Finite iterated prisoner s dilemma revisited belief change and end game effect
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Finite Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Revisited: Belief Change and End Game Effect. Jiawei Li (Michael) & Graham Kendall University of Nottingham. Outline. Iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) Probability vs. uncertainty A new model of IPD End game effect Conclusions.

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Finite iterated prisoner s dilemma revisited belief change and end game effect

Finite Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Revisited: Belief Change and End Game Effect

Jiawei Li (Michael) & Graham Kendall

University of Nottingham


Outline
Outline Change and End Game Effect

  • Iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD)

  • Probability vs. uncertainty

  • A new model of IPD

  • End game effect

  • Conclusions

Jubilee Campus, University of Nottingham


Iterated prisoner s dilemma ipd
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) Change and End Game Effect

  • Prisoner’s Dilemma

Two suspects are arrested by the police. They are separated and offered the same deal. If one testifies (defects from the other) for the prosecution against the other and the other remains silent (cooperates with the other), the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence. Each prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent.


Iterated prisoner s dilemma ipd1
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) Change and End Game Effect

Nash equilibrium: (Defect, Defect)


Iterated prisoner s dilemma ipd2
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) Change and End Game Effect

  • Finite IPD

    • n-stages;

    • n is known;

    • End game effect;

    • Backward induction;

    • Nash equilibrium;


Iterated prisoner s dilemma ipd3
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) Change and End Game Effect

  • Finite IPD experiments

Each of 15 pairs of subjects plays 22-round IPD. Average cooperation rates are

44.2% in known and 55.0% in unknown. (from Andreoni and Miller (1993))


Iterated prisoner s dilemma ipd4
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) Change and End Game Effect

  • Incomplete information (Kreps et al (1982))

    • ‘Tit for Tat (TFT)’ type or ‘Always defect (AllD)’ type;

    • Assign probability  to

      TFT type and 1- to AllD type;

    • Mutual cooperation can be

      sequential equilibrium;

    • End game effect;


Iterated prisoner s dilemma ipd5
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) Change and End Game Effect

  • A new model

    • Assumption that both players may be either AllD or TFT type;

    • Repeated game with uncertainty;

    • Changeable beliefs;


Probability vs uncertainty
Probability vs. uncertainty Change and End Game Effect

  • Probability:

    Tossing a coin;

    50% -- 50%

  • Uncertainty:

  • Tossing a what?

  • 50% -- 50%?


Probability vs uncertainty1
Probability vs. uncertainty Change and End Game Effect

  • Probability

    • Tossing a coin repeatedly;

    • 50% -- 50%

  • Uncertainty

    • Tossing the dice repeatedly;

    • Expected probability may

      change according to the

      outcome of past playing.


Probability vs uncertainty2
Probability vs. uncertainty Change and End Game Effect

  • Repeated games with uncertainty

    • Bayes theorem:

      P(Head) = 0.5;

      p(Head|1Head) = 0.683;

      p(Head|1Tail) = 0.317;

      p(Head|2Head) = 0.888;

      p(Head|2Head+1Tail) = 0.565;

      ......


A new model of ipd
A new model of IPD Change and End Game Effect

  • Let ROW and COL denote the players in a N-stage IPD game.

where R, S, T, and P denote, Reward for mutual cooperation, Sucker’s payoff, Temptation to defect, and Punishment for mutual defection, and


A new model of ipd1
A new model of IPD Change and End Game Effect

  • We refer to COL’s belief (Row’s type) by

    that denote the probabilities that, if ROW is a TFT player, ROW chooses to cooperate at the 1,…,n stage. Similarly, we define ROW’s belief about COL’s type by that denotes the probabilities that COL chooses to cooperate at each stage if COL is a TFT player. {δi} and {θi} represent the beliefs of player COL and ROW respectively.


A new model of ipd2
A new model of IPD Change and End Game Effect

Two Assumptions:

  • A1:

  • A2: If either player chooses to defect at stage i, there will be


A new model of ipd3
A new model of IPD Change and End Game Effect


A new model of ipd4
A new model of IPD Change and End Game Effect


A new model of ipd5
A new model of IPD Change and End Game Effect


A new model of ipd6
A new model of IPD Change and End Game Effect

(D, D) is always Nash equilibrium at stage i; but it is not necessarily the only Nash equilibrium. When (2) is satisfied, both (C, C) and (D, D) are Nash equilibrium. (2) is a necessary and sufficient condition.


A new model of ipd7
A new model of IPD Change and End Game Effect

A sufficient condition for (C,C) to be Nash equilibrium:

This condition denotes a depth-one induction, that is, if both players are likely to cooperate at both the current stage and the next stage, it is worth each player choosing to cooperate at the current stage. For example, when T=5, R=3, P=1, and S=0, the condition for (C,C) to be Nash equilibrium is,


End game effect
End game effect Change and End Game Effect

  • ?

  • Unexpected hanging paradox.

    • A condemned prisoner;

    • Will be hanged on one weekday

      in the following week;

    • Will be a surprise;


End game effect1
End game effect Change and End Game Effect


End game effect2
End game effect Change and End Game Effect

P1 = 1

P2 = 1

P3 = 1

P4 = 1

P5 = 1


End game effect3
End game effect Change and End Game Effect


End game effect4
End game effect Change and End Game Effect

  • Process of belief change

P1 = 1/5

P2 = 1/5

P3 = 1/5

P4 = 1/5

P5 = 1/5

P1 = 0

P2 = 1/4

P3 = 1/4

P4 = 1/4

P5 = 1/4

P1 = 0

P2 = 0

P3 = 1/3

P4 = 1/3

P5 = 1/3

P1 = 0

...

P4 = 1/2

P5 = 1/2

P1 = 0

...

P5 = 1


End game effect5
End game effect Change and End Game Effect

  • Backward induction is not suitable for repeated games with uncertainty because uncertainty can be decreased during the process of games.

  • End game effect has limited influence on the players’ strategies since it cannot be backward inducted.


End game effect6
End game effect Change and End Game Effect

  • Why does the rate of cooperation in finite IPD experiments decrease as the game goes toward the end?


Conclusions
Conclusions Change and End Game Effect

  • 1. We develop a new model for finite IPD that takes into consideration belief change.

  • 2. Under the new model, the conditions of mutual cooperation are deduced. The result shows that, if the conditions are satisfied, both mutual cooperation and mutual defection are Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, mutual defection is the unique Nash equilibrium.


Conclusions1
Conclusions Change and End Game Effect

  • 3. This model could also deal with indefinite IPD and infinite IPD.

  • 4. The outcome of this model conforms to experimental results.


Conclusions2
Conclusions Change and End Game Effect

  • 5. Backward induction is not suitable for repeated games with uncertainty when the beliefs of the players are changeable.

  • 6. This model has the potential to apply to other repeated games of incomplete information.


Thank you. Change and End Game Effect


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