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Western Front, Part I:

Western Front, Part I:. Fall of France 1940. I. Phony War ( Sitzkrieg ), September 1939–May 10, 1940. I. Phony War ( Sitzkrieg ), September 1939–May 10, 1940. A. Vulnerability of Germany to attack from the West during Polish campaign 1. Maginot Line 2. Dyle Plan. Maginot Line.

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Western Front, Part I:

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  1. Western Front, Part I: Fall of France 1940

  2. I. Phony War (Sitzkrieg), September 1939–May 10, 1940

  3. I. Phony War (Sitzkrieg), September 1939–May 10, 1940 • A. Vulnerability of Germany to attack from the West during Polish campaign • 1. Maginot Line • 2. Dyle Plan

  4. Maginot Line

  5. Maginot Line – Block 14 at Ouvrage du Hochwald

  6. I. Phony War (Sitzkrieg), September 1939–May 10, 1940 • B. Hitler wanted to invade Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (Fall Gelb) • 1. rebuff of peace offer October 6 • 2. provisional date for invasion November 12 (cancelled November 7) • 3. new provisional date for invasion January 17 • a. liaison officer captured in Belgium with plans January 10 • b. old plan replaced by Manstein plan (Sichelschnitt instead of Schlieffen) • 4. new date for invasion May 10

  7. II. Fall of Norway – invaded April 9, 1940

  8. III. Commanders and Their Strategies • A. French: • 1. Maurice Gamelin (1872-1958) • – commanded 1933 – May 18, 1940 • 2. Maxime Weygand (1867-1965) • – commanded May 18 – June 22, 1940

  9. Maurice Gamelin (1872-1958)

  10. Maxime Weygand (1867-1965)

  11. III. Commanders and Their Strategies • B. German: Franz Ritter Halder (1884–1972) – head of Army General Staff 1938–1942 • 1. Army Group A: Fedor von Bock (1881–1945) “Der Sterber” • 2. Army Group B: Gerd von Rundstedt (1875–1953) • 3. Army Group C: Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb (1876–1956)

  12. Franz Ritter Halder (1884–1972)

  13. Fedor von Bock (1881–1945)

  14. Gerd von Rundstedt (1875–1953)

  15. Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb (1876–1956)

  16. All behind you, Winston

  17. IV. Battle of France May 10, 1940–June 22, 1940 • E. Great Britain • 1. Churchill replaces Chamberlain May 10, 1940 • 2. British Expeditionary Force (BEF)

  18. Lesson of the debacle? • “Some of the lessons that can be learned from what went wrong from the British point of view are as relevant today as they were then. First and Foremost, the campaign showed that politicians must never, even in peacetime, deprive their armed forces of the equipment they need. Complacently assuming that the equipment can be manufactured once war is declared is demonstrably unwise.” • −Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univeristy Press, 2006), xiv.

  19. IV. Battle of France May 10, 1940 – June 22, 1940 • A. Disposition of Forces • German Allies (France and Great Britain) • 2 million troops 4 million troops • 136 divisions 174 divisions • 2439 tanks 2689 tanks • 3200 aircraft 2400 aircraft

  20. Matilda Tank

  21. Panzer I German tank (Calais, May 1940)

  22. Panzer II German tank (May 1940 in France)

  23. IV. Battle of France May 10, 1940–June 22, 1940 • B.Belgium – Fort at Eben Emael • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iD_rX71O78I • C. The Netherlands – Bombing of Rotterdam • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Foiim649Wh0 (25:50)

  24. German Paratroopers

  25. Rotterdam Blaak Railway Station and Laurenskerk

  26. Bombing of Rotterdam • Rotterdam – “20,000” (war-time propaganda – as high as 25,000 to 30,000) • – 814 Dutch civilians (collateral damage) • – General Kurt Student had ordered carpet bombing • – FDR, Sept. 1939, had asked a promise that belligerents would not attack civilian targets • – all belligerents complied • – 5/13 downtown Rotterdam bombed / call back not received in time • – 5/15 British allow RAF to attack oil refineries and other civilian industrial targets in the Ruhr • – 1st German bomber attacks on England / night of June 5/6, 1940

  27. IV. Battle of France May 10, 1940–June 22, 1940 • D. Attitude of the French and Expectations of German Generals • 1. Heinz Guderian (1888–1954) Achtung—Panzer! (1937) • a. acknowledged influence of B. H. Liddell Hart • b. Panzer divisions exceeded expectations • 2. Erik von Manstein (1887–1973) – placed in charge of an infantry battalion • 3. Erwin Rommel (1891–1944) – commanded 7th Panzer Division • 4. Charles De Gaulle (1890–1970) – counterattacked with tanks • 5. French Defeatism

  28. Heinz Guderian (1888–1954)

  29. Erik von Manstein (1887–1973)

  30. Erwin Rommel (1891–1944)

  31. Charles De Gaulle (1890–1970)

  32. 5. French Defeatism

  33. ROTT

  34. Mrs Miniver (1942) • Director: William Wyler • Title character derived from book Mrs Miniver by Jan Struther • Screenplay: George Froeschel, James Hilton, Claudine West, Arthur Wimperis • Nominated for 12 Academy Awards / Won 6 • 1. Best Actress: Greer Garson • 2. Best Supporting Actress: Teresa Wright • 3. Best Cinematography (Black and White): Joseph Ruttenberg • 4. Best Director: William Wyler • 5. Best Picture: 1943 • 6. Best Writing, Screenplay

  35. Mrs Miniver (1942) • “Ramsgate” – eastern coast of Kent / ferry to Dunkirk • – Many boat owners did not skipper their own boats over • – commandeered and sailed by navy personnel

  36. IV. Battle of France May 10, 1940–June 22, 1940 • F. Evacuation of Dunkirk – May 27–June 4 • – trapped: 630,000 total (250,000 British; 380,000 French) • – evacuated: 335,000 total (215,000 British; 125,000 French)

  37. Why did the German army not destroy the BEF and French soldiers at Dunkirk? • “It would almost certainly have ended with the capture of most of the BEF had not Hitler and his generals reined in their panzer divisions at least three times between 20 and 30 May 1940.” • −Montfiore, Dunkirk, xiv.

  38. Why did the German army not destroy the BEF and French soldiers at Dunkirk? • “The most convincing evidence indicates that Hitler was indeed trying to block the evacuation, but wasn’t willing to risk his armor to dot it. The British looked finished anyhow…. He needed the armor for the next phase of the campaign, the drive across the Somme and into the heart of France…. The decision was all the easier when Herman Göring announced that his Luftwaffe could handle Dunkirk alone…. Still another miracle was provided by the Luftwaffe itself…. The German planes rarely strafed the crowded beaches; they never used fragmentation bombs; they never attacked tempting targets like Dover of Ramsgate.” • −Walter Lord, The Miracle of Dunkirk (New York: Viking, 1982), 273.

  39. Why did the German army not destroy the BEF and French soldiers at Dunkirk? • “Guderian stated that the order came down to him from Kleist with the words: ‘Dunkirk is to be left to the Luftwaffe….’ At the same time there is evidence that even the Luftwaffe was not used as fully or as vigorously as it could have been − and some of the air chiefs say that Hitler put the brake on again here. All this caused the higher circles to suspect a political motive behind Hitler’s military reasons…. He [Blumentritt] felt that the ‘halt’ … was part of a political scheme to make peace easier to reach. If the BEF had been captured at Dunkirk, the British might have felt that their honour had suffered a stain which they must wipe out. By letting it escape Hitler hoped to conciliate them.” • −B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, 89−90.

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