Who to Protect our Borders

1. Who to Protect our Borders Henri Boshoff

2. Scope • Border Control a reality check. • What happened in the past • Changing the Guard • Changing the Guard again • Who is protecting our Borders today • Does a integrated strategy exist • Conclusion.

3. Border Control a reality check. • Uncertainty today on which Border Control policy is in place • In 2003 it was announced that the SANDF has to withdraw from all support to the police borderline control by March 2009 • This process was stopped in October 2009 • On 18 November 2009 the Cabinet make it official, the South African National Defence Force is once again responsible for borderline control and protection, first deployment must be in place by 2010

4. What happened in the past • The 1996 Constitution states that it is the SANDF that is ultimately responsible for protecting the national borders: • “The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force”. • The constitutional mandate of the SAPS makes it clear that border control is not its function: “The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law”

5. Cont • How did it come to pass that the SANDF have all but been removed from our borders? • Reading the 1998 Defence Review, it was clearly assumed, without any analysis having been conducted to support this conclusion, that the SAPS would be capable of adequately combating crime and driving down the high levels of violence in the country. • The Defence Review conceded that the SANDF could play a role, however limited, in supporting the SAPS in the execution of non-military tasks and allowed for the possibility that the SANDF could assist the SAPS in.

6. Changing the Guard • In 2003 it was announced that the SANDF has to withdraw from all support to the police borderline control by March 2009; Commando units must be closed and internal support to police in crime fighting will only be on request. • The 2003 decision spelled out the withdrawal of the SANDF in detail. The Departments of Defence and of Safety and Security at the time established a joint SANDF-SAPS Exit-Entry Strategy Steering Committee. • This steering committee was eventually replaced by a dedicated Joint Task Team to plan, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the exit-entry strategy at national and provincial level. The Task Team was co-chaired by a Major General (SANDF) and an Assistant Commissioner (SAPS).

7. Cont • The strategy made provision for certain exit criteria for the SANDF. These were: • The police had filled every possible vacuum the SANDF had left as a result of their withdrawal from continuous support in ensuring urban, rural and borderline safety. • The SANDF sustain the capacity, in accordance with an approved inter-departmental agreement, to support the police in joint crime combating operations where the police could not contain the situation on their own. • The SANDF sustain their command and control capacity as part of the JOINTS (Joint Operational Intelligence System, a command and control mechanism) to ensure joint command and control in support of the people of South

8. Cont • The SANDF maintain support to the SAPS regarding maritime and air borderline control function. • The police developing their capacity to take full responsibility for crime combating in urban and rural areas, as well as for the control of the landward borderline of SA. • The police`s entry criteria were: • The police developing their capacity to take full responsibility for crime combating in urban and rural areas, as well as for the control of the landward borderline of SA. • The police maintaining their system of command and control through the JOINTS to coordinate all operational activities in support of the people of SA.

9. Cont • To support this, the police would have the National Intervention Unit available as force multiplier across provincial boundaries whenever their support was requested. • The establishing of 43 area crime combating units inter alia capable of executing borderline duties • The establishment of sector policing. • Research conducted by the ISS last year, as well as a performance audit by the Auditor General (AG) on the Border Control and Police Advisory Council found that the SAPS has failed to take over the function of borderline control from the SANDF. In addition the AG found a lack of interdepartmental training and no all-inclusive borderline-specific training curriculum in place

10. Changing the Guard again • On 18 November the Cabinet make it official; the South African National Defence Force is once again responsible for borderline control and protection. The new deployment of the SANDF will be incorporated into the border control strategy being finalised by the JCPS (Justice, Crime Prevention and Security) cluster. The cluster includes the departments of Defence and Veterans, Correctional Services, Home Affairs, Justice, Police and State Security

11. Cont • The redeployment of the SANDF will take a while, as they has to get new equipment and start to build up intelligence, as well as command-and-control again. • The SANDF will need funding to restore border bases, new vehicles, other mission specific equipment, proper mission-specific training, and deployment allowances. • They will also have to find a way to regain the local knowledge of the border areas lost when the Commandos were disbanded. • Perhaps they need to find some way to draw them into the Reserve Force under a different system.

12. Who is protecting our Borders today • The return of the SANDF to the function of borderline control in isolation will also not be successful. • It must be seen against the concept of border protection that includes border post, borderline and area protection. • The implementation of area protection was based on the deployment of area protection units in the form of Commando units. They were disbanded between 2003 and 2008 and the function was supposed to have been taken over by sector policing. • Reports and research indicates that this concept has also failed. It is unclear how that will be rectified.

13. Cont • The SANDF deployment will be phased in over a period. • What is strange is that there is no SAPS exit and SANDF entry strategy • This will have serious impact on borderline control as well as cross border crime. • In practice it means that certain border lines will not be policed.

14. Does a integrated strategy exist • The new deployment of the SANDF will be incorporated into the border control strategy being finalised by the JCPS (Justice, Crime Prevention and Security) cluster. The cluster includes the departments of Defence and Veterans, Correctional Services, Home Affairs, Justice, Police and State Security according to Cabinet. • Border Management Agency something for the Future • It does not in the medium seems that a integrated strategy exist. • Are Border Control still managed by the Border Control Coordinating Committee (BCOCC) • Is the JOINTS (Joint Operational Intelligence System, a command and control mechanism) still functional to facilitate such a strategy

15. Conclusion. • It is time to serious look at a integrated strategy • Look at systems who worked in the past • Looking further than Border Control but towards the concept of Area Safegaurding • This include the border as well as the inland, mostly rural areas • The SANDF must be structured to address this challenge as far as Command and Control and capability is concerned • How best to integrate all role players • Do we need a knew dedicated agency • Can a Gendarmerie not be establish to take over most of these task leaving the SANDF and more specific to do it primary function.