PAGSANDA: INFORMAL CREDIT AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN SULU Jamail A. Kamlian

1. PAGSANDA: INFORMAL CREDIT AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN SULU Jamail A. Kamlian MSU – Iligan Institute of Technology A Work-in-Progress Reportpresented to International Alert during the Work-in-Progress Review Meeting Asian Institute of Management, Makati, December 8-9, 2011

2. The value of this study can be most appreciated by looking at the following:

3. Firstly, unlike mainland Mindanao, the problem on land dispossession in Sulu is not caused by the ever-growing number of migrant populations competing and sometimes (consciously and/or unconsciously) grabbing the lands of the Lumad and Bangsamoro peoples. More often, informal credit locally known as Pagsanda, is responsible.

4. Secondly, while there have been studies conducted on informal credit, they however deal mostly with its types, forms, mechanics, dynamics, etc. None so far has focused on examining the direct link between informal credit and violent conflict. The above-mentioned fact makes this study a pioneering one on this field.

5. Thirdly, by exposing thecomplex network of connections between Pagsanda and local values, politics, economics, socio-cultural practices and violent conflict, this study will help us understand better the particularity of the Bangsamoro problem (in Sulu) and how it differs from the mainstream of the national situation.

6. Finally, this study could provide baseline data for local and national policy makers in planning and formulating relevant credit policies appropriate and responsive to the needs of rural Bangsamoro communities like Sulu.

7. Objectives: 1st set • Identify and describe the various forms of Pagsanda existing in the province of Sulu; • Ascertain the role it plays in determining and maintaining the economic, political and social relationships among local people; and • Look into the factors that perpetuate the practice of Pagsanda;

8. Objectives: 2nd set • Investigate the potential link between Pagsanda and the procurement or proliferation of loose firearms in the province of Sulu; • Analyze the implications of Pagsanda on Rido particularly in the area of paying off “blood money”, emergence of Rido due to competition among Manananda, and the aggravation of existing Rido cases; • Look into the possible link between Pagsanda and the violent electoral processes in Sulu; and • Determine the spill-over effects of informal credit into other sectors of the informal economy.

9. To carry out the 2nd set of objectives, the research shall inquire on the following possible cases: 1. Conflict due to “Multiple Pagsanda Transaction” (i.e. The same Butang pawned to two or more different Manananda at the same time); 2. Manananda killed by Magsasanda or vice versa due to misunderstanding on the terms of the Pagsanda transaction;

10. Cont... 3. Magsasanda/Manananda involved in fighting the conflict of his client/patron; 4. Rido cases complicated/aggravated by the procurement of firearms obtained from Pagsanda transactions; 5. Election-related violence involving Manananda/Magsasanda candidates;

11. Methodology • Triangulation - Key informant Interviews (KII) - Focus Group Discussions (FGD) - Case Studies - Participant Observation

12. Framework • The framework of this paper is based on the assumption that while Pagsanda has its own utility and positive dimensions, it nonetheless functions too not only as potential battery that could power up violent conflict among its participants but complicate / aggravate as well existing conflicts.

13. The various socio-cultural, religious and conflict related reasons that make the Tausug resort to Pagsanda serve as the burning fuel that makes the system exist and work. As Pagsanda works, some structures are affected namely: Political, Economic and the Peace and Order Situation. At times, the effect of Pagsanda on these structures is violent conflict. The indefinite shape that encloses the Pagsanda System refers to the informal economy in Sulu of which Pagsanda is part of. PAGSANDA & VIOLENT CONFLICT FRAMEWORK

14. Conflict-Related Factors Pagbunoh (Family Feud) Paghiluhalah (Peace & Order) Pagbisinapang (Firearm Procurement) Socio-Cultural Practices Pagtiyaun (Marriage) Pagpanayam (Gambling) Paglainhulah (Migration) Religious Traditions PagparkalahDakula Pagdua’a pa taas Kamatayan CAUSAL CONSIDERATIONS

15. Note: Pagsanda is an open system i.e. a fluid informal system held intact only by certain customs & local values. The pot is not covered as anyone could participate in it either as Magsasanda or Manananda

18. What has been done so far? • A significant number of related literatures and studies have been reviewed to help substantiate the research. • Some Key Informants Interviews (KII) were already conducted; • 6 cases have been documented including those in my previously conducted research;

19. Cont... • 4 municipalities with a substantial number of Pagsanda cases that resulted to conflict were already identified. These include: Parang, Patikul, Panamao and Indanan. • A series of KIIs and FGDs are already scheduled to be conducted by Christmas break in the above-mentioned localities.

20. Initial Findings • A direct link between informal credit and violent conflict is very much discernible in the cases that I have documented so far. • This is especially true to the following: - “Manananda killed by Magsasanda due to misunderstanding on the unwritten terms of the Pagsanda transaction” - “Rido cases complicated/aggravated by the procurement of firearms obtained from Pagsanda transactions” - “Election-related violence”

21. Case of a Manananda killed by Magsasanda due to misunderstanding on the terms of the Pagsanda transaction • The Pagsanda transaction was conducted in the 70s between Manananda X and Magsasanda Y. • Because Magsasanda Y did not have enough means to redeem his property, he passed the burden of redeeming the property to his children. • The children were not also able to redeem the pawned property. • It was Mr. Z, one of the grandchildren of Magsasanda Y, who was finally able to acquire the necessary amount to redeem the pawned property.

22. Cont... • When Mr. Z came to Manananda Y to redeem the property, he was simply told that his grandfather has already sold the property to him. Thus, Mr. Z cannot redeem it anymore. • One morning, Mr. Z invited Manananda Y to his residence to talk about the case over a cup of coffee. Manananda Y accepted the invitation, had his cup of coffee and ended up shot dead by Mr. Z after a heated argument. • The case remains unsettled up to now.

23. Rido complicated/ aggravated by the procurement of firearms obtained from Pagsanda transactions • Case #12 is about JawadHabisi who pawned their land due to a threat from armed groups who asked them to pay revolutionary tax. • They used the money to purchase 5 M16 Armalite rifles which he issued to 2 of his cousins and 2 cousins of his wife who volunteered to defend the family. • While the cousins had to stay in the Habisi household, they had to be supplied with cigarrettes, coffee, food and other supplies. • While their firearms somehow gave them protection, it however made them an even more attractive target by the armed groups

24. “Election-related violence involving Manananda / Magsasanda” • Case #14 is about SawajanLadjabatu who pawned his pusaka to purchase firearms due to the murder of his brother in law Jafaar by their political enemies. • The retaliation and counter retaliation so far has led to no less than 11 casualties: 2 killed and 4 wounded on Ladjabatu’s clan , while 5 killed and several others wounded on the other side. • Case remained unsettled

25. Hopefully, the series of KIIs and FGDs scheduled in Christmas break will uncover more cases that will demonstrate more direct links especially on: - “Conflict due to “Multiple Pagsanda Transaction” (i.e. The same Butang pawned to two different Manananda at the same time)” - “Magsasanda/Manananda involved in fighting the conflict of his client/patron” - “Election-related violence involving Manananda / Magsasanda”

26. Thank YouMagsukolWassalam