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Nuclear Safety Culture: The Way of Thinking

This paper discusses the process and importance of practicing nuclear safety culture at China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Corporation (CGNPC). It highlights the four elements for safe operation and emphasizes the need for a common thinking pattern shared by all staff members.

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Nuclear Safety Culture: The Way of Thinking

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  1. Preset to the International Conference on Fifty Years of Nuclear Power– the Next Fifty Years Moscow--Obninsk, 27 June – 2 July 04Nuclear Safety Culture -- The Way of Thinking PU, Jilong China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Co.Ltd Shenzhen, China, 518031 2004-07

  2. Nuclear Safety Culture -- The Way of Thinking 1 Introduction 2 The process of practicing nuclear safety culture at GNPS 3 Cognition: Whose culture is safety culture? 4 Correct pattern of thinking constitutes the most important but most difficult part associated with the culture construction 5 Conclusion: Experiences gained associated with the promotion of the construction of safety culture on CGNPC

  3. Nuclear Safety Culture -- The Way of Thinking 1 Introduction China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Corporation, Ltd. (CGNPC) was established in May 1994 as a large independent power generation corporation in mainland China. • Total asset: 53618 MRMB ( 6460MUSD) • Equity: 15546MRMB ( 1873MUSD) • Nuclear power units: 2x2, PWR in operation 2-4 PWR in planning

  4. Daya Bay NPS (GNPS) * Rated Output: 2×900 MWe • Annual Electricity Output: • 10—12.6 billion kWh * Reactor: Model: M310 PWR Thermal power: 2×2905MW Operating Pressure: 15.5Mpa Coolant Temperature: Vessel Inlet 292.4℃ Vessel Outlet 327.6℃ Effective Coolant Flowrate: 68230 m3/h

  5. Ling Ao NPS (LNPS) * Rated Output: 2×900 MWe • Annual Electricity Output: 10—12.6 billion kWh * Reactor: Model: M310 PWR Thermal power: 2×2905MW Operating Pressure: 15.5Mpa Coolant Temperature: Vessel Inlet 292.4℃ Vessel Outlet 327.6℃ Effective Coolant Flowrate: 68230 m3/h

  6. GNPS Off-take and Capability Factor

  7. GNPS WANO Indicators

  8. Milestones of LNPS Unit1 Milestones of U1 Planned Achieved Signing Main Equipment Supply Contracts Oct. 1995 Oct. 25, 1995 Effectiveness Main Equipment Supply Contracts Jan. 1996 Jan. 15, 1996 Project Commencement July 1996 July 15, 1996 First Concrete Pouring May 1997 May 15, 1997 Nuclear Island Erection Jan. 1999 Jan. 26, 1999 Conventional Island Erection Apr. 1999 Apr. 15, 1999 Initial Fuel Loading Dec. 2001 Dec. 8, 2001 Initial Criticality Feb. 2002 Feb. 4, 2002 Grid Connection Apr. 2002 Feb. 26, 2002 End of Performance Test July 2002 May 12, 2002 Commercial Operation July 2002 May 28, 2002

  9. Milestones of LNPS Unit2 Milestones of U2 Planned Achieved Signing Main Equipment Supply Contracts Oct. 1995 Oct. 25, 1995 Effectiveness Main Equipment Supply Contracts Jan. 1996 Jan.15, 1996 Project Commencement July 1996 July 15, 1996 First Concrete Pouring Jan. 1998 Nov. 28, 1997 Nuclear Island Erection Sep. 1999 Sep. 20, 1999 Conventional Island Erection Dec. 1999 Dec. 15, 1999 Initial Fuel Loading Aug. 2002 July 15, 2002 Initial Criticality Oct. 2002 Aug. 27, 2002 Grid Connection Dec. 2002 Sep. 14, 2002 End of Performance Test Mar. 2003 Nov. 20. 2002 Commercial Operation Mar. 2003 JAN. 10. 2002

  10. Achievement of LNPS Excellent Record of LNPS maintaining continuous safe operations without unplanned reactor or turbine shutdown from initial fuel loading up to the end of its initial fuel cycle.

  11. Nuclear Safety Culture -- The Way of Thinking • Among the numbers of elements contributed to the achievements of CGNPC to date, primarily attributable is to unrelenting promotion and implementation of the nuclear safety culture requirements.

  12. No. 75-INSAG-4: • Thus, we need “all pervading safety thinking”.

  13. Nuclear Safety Culture -- The Way of Thinking Four elements for safe operation • Safety management structure: supporting continuous improvement ; • Hard environment: equipment management; • Cultural environment:staff and team; • Technical Innovation: adopt proven technology.

  14. Nuclear Safety Culture -- The Way of Thinking • law + public morals = good social orders • Provisions + code of behavior = excellent performances Safety culture boils down to rigid regulations supplemented by good individual behavior. Safety culture is basically a pattern of behavior embedded in the organization manifested by a common thinking pattern shared by all the staff of the organization.

  15. Nuclear Safety Culture -- The Way of Thinking • No. 75-INSAG-4 highlights: • questioning attitude • rigorous and prudent approach • communication. • in light of CGNPC circumstances and Chinese specific conditions, we need identifying complementary requirements : • a keen sense of responsibility • correct comprehension and perception • good skills • healthy psyche. • These features are all-important and self-explanatory, although they are absolutely necessary to the Chinese.

  16. 2. The Process of Practicing Nuclear Safety Culture at GNPS Cultivation of safety culture at CGNPC started from the learning altitude. In 1991-1992, a campaign of presentations on INSAG-4. Mar. 1992 - June 1993, study the Plant Safety and Quality Manual. From June 1993, a live safety culture indoctrination using live examples to strengthen event analysis and experience feedback mechanisms from January 1995, improve and enhance experience feedback systems and event analysis methodologies In January 1996, a nuclear safety culture self-evaluation campaign was conducted. from 2000, continuous improvement implemented under the guidance of the corporate business plan and the performance indicators system.

  17. 2. The Process of Practicing Nuclear Safety Culture at GNPS To answer the doubt that “safety culture was imported culture” and whether it could play any constructive role in China, special comparison made between safety culture and Chinese traditional culture. The results indicate that safety culture is the crystallization of the advanced culture of the entire mankind including the advanced elements of Chinese culture.

  18. 2. The Process of Practicing Nuclear Safety Culture at GNPS • In actual work, apart from learning and indoctrination, emphasis has been placed on strengthening experience feedback with the results fed back to the training activities. Attention was also paid to internal and external exchanges.

  19. 2. The Process of Practicing Nuclear Safety Culture at GNPS • Intensive efforts were kept up to implement safety culture construction at the grassroots level. • Emphasis was placed by the requirements in Chinese taste : • Three “Honests” • being honest, • behaving honestly • performing honest deeds • Double R, Double S • strict requirements • rigorous organizations • rigid work attitudes • strict discipline

  20. 2. The Process of Practicing Nuclear Safety Culture at GNPS • enforcement of STAR system with continuing emphasis placed on enhancing transparency. • A rigid safety culture construction plan was defined with periodic monitoring imposed.

  21. 3.Cognition: Whose Culture is Safety Culture? • Safety culture is the leader’s culture. • To build a good safety culture environment in a nuclear power enterprise, the top leaders must serve as living examples and role models for the staff to follow. • A fine example is the best teacher.

  22. 3.Cognition: Whose Culture is Safety Culture:Good Samples • In 1995, during its first refueling outage, the drop time of 7 out of a total of 53 clusters of control rods was found to exceed the acceptance criterion. Safety analysis demonstrated that such event would not adversely affect the nuclear safety in any way. • At a time when GNPS was facing Herculean operational risks, many people held the view that GNPS could continue to operate. • Management at the time resolved that decisions should never be taken on the basis of mere speculation. • As a result, decision was taken to shut down the unit for thorough checking and repairs. • Results of such repairs indicate that this has been an unexpected event arising from the adoption of “unproven improvement”.

  23. 3.Cognition: Whose Culture is Safety Culture:Good Samples • The single biggest benefit arising from the handling of the above event is the demonstration of the high sense of safety awareness and role model. The management has set a defining example of how to perceive problems from a correct safety perspective.

  24. 4 Correct pattern of thinking • Correct pattern of thinking constitutes the most important but most difficult part associated with the culture construction • Safety Culture requires that proper implementation of the regulations; codes and individual work attitudes on the part of the individuals translate it into the thinking pattern of each and every staff member.

  25. 4 Correct pattern of thinking • Regarding culture, we must be highly prudent and cautious. • It is not easy to form habits. When we face major operational pressures, when our performance indicators in certain areas show tendencies of lagging behind, can we still keep calm and impunity? When we get excellent results of operation, Do we still desire to identify our own drawbacks and areas requiring improvements?

  26. 4 Correct pattern of thinking • What we’ve seen from good performance in 2003? • The case study demonstrates: 1 Even the performance are excellent, there are still some room to improve; 2 The gap between requirements and achievements always exists ,we could never be self-satisfied.

  27. 次数 Numbers of Scram per 7000 hour Critical(GNPS &LNPS)

  28. Unavailability of Safety Systems

  29. 4 Correct pattern of thinking Problem: • the number of automatic reactor shutdowns over 7000 hours has been on the increase over the past 3 years following the fine records set in 1998 and 1999. • there is still substantial room for improvement in respect of controls over sensitive equipment identification and human error prevention. • Equipment management • Top ten technical issues • Safety culture:effectiveness of root cause analysis and experience feedback

  30. Key Points About Understanding of Safety Culture • Safety culture is closely bound up with national and corporate cultures. • Safety is the result of collective actions and is dependent upon efforts of each and every member. • Safety problems arise from extremely trivial and minor aspects that could be easily neglected by the staff. • Human inadequacies should be addressed from organizational and procedural standpoints.

  31. Key Points About Understanding of Safety Culture • No consequence does not mean absence of importance. • Eyes should look inwards instead of outwards • Corrective actions must start with the leadership with the finger pointed upwards instead of downwards. • Safety management structure must be a fully integrated dynamic system

  32. Key Points About Understanding of Safety Culture Do dialectically understand and Deal with the relevant categories: • Safety vs. Security • Leader’s Demo vs. Staff Participation • Performance Results vs. Process Monitoring • Short-term Target vs. Long-term Strategy • Independence vs. Effectiveness of the Supervision • Transparency vs. Accountability/Penalty

  33. 5.CONCLUSION • Experiences gained associated with the promotion of the construction of safety culture on CGNPC • Safety culture is the common wealth of mankind. However, actual local conditions should be taken into account with efforts concentrated in the main direction. • The basic requirements of safety culture are complementary to the modern enterprise system. • Insofar as standards or criteria are not lowered, safety culture slogans should be nationalized and localized. • Construction of safety culture must be pinned down to individual working groups at the grassroots level. • Specific efforts must be made to address transparency associated with events and experience feedback.

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