Key Findings

1. Key Findings EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS Niels Dabelstein, 13 May 2008

2. A joint evaluation • Partner countries and Development Partners develop evaluation framework jointly • Country level evaluations led by partner countries and managed in-country • Partner countries participate in evaluation of development Partners • Joint Reference Group and overall management

3. Country level evaluations • the utility of the Paris Declaration itself as a tool for aid effectiveness; • the change of development partners behaviour in terms of alignment of their systems and procedures to implement the PD commitments; • the change of country behaviour, with ownership as the key entry-point; Bangladesh ,Bolivia, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Viet Nam

4. Development Partners HQ level evaluations • Level of leadership and commitment as expressed in policies and strategies; • Development of capacities as expressed in guidelines, procedures, staff training, resources and delegation of authority (to field level); • Conducive incentive systems: RBM, HRD. AsDB, Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, UK, UNDP/UNEG

5. Key Findings • A political agenda for action, not just technical • Differing expectations and uses of the declaration • Lack of flexibility to deal with different contexts • The role and limits of the monitoring indicators • Synergies and tensions between commitments • Transition and transaction costs

6. A political agenda for action, not just technical • In both partner and donor countries where the political understanding and support are strongest, so are the levels of commitment, capacity and incentives for implementation on all fronts. • Conversely, where the Declaration remains the enclave of small circles of officials, working on what are treated as technical issues, the basis for breaking through the obstacles and resolving real political difficulties is much weaker.

7. Differing expectations and uses of the declaration • Many country and donor partners are evidently struggling to get a firm grasp on the appropriate level of direction to expect from the Declaration. Views of the Declaration vary from it being a “statement of intent” all the way to it being a set of “non-negotiable decrees.” • The widespread tendency to focus intently on indicator targets feeds the latter view, and concerns over managing tensions and possible conflicts between commitments are still hampering progress by some donors and partner countries.

8. Dealing with different contexts • It is of critical importance to adapt the Declaration to different contexts, while maintaining its incentives for the most important collective and collaborative improvements. • In some partner countries this challenge is apparently being managed with some success, mainly through clear and open country leadership with support from a critical mass of development partners.

9. The role and limits of the monitoring indicators • The Monitoring Survey has had one of its presumed intended effects: to keep wide attention focused on concrete measures of implementation to improve aid effectiveness • However, misunderstanding of the role of the Survey has had serious unintended effects in narrowing the focus of attention, debate, and action to a partial group of measures. Most of these measures are not necessarily the most clear, important or appropriate priorities.

10. Transition and transaction costs • Donors do have the basic capacity to move forward, but the transaction costs and transition pains are greater than anticipated (particularly in the field). This may constrain engagement, at least during a transitional period or perhaps even in the longer term. • Donors must provide and adjust for the transitional and new strains and transaction costs being reported in their own programs , and when requested strengthen support to partner countries to make their own adjustment. Modify the expectations and pace of change if necessary.

11. Ownership • The principle of ownership has gained much greater prominence since 2005 • National ownership is strong, but also narrow • Donors’ own political and administrative systems set differing limits on their actual behaviour

12. Mutual Accountability • Not just between Countries and Donors but also within countries. • The obstacles limiting progress are political in nature. Political leaders need to re-engage to get it on track. • Limited progress reported – but: • More pieces of the solution are actually at hand than is generally assumed:

13. Mechanisms for Mutual Assessment of Progress • Annual consultations around major national strategies: development strategies; programs of action; poverty reduction strategies (including for example the Bangladesh accountability forum); • Dedicated comprehensive mutual review mechanisms such as the Independent Monitoring Team in Vietnam, a wide-ranging mechanism in the Philippines, or the task force to monitor the Harmonization Action Plan in Bangladesh; • Consultative Groups, Round Tables or their equivalents where they exist; • Consultations on Joint Assistance Strategies where these exist; • Joint reviews of sector strategies and sector or other major funding programs; and • “Cluster forums”

14. Civil Society • In Partner countries: a continuing challenge in achieving sufficient engagement of the broader society, and even that of national line ministries and sub-national levels of government. • Donors cited reservations among their own development NGOs who are worried about the apparently increased reliance on government-to-government relationships and a narrowing scope for civil society.