NUTS 2 regions

1. EU-programmes as an instrument of regional development in the Czech Republic – success and problems

2. By May 1st 2004, the Czech Republic became member of the EU and so has had the possibility to profit from the big structural fonds of the EU • With the exception of Pragueall Czech regions are Cíl 1 regions with the most possible support from EU • In the shortened stretch of time 2004-2006 the Czech Republic got a total budget of 1,9 billion EUR from structural funds and 0,9 billion EUR from cohesion funds, forthe time 2007-2013 it will be about 18 billionfromstructural fonds and about 9 billionfrom cohesion funds • The money from structural funds are divided into the different operational programmes • The quotas for support are at an average of about 45 % of the investive costs, but can rise up to an amount of 90 % of the investive costs.

3. NUTS 2 regions

4. Operational Programmes (OP) • Divided by topics (so calledsectoralprogrammes) • 2004-2006: 5 programmes • 2007-2013: 17 programmes • Divided by regions (regional operational programmes) • 2007-2013: 7 programmes (regional operational programmes)

5. Contents of the OP 2004-2006 (sums in Mio. EUR)

6. Highest demand (fast, simpleinvestments) X problemswith the ESF programme (toomuch money, small projects, not used in a constructive and effective way)

7. Orientation concerning the contents of the OP 2007-2013

9. The most important restrictions and problems when implementing the Operational Programmes;recommendations to speed up the cash drain and the preparation for the programme period 2007-2013 • Administration of payout of costs for the final recipients: • Administration doesn‘t work continuously; accumulation of applications when calculating the payments • Legislative: • Furtheron unsufficient linking of the Czech with the European legislative • It is necessery to solve new rising contradictions in the Czech legislative and the regulations of the EU-Commission • Information and public relations: • Too much information about support programmes; the quality and the extent of information are variable; they are complex and confusing, terminologically not uniform and often not even up to date. • Unsufficient information about the accepted applicationsand about successful projects, best practice • Unsufficient work of public relations in the regions about the Operational Programmes for the final recipients

10. Examples for the public presentation of the project and the supporting institutions

12. Evaluation and selection of the projects, agreement about the contract/passing of a resolution: • Long lasting process of the evaluation and selection of the projects, of the agreements about the contract, the passing of a resolution, and so delay of the project implementation • Decisive delay when deciding on the applications, agreements about the contract/ signing of the agreement and other administrative services by the officials of the implementation structure • Deficits in the manner of selecting projects; low transparency of procedure of classification and selection of the project applications, deficits of the criteria of evaluation, low comprehensibility of the conditions for applicants • Applictions for projects and their administration: • Unsufficient or no information about the current status of the project application (the applicant is informed insufficiently about the procedure of the project‘s processing) • Structure of applying stresses the applicant too much; the conditions for the project processing are often not clear and often obligatory structures of the documents are missing • Unsufficient reserves of qualified project plans and applications

13. Adjustment of the implementation systems: • Problems when adjusting the implementation systems • Complications with the communication and cooperation between the scopes (subjects) • Unsufficient supply with staff in the institutions dealing with implementation • Methodical management: • Liability of the predetermined methodics from the managing institutions of the operational programmesand their linking to the documentation of transaction on all levels of the projects‘ administration • Monitoring: • Unsufficiently working monitoring system • Difficult passing on of the projects‘ indicatorsto the ministries involved, whose targets are often estimated too high and can so be reached only with difficulties

14. Limited possibility of advance payment • Problems of raising a credit for the applicants • Politicalinfluence! (on all levels)

15. Effects on the economical or regional development are difficult to be evaluated: • extern evaluation: in 2-3 years • intern evaluation– countable – productivity –(f.ex.„how manykm roads were reconstructed for one EURO “), no data available • exceeding institutionaldensity – the applicant‘s way to get the money (via a number of implementation subjects) is too long • Not correctly set systems of indicators – problems are expected for the finalex-post evaluation of the operational programmes

16. The aim is: to use (exhaust/use up) the moneyand not to reach/achieve something and to use the money as a means = must be criticized