Department of Homeland Security (DHS) GPS Interference Detection and Mitigation (IDM)

1. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) GPS Interference Detection and Mitigation (IDM) John Merrill DHS GIS Program Manager Office of Applied Technology Geospatial Management Office

2. Topics of Discussion • DHS IDM Mandates • Threats to Critical Infrastructure (CI)/Key Resources (KR) Relying on GPS • Threat Assessment & Operations Plan • Incident Response • Mitigation & Detection • Central Data Repository • PNT Interference System Capability

3. DHS IDM Mandates • Coordinate domestic capabilities to identify, analyze, locate, attribute, & mitigate sources of interference to the GPS & its augmentations. • Develop & maintain capabilities, procedures & techniques, & routinely exercise civil contingency responses to ensure continuity of operations in the event that access to GPS signal is disrupted or denied. • Collect, analyze, store, & disseminate interference reports from all sources to enable appropriate investigation, notification & enforcement action.

4. Extent of GPS Dependencies Stock Exchanges ATM Networks Energy Plants Substations Internet Banking Power Grids Banks/ Nodes GPS Time GPS Time GPS Supporting Power Grid Systems GPS Supporting Banking Operations GPS GPS Time & Position GPS Time & Position Switching Towers & Signals Rail Yards Wireless Internet C2 Centers Comms Networks Access GIS / Map Relay Position To 911 Dispatch Air Traffic Control Ship Routing GPS Supporting Transportation Systems GPS Supporting Communications Systems

5. Preparedness Activities • DOT-DOD Information Dissemination & Coordination Team (IDCT) sponsored a Command Post Exercise on February 19, 2009 to fulfill: • Space-Based PNT Policy goals • DHS Interference Detection and Mitigation (IDM) Plan objectives • National Security Council – Chartered Purposeful Interference Response Team (PIRT) requirements • Rehearse newly revised GPSOC, NOCC, NAVCEN procedures

6. Preparedness ActivitiesCommand Post Exercise (CPX) • Simulated purposeful scenarios • Illuminated need for • Interagency checklist with clear lead and supporting authorities and incident ranking criteria • Multi-agency collaborative environment for shared situational awareness • Further exercises w/greater complexity, scope, and interaction with PIRT • Continue CPX simulations until response is second nature

7. Threat Assessment & Operations Plan (OPlan) • Preliminary Study of CI/KR Vulnerabilities • Report with Recommendations: • Joint Civil & Defense Interagency Stakeholders Dependency on GPS • Impact to CI/KR • Technical Tools to Mitigate Vulnerability Gaps • Demonstration/test to ID Vulnerabilities and Measure Effective Mitigation Techniques • Operations Plan

8. Central Data Repository Requirements(Policy Derived Qualitative) • Central Interference Report (IR) database focal point of all PNT interference • Encompass process and functions for detection validation, investigation, assessment, corroboration of IR • Automated dissemination of data and reduce IR information distribution delays for decision support • Mechanisms for cataloging PNT applications and associated vulnerabilities to interference • Employ information assurance components and processes to protect database • Assure the integrity of IR and sensors

9. Central Data Repository Requirements(Quantitative Goals & Objectives) • User Access Threshold – 70 concurrent user access • User Access Sign-on – 475 read access • 150 PNT incident reports (IR) per month (1800 annually) • Database support 500,000 unique IR entries • Responses to system queries less than 8 seconds • New & updated IRs posted immediately visible, available and accessible • System availability of 99.9% • Automatic update to subscribers – Initially: • Navigation Center, FAA Operations Center, GPS Operations Center.

10. Central Data Repository • Baseline Requirements - Cost control, use existing architecture • FAA Spectrum Engineering Tracking System (SETS) • Integrated Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) • Geospatial enabling/visualization tool • Geographic Information System interface that integrates multiple geospatial data sources from a centralized geospatial data warehouse • Based on the Environmental Systems Research Institute’s (ESIR) suite of products; ability to map, analyze, and view information from a mission specific application which assembles and compares data from various sources.

11. Central Data Repository • Federal Aviation Administration’s SETS core 10 data fields (mandatory entries): • SETS ID # {Record URL} • DATE START - DD/MM/YYYY • DATE STOP - DD/MM/YYYY • EVENT TIME START - #### UTC • EVENT TIME STOP - #### UTC • LATITUDE - +##.####### Degrees • LONGITUDE - +###.####### Degrees • USER EQUIPMENT TYPE • FREQUENCY (L1, L2, L5… etc.) - ####.#### • REMARKS & OTHER RELEVENT INFORMATION

12. Central Data Repository • Federal Aviation Administration’s SETS four additional data fields (optional entries): • Event Status • Source • Joint Spectrum Interference Report (JSIR) DTG • Altitude • Future data field: US National Grid • The following slides show the existing FAA’s SETS web pages which will be changed to a DHS PNTIP “look & feel”

13. Address will change to: http://pnt.dhs.gov/login/EVENT_entryPNTIP.asp This is the Intranet available to authenticated users Equip – FAA Equipment types which may be experiencing the interference. Eventually populate with PNT equipment

14. This is currently the FAA Maintenance Management System Mainframe event code category. In the GPS SETS module is replaced by Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) date time group .

15. PNTIP

16. PNT Interference System Capability • Collaboration of Federal Agencies • Utilize Existing Infrastructure for Mitigation of PNT Interference • CORS, NDGPS, Rescue-21 • Excess of 25,000 available • Negotiating with TELCOM Industry • Leverage Current Technology

17. Patriot WatchOverlook Systems Technologies, Inc. • System-of-Systems approach to provide real-time monitoring (preparedness), location & notification (response) of GPS interference • Designed with government & commercial hardware • Persistent monitoring yields situational awareness • Timely response to anomalies • Sensor placement based on PNT critical infrastructure & resources • Remains operational when GPS systems is “stressed”

18. Patriot ShieldOverlook Systems Technologies, Inc. • System-of-Systems designed to deny the nefarious use of PNT signals within the United States • Deployable & fixed assets part of national solution • Intelligence community part of systems activation • CONOPS requires coordinated operational threat response • Modeling, simulation, & testing critical to systems development • Will leverage existing Electronic Attack & Testing Coordination protocols for notification & response

19. FAA DoD DHS Local Law DOT FCC National Level System Architecture Homeland Special Signal Detection & Geo-location Multiple DF Sensor Network - Low Data Message Handling Requirements Sensor Data Detection Descriptor Word (Position, Amp, Freq, Time and LOB Data) Regional Sensor Network State & Local Fusion Centers (notional) Regional Alarm Summary Data National Alarm Summary Central Data Repository

22. Bloomberg ABC UN FOX

23. Summary • Central Data Repository Funded; TRIAD & other federal agencies by December 2009 • Vulnerability Assessment & OPLAN Early 2009/2010 • National Level Sensor Capability 3 – 6 Years

24. Partnerships • USAF Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program • Federal Aviation Administration • National PNT Coordination Office • Overlook Systems Technologies, Inc. • NAVSYS Corporation • L3 Communications • Integrity Applications, Inc. • Department of Homeland Security • U. S. Coast Guard • National Geospatial Intelligence Agency • National Security Agency • Naval Surface Warfare Center – Dahlgren, VA • USAF GPS Wing • Joint Navigation Warfare Center

25. DHS Geospatial Management Office Mr. John Merrill John.Merrill@dhs.gov 202-447-3731