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The Role of Land-use Planning in Chemical Disaster Risk Management. International Conference Environmental Knowledge for Disaster Risk Management 10-11 May, 2011 New Delhi, India Prof. Dr. Chr. Jochum on behalf of GIZ (chr.jochum@t-online.de). Professional Profile Christian Jochum.
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The Role of Land-use Planning in Chemical Disaster Risk Management International Conference Environmental Knowledge for Disaster Risk Management 10-11 May, 2011 New Delhi, India Prof. Dr. Chr. Jochum on behalf of GIZ (chr.jochum@t-online.de)
Professional Profile Christian Jochum • Born 1943 in Frankfurt a.M./Germany • PhD in Chemistry, certified Safety Engineer • Honorary Professor (rtd.) at Frankfurt University • 28 years experience in large chemical/pharmaceutical company (Hoechst AG) • 1969 – 1979 Pharmaceutical research and pilot plant operations • 1979 – 1997 Safety department (Site and Corporate Safety Director and „Major Accident Officer“ since 1987) • EHS – and crisis management consulting for different types of businesses and administration since 1997 • Commission on Process Safety (formerly Major Hazard Commission) at the German Federal Minister for the Environment (Chairman since 1998) • European Process Safety Centre (Rugby/UK): Director of Centre since 2007 • GIZ/InWEnt Senior Advisor since 2009
Commission on ProcessSafety (Kommission fuer Anlagensicherheit [KAS]) • Mandated by the German Federal Immission Control Act • Advises German federal government as well as plant operators and state and local authorities on process safety • 32 members with different professional and educational background representing different stakeholders (“Round Table”) • Any group needs “allies” to win votes • Consensus intended, but majority decisions possible • About 55 guidelines issued on different topics, e.g. • Land Use Planning (Safety distances) • Risk evaluation and perception • Emergency Planning • Industrial parks • Provisions against terrorist attacks on chemical plants • All publications of the Commission are available (partly in English) at • www.kas-bmu.de
EPSC (European Process Safety Centre) www.epsc.org • Industry funded association of major chemical companies in Europe. • Approx. 40 contributing enterprises • Dedicated to improving best practice in Chemical Process Safety • Working groups on e.g. • Safety Critical Systems (inc. IEC 61511) • Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) • Auditing • Process Safety Incident and KPI reporting • Process Safety Competence • Senior Management Commitment • Work in conjunction with European Commission on implementation and upgrading Seveso 2 Directive • Cooperation with CEFIC (European Chemical Industry Council) and U.S. Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)
“Onion skin model” (Off-site Emergency Plan)
Land-use Planning as part of Chemical Disaster Risk Management
Obligationsaccordingto Art. 12 ofthe EU Seveso II Directive Member States are required • to control – the siting of new establishments, – modifications to existing establishments, – new developments such as transport links, locations frequented by the public and residential areas in the vicinity of existing establishments • to ensure that their land-use and / or other relevant policies and the procedures for implementing those policies take account of the need, in the long term, to maintain appropriate distances between Seveso establishments and certain sensitive land uses (e.g. residential areas, buildings and areas of public use)
Guidanceofthe German Commission on ProcessSafety (KAS) • To facilitate implementation of Seveso II art. 12 the KAS has issued a guidance. It covers: • (Planning and) Siting of new establishments (“Greenfield Planning”) • Modifications to existing establishments • New developments in the vicinity of existing establishments • The guidance (originally from 2005) has been updated in 2011 as “KAS-18” (in German). A short version of the first issue “SFK/TAA-GS-1” is available in English, too. A translation of an updated short version is underway. All publications are available at at www.kas-bmu.de
Planningwithoutdetailedknowledge (“Greenfield Planning”) • No detailed knowledge of e.g. • kind of later industrial use • kind of technical installations • kind and quantity of dangerous substances to be handled • safety measures by the operator • Designation of building zones has to be future-orientated in order to allow for further development of both industrial and residential facilities. • Therefore, separation distances recommended for planning without detailed knowledge are usually greater than separation distances for the specific siting of an establishment, where detailed knowledge is available.
Planningwithdetailedknowledge New development GeplantesWR
Planningwithdetailedknowledge • Designation of sensitive areas in the vicinity of an existing establishment ⇨ most frequent planning case • Expansion of an existing establishment in the vicinity of sensitive areas • No problem, if distance between expansion area / existing establishment and sensitive area reaches or exceeds the recommended separation distance • If distance between expansion area / existing establishment and sensitive area is smaller than the recommended separation distance: • individual case study necessary to determine which distance is appropriate
Planningwithdetailedknowledge: Individual casestudy • General recommendations are made for the scenarios to be considered in a case study, e.g.: • total loss of containment unlikely • leak area not less than 80 mm2(leak diameter: 10 mm) • medium dispersion conditions. These recommendations cannot replace the consideration of the particular situation given. • Possible results of an individual case study: • intended expansion / designation cannot be realized to the extent desired • certain uses will not be possible / envisaged use has to be reconsidered • appropriate distance can be smaller than the recommended separation distances
Inapplicabilityoftheguidance • Licensing procedures • application for new establishments within existing spatial planning • very rare cases in Germany • modifications within an existing establishment vast majority of cases B. Assessment of historically grown situations C. External emergency planning
Assessment of historically grown “mixed” situations • Legally • Guidance (and its separation distances) is not applicable • Competent authority has to make case by case decisions whether or not the operator meets his obligations according to the Federal Immission Control Act and / or any other relevant legal provisions. • In case of inacceptable risks the competent authority has to issue subsequent orders (up to closure of facility) • “Real Life” • Guidance with its separation distances plays more and more a prominent role in public discussions • Courts take the guidance into account as “recognised source”
External (off-site) emergencyplanning • Separation distances recommended for planning without detailed knowledge are based on “credible worst-case” scenarios • Off-site emergency planning has to be based on more serious scenarios (“ultimate worst-case”) • off-site emergency plan has to cover a larger zone than land-use planning • However, restricted land-use for areas which are possibly at risk will make emergency response easier and more effective • Sensitive developments (e.g. residential areas) endorsed by land-use planning have to be included in off-site emergency planning
Zoning around Industrial Sites (Off-site Emergency Plan)
ImplementationoftheGuidance on Land-usePlanning • Absence of a legally binding land-use plan is a frequent case in heavily built-up urban areas which have developed over decades • High potential for conflicts regarding safety and separation distances between dangerous industrial establishments and sensitive areas • Increasing willingness of operators of establishments to file objections against building permissions issued for development projects in their immediate vicinity. • Remediation of existing “mixed” situations very seldom up to now: • Technical improvements at a filling station for toxic gases • Relocation of a chemical plant near Frankfurt airport • Plans for state funded relocation in the Netherlands • An early information exchange between “Seveso-” and land-use planning authorities as well operators of establishments is necessary to avoid incompatible developments
Thank you very much for your attention I have to thank my colleagues W. Gierke and H. Marder for some of the slides
Planningandsitingofnewestablishments • Planning usually starts with the drawing up of a legally binding land-use plan with designated building zones by the responsible municipal building authority. • Immission control authorities have to be consulted as “representatives of public interest“. • The siting of a completely new establishment, where dangerous substances are to be handled in greater amounts, is a rare case in Germany; much more frequent are modifications to existing establishments.
Whatistherightdistance? ? Sensitive area Industrial site „AppropriateDistance“
Methodologyforthedevelopmentof a guidance 1. Selection of representative industrial activities according to Annex I of the EU IPPC Directive 2. Identification of representative dangerous substances involved in the selected industrial activities 3. Calculation of standardized accident szenarios based on agreed-upon conventions 4. Comparison of calculated szenarios with data of past accidents 5. Allocation of dangerous substances to categories of separation distances
Conventionsforcalculations • Pipe rupture as a representative szenario (Total loss of containment is not considered) • Calculation of corresponding mass flow (kg/sec) for varied source terms (pipe diameter: 10-50 mm, leak area: 80-1963 mm2) • Duration of substance release: 10 min • Dispersion modell: VDI Guideline 3783, medium dispersion conditions (plain ground, 20° C, wind speed: 3 m/sec) • Calculations for 3 endpoints: – ERPG 2 (toxicological effects) – 1.6 KW/m2 (thermal radiation) – 0.1 bar (overpressure)
Comparisonofcalculatedszenarioswithdatafrompastaccidents • Analysis of major accidents reported under German and EU law between 1980 and 2001 concerning the amount of released substances and the size of leaks in pipes or containers For most of the representative substances a release equivalent to a leak of a diameter of 25 mm (leak area: 490 mm2) seemed to match best with known accident history • Allocation of 18 leading substances to 4 classes of separation distances • Recommendations for planning without and with detailed knowledge
Licensing procedures • A licence has to be granted if obligations under the Federal Immission Control Act are complied with. • Operators‘ obligations are, among others, • to avoid harmful effects on the environment or any other hazards to the general public and the neighbourhood, • to take precautions to prevent any harmful effects on the environment or any other hazards, in particular by such measures as are appropriate according to the state-of-the-art of technology / best available techniques. • Due to the detailed knowledge of the installation to be sited, separation distances determined in a licensing procedure may be (considerably) smaller than the ones recommended for planning without detailed knowledge.
