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Michel de Montaigne 1533 –1592

Michel de Montaigne 1533 –1592. I study myself more than any other subject; it is my metaphysic, my physic... ( Essays , vol. 19, ch. XIII ). Michel de Montaigne 1533 –1592. skepticism t he purpose of philosophy the basis of friendship essay i nterpretation vs. experience.

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Michel de Montaigne 1533 –1592

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  1. Michel de Montaigne1533 –1592 I study myself more than any other subject; it is my metaphysic, my physic... (Essays, vol. 19, ch.XIII)

  2. Michel de Montaigne1533 –1592 skepticism the purpose of philosophy the basis of friendship essay interpretation vs. experience

  3. skepticism any questioning attitude, an approach of never assuming that the evidence presented tells an unbiased truth or the whole truth. the suspension of judgment in the face of new information or when a clear and certain truth cannot be determined.

  4. skepticism Philosophical (Pyrrhonic) skepticism: attitude of refraining from making truth claims. Scientific skepticism: waits for quantifiable, verifiable, repeatable results of empirical investigations. Religious skepticism: doubts faith-based claims of truth. Academic skepticism: claims that any knowledge of truth is impossible (extreme form of Platonism - even this claim itself cannot be understood as an ultimate truth).

  5. skepticism Skepticism is similar to empiricism – it seeks after knowledge that is based on experience. Cartesian skepticism is not skepticism, per se, but the initial part of his method, which is why it is better referred to as “methodic doubt”. Descartes’ skepticism is simply a step toward achieving absolute (clear and distinct) knowledge. It is proposed in order to be surpassed. against dogmatism: “As for me, I love life and cultivate it as God has been pleased to grant it to us” -vol19, ch XXI

  6. the purpose of philosophy “to study philosophy is nothing but to prepare one’s self to die” -Cicero Superficially: studying removes us from our physical experience just as does death. More profoundly: philosophical reflection inures us to death by revealing the vitality of truly living.

  7. the basis of friendship Friendship is nourished by communication. What we commonly call friends and friendships, are nothing but acquaintance and familiarities, either occasionally contracted, or upon some design, by means of which there happens some little intercourse betwixt our souls. But in the friendship I speak of, they mix and work themselves into one piece, with so universal a mixture, that there is no more sign of the seam by which they were first conjoined. vol 6, chXXVII

  8. essay writing from the perspective of the author's personal point of view I, who profess nothing else, therein [knowing oneself] find so infinite a depth and variety, that all the fruit I have reaped from my learning serves only to make me sensible how much I have to learn. vol 19, chXIII

  9. interpretation vs. experience Who will not say that glosses augment doubts and ignorance, since there’s no book to be found, either human or divine, which the world busies itself about, whereof the difficulties are cleared by interpretation. There is more ado to interpret interpretations than to interpret things, and more books upon books than upon any other subject; we do nothing but comment upon one another. Every place swarms with commentaries; of authors there is great scarcity. We exchange one word for another, and often for one less understood. vol 19, chXIII

  10. Francis Bacon1561 –1626 It is pointless to expect any great advances in science from grafting new things onto old. If we don’t want to go around in circles for ever, making “progress” that is so small as be almost negligible, we must make a fresh start with deep foundations. (NovumOrganon, XXXI)

  11. Francis Bacon1561 –1626 syllogism induction axiom mind’s anticipation of nature vs. interpretation of nature 4 idols method

  12. syllogism Central building block of Aristotelian logic. Derives a third term from 2 accepted premises. Relies on certain facts being accepted as true. Bacon sees them as useless for scientific inquiry because (among other problems) they rely on words that may be poorly defined or too abstract. Unlike information gleaned from experiment (induction), they are divorced from practice and the active part of science.

  13. syllogism Major premise: All men are mortal. Minor premise: Socrates is a man. Conclusion: Socrates is mortal.

  14. induction L. All the truer kind of interpretation of nature is effected by instances and experiments fit and apposite; wherein the sense decides touching the experiment only, and the experiment touching the point in nature and the thing itself.

  15. axiom A term or statement that can be accepted as truthful. Bacon’s method seeks to derive these true general rules from sense impressions and experiment through series of intermediate axioms.

  16. mind’s anticipation of nature vs. interpretation of nature one method for the cultivation (anticipation) another for the invention, of knowledge (interpretation) And for those who prefer the former, either from hurry or from considerations of business or for want of mental power to take in and embrace the other (which must needs be most men's case), I wish that they may succeed to their desire in what they are about, and obtain what they are pursuing. But if there be any man who, not content to rest in and use the knowledge which has already been discovered, aspires to penetrate further; to overcome, not an adversary in argument, but nature in action; to seek, not pretty and probable conjectures, but certain and demonstrable knowledge — I invite all such to join themselves, as true sons of knowledge, with me, that passing by the outer courts of nature, which numbers have trodden, we may find a way at length into her inner chambers. And to make my meaning clearer and to familiarize the thing by giving it a name, I have chosen to call one of these methods or ways Anticipation of the Mind, the other Interpretation of Nature. (preface)

  17. mind’s anticipation of nature vs. interpretation of nature XXVI The conclusions of human reason as ordinarily applied in matters of nature, I call for the sake of distinction Anticipations of Nature (as a thing rash or premature). That reason which is elicited from facts by a just and methodical process, I call Interpretation of Nature. XXVII Anticipations are a ground sufficiently firm for consent, for even if men went mad all after the same fashion, they might agree one with another well enough. XXVIII For the winning of assent, indeed, anticipations are far more powerful than interpretations, because being collected from a few instances, and those for the most part of familiar occurrence, they straightway touch the understanding and fill the imagination; whereas interpretations, on the other hand, being gathered here and there from very various and widely dispersed facts, cannot suddenly strike the understanding; and therefore they must needs, in respect of the opinions of the time, seem harsh and out of tune, much as the mysteries of faith do.

  18. 4 idols

  19. method System for organizing the patterns that we naturally perceive in interpreting our human situation. Bacon’s negative method consisted of seeking to eliminate the idols of the minds. His positive method (induction) consisted of arranging information gained from observation into three “tables”.

  20. method the Table of Essence and Presence (all known instances that agree in having a particular nature), the Table of Divergence or of Nearby Absence (instances in which that nature is absent but which in other ways is close to instances in which it is present), and the Table of Degrees or of Comparison (instances that do not have that nature but seem they should have it potentially and than instances that do have that nature being investigated and to which intensity or degree it is present).

  21. method

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