A Combinatorial Auction Designed for the Federal Communications Commission Charles R. Plott California Institute of Technology BINARY CONFLICT MECHANSMS (BICAP) Winning packages cannot intersect.
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A Combinatorial Auction Designed for the Federal Communications Commission
Charles R. Plott
California Institute of Technology
BINARY CONFLICT MECHANSMS (BICAP) Communications Commission
Winning packages cannot intersect.
Binary conflict is a very general concept. Non intersecting paths and routes can be viewed as applications.
TIME PATH OF AUCTION PROCESS Communications Commission
SEALED BID THEN CONTINUOUS
Eligibility Forces Bidding: Rules and Management Communications Commission
Eligibility t =
min [ Activity t-1, Eligibility t-1]
max Activity in sealed bid phase
Activity in continuous phase
bidding units on item j
all items j
bidding units on item j
SPEED PARAMETERS Communications Commission
INCREMENT REQUIREMENTS - A BID WHEN PLACED MUST BE X%
ABOVE THE MAXIMUM COVER
WINNING BIDS BIDDING POINTS
COUNT FOR MORE
WINNING LEVEL BIDS
AT OR ABOVE MAXIMUM COVER
BELOW MAXIMUM COVER
The cover of a set K is the maximum of bids in the systems with union contained in K. A bid is dominated if it is less than the value of the cover. For simplicity, a cover limited to unions of singles has been suggested for 3 and 4.
MEASUREMENTS HERE Communications Commission
ROUND t END
ROUND t+1 END
In ROUND t+2 these two bids will get no activity credit because they are both below their respective covers. The covers for activity are relative to bids in the system when the round opens (in this case bids at the end of one round and bids at the beginning of the next round are the same).
ABOVE MIN WIN
ABOVE VALUE OF SINGLES/COVER
Screens are capable of scale. 102 license example Communications Commission
Query Results Communications Commission
All bids in system.
Provisional winners (yellow)
Bids kicked out as provisional winners. Communications Commission
Bids brought in as provisional winners.
DOES IT WORK? Communications Commission
Proof of Concept: Efficiency
Design Consistency: ?
A Communications Commission
The colors represent bidders and not whether a package is involved.
first best 100% efficiency
Actual outcome at 98% efficiency. The inefficiency is due to misallocations of the second six items, which are of low value. Only I and K are in the wrong hands.
Efficient allocation and actual allocation in the 34 license experiment. Color of box is bidder who should get the license. The dot is the color of the bidder who got the license. No dot on a license means the right bidder got it. Notice that the pattern is complex. All bidders have a preference for all licenses. Efficiency forces compromises as shown.