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If u cn rd ths u r jst lke vryne lse.

If u cn rd ths u r jst lke vryne lse.

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If u cn rd ths u r jst lke vryne lse.

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  1. If u cn rd ths u r jst lke vryne lse. Aoccdring to a rscheerarhat an Elingsh uinervtisy, it deosn’t mttaer in waht oderr the ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihing is taht frist and lsat ltteer are at the rghit pclae. Youcan sitll raed it wouthit porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae we donot raed ervey lteter by itslef but the wrod as a wlohe. Cehiro!

  2. Observation: “ordinary” and scientific • Its role in accounts of scientific reasoning • Hanson’s arguments that observations are “theory-laden” • The implications of Hanson’s arguments for accounts of scientific reasoning and of scientific objectivity

  3. Observation In philosophy, it was long accepted that: • Facts are directly given through observation to unprejudiced observers with normal sensory receptors. • Observations are (logically) priorto and independent of theory. • Observations constitute a firm and reliable foundation for science. • Assumed by both those who claimed scientists use “The Inductive Method” as well as by those who offered alternative accounts of scientific reasoning/logic.

  4. Just how “obvious” are the observations scientists and the rest of us engage in? • Models of scientific reasoning • For those advocating “The Inductive Method,” observation came first and generalizations and hypotheses only later. • For those advocating “Sophisticated” Inductivism or Falsificationism, observations were the foundation by which theories can be confirmed or falsified. • In our reading by Duhem, he does not discuss observation in detail when arguing for Holism but he does in a quote in Hanson’s article.

  5. Just how “obvious” are the observations scientists and the rest of us engage in? “Enter a laboratory, approach the table crowded with an assortment of apparatus… “The experimenter is inserting into small openings the metal ends of ebony-headed pins; the iron oscillates, and the mirror attached to it throws a luminous band on a celluloid scale; the forward –backward motion of this spot enables the physicist to observe the minute oscillations of the iron bar. “But ask him what is he doing.

  6. Just how “obvious” are the observations scientists and the rest of us engage in? “Will he answer “I am studying the oscillations of an iron bar that carries a mirror”? “No, he will say that he is measuring the electric resistance of the spools. If you are astonished, if you ask him what his words mean, what relation they have with the phenomena [you both have just observed] He will answer that your question requires a long explanation and that you should take a course in electricity.”

  7. Observation What is the nature of observation? Is it “raw”? (“the unvarnished news?) Will 2 observers with normal sensory receptors always“see the same thing” when looking at “the same thing”? Are observations, whether in science or common sense, prior to or independent of theory? Do observations provide a firm and reliable foundation for science?

  8. Hanson on observation The general argument • There are two senses of ‘seeing’ • The physical processes involved that result in 2 tiny inverted images on each retina (which we do not see) • The visualexperience of seeing – what we see. • Observation, which is seeing in the second sense of visual experience, is not solely determined by the physical processes involved in the first sense of seeing.

  9. Observation The physical process of “seeing” • Light traveling from an object etches 4 inverted images on our retinas • That “information” is sent, via the optic nerves, to our brains. • So, if two of us are looking at the same object, from the same perspective, and similar lighting, etc… the images on our retinas are the same as is the information sent via the optic nerves. • Yet we may not be seeing the same thing in the sense of our visual experiences.

  10. Hanson Important to keep in mind: • The “interlocutor”: her purpose and her “formula” • That Hanson never denies that there is a world full of objects that exist independently of us and constrain what it is possible to observe. • Hanson offers layers of arguments and evidence to support his general argument that “there’s more to seeing than meets the eyeball.”

  11. Observation The “interlocutor”: its purpose and its formula • The purpose of the “voice” is to respond to what Hanson sees as the most obvious and significant challenge to his argument • Namely, that observers in all of his examples (and generally) do see the same thing, but interpret it differently. • This is an attempt to save the philosophical assumptions earlier outlined.

  12. Observation Hanson’s response: • When observation is involved, we don’t first see and then interpret – we just see …” • The act of interpreting does involve two steps • Normal seeing does not… If there wasn’t a world independent of us that constrains what it is possible to observe, what I am arguing about the nature of observation would not be startling or surprising or a big deal. It’s because there is such a world that my argument is significant because that world has been used to advance an overly naïve view of observations.

  13. Hanson on observation Gestalt experiences/experiments and Hanson’s general argument that • There are two senses of ‘seeing’ • The physical processes involved that result in 2 tiny inverted images on each retina (which we do not see) • The visualexperience of seeing – what we see. • That the second is not solely determined by the first.

  14. Hanson on observation Gestalt experiences/experiments and Hanson’s general argument: • In each case, the “object” being observed does not change so the physical processes involved are the same (light rays, retinal images, etc.) • But what we “see” in the sense of visual experiencedoes change. • We can learn to “flip” our image of the Necker cube… we can learn to see the card deck includes anomalous cards. • Prior experience, expectations, and learning to see

  15. Observation • Concepts, background knowledge, and general theories also help to shape what we see (observe). • Perhaps obvious (or at least should be) when we’re discussing scientific observations:

  16. Observations in science Examples of the role of concepts and theories: Debris tracks as evidence of subatomic particles Galileo and Jupiter’s moons, and the moon’s mountains and craters Archaeologists and anthropologists on beads, caves, burial sites, tools, etc. Psychologists on children’s development of a theory of mind (and relative lack thereof among other primates) Perfection vs. evidence of history and of jury-rigging Learning to see using scientific instruments Observing sexual behaviors of species

  17. Observation • Another layer: conceptual schemes (or frameworks) help shape what we see • Cross cultural differences • Color schemes • Red, white and black • Mathematical systems • 1, 2, 3, many • Two dimensional representations of three dimensional objects

  18. Conceptual schemes and language What do you see? What does an infant see? What does a three year old see? What does an adult who has never been introduced to apples see?

  19. Conceptual schemes, language, and what we observe

  20. Conceptual schemes, language, and what we observe • Why doesn’t the 3 year old (or we) see: • A puddle of “apple stuff” • An “apple-ing” event • A bunch of undetached apple parts • An instantiation of the Platonic form “Applehood” • Because of the conceptual scheme our language embodies and we learn as we learn the language: individual physical objects, for the most part, as well as notions of individuation -- “this is the same X I observed yesterday…”

  21. Observation The “interlocutor’s formula” • In each of Hanson’s examples (and mine), two people do see the same thing; they just interpret it differently. • ‘Interpretation’ has a perfectly precise meaning. It sometimes involves figuring out what we are looking it when it isn’t clear… or looking for the meaning of a text. It does not belong here, in the case of ordinary seeing which just happens.

  22. Observation • The formula: In each of Hanson’s examples, two people do see the same thing; they just interpret it differently. • It happens instantaneously, so we’re unaware we are doing it… • Hanson: instantaneous interpretation, like some other ideas in the history of philosophy, is just spooky (without warrant, stranger than fiction… and so forth).

  23. Observation What are the implications of Hanson’s arguments for Models of scientific reasoning we have considered? The notion of scientific objectivity? The veracity of our own observations?

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