible techniques to reveal the carbon value of efficiency and renewables: • Consumer allocation (RGGI region) • Load-side cap and trade (California and Oregon)

14. RGGI answer: The Consumer Allocation • Allocate up to100% of initial credits to consumer representatives (eg, distribution utilities, Efficiency Utility) • RGGI MOU - state minimum commitment is 25% • Most states will be higher – Vermont law is 100%; NJ, CT, NY all considering high %s • Generators need to purchase allowances, recycling the windfall revenue BACK to consumers • PUCs supervise use of the $$ for benefit of consumers • Best result: focus on investments that lower carbon (EE &RE) • Result: lower program cost, greater efficiency

15. IPM Results: Carbon Prices

16. Energy Bill Impacts Source: REMI modeling for the RGGI State Working Group design process

17. RGGI Cumulative Capacity Additions

18. West Coast approach: Load-Side Cap & Trade Basic rule: LSEs must have credits to cover the emissions associated with their sales to retail customers? Steps: • Measure historic emissions associated with electricity serving the state (or region) – • All sources, wherever located -- both in-state and imports • Set “hard” emissions caps to lower impact in stages • Distribute allowances (“carbon credits”) to LSEs • LSEs spend credits as needed to match their portfolio of sources • can sell excess credits from RE & EE choices • Gains: (a) no leakage problem (b) no generator windfall (c) EE and RE earn carbon value automatically

19. Conclusions • Cap-and-trade architecture is a matter for PUCs and Energy Offices, not just Air agencies • Consumer allocation avoids generator windfall and provides a revenue source for efficiency and renewables: • In RGGI, 50% consumer allocation could add $250 million (=+50%) to regional EE budgets • Efficiency is the key to low-cost power sector carbon reduction

20. For more information… “Another Option for Power Sector Carbon Cap and Trade Systems – Allocating to Load” “Addressing Leakage in a Cap-and-Trade System: Treating Imports as a Source” “Why Carbon Allocation Matters – Issues for Energy Regulators” Richard Cowart, Regulatory Assistance Project – Memos for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) --Posted at www.raponline.org Email questions to RAPCowart@aol.com